University of Massachusetts Amherst

ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst
Doctoral Dissertations

Dissertations and Theses

August 2015

Bringing the Household Back in: Family Wage Gaps and the
Intersection of Gender, Race, and Class in the Household Context.
Melissa J. Hodges
University of Massachusetts Amherst

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2
Part of the Inequality and Stratification Commons

Recommended Citation
Hodges, Melissa J., "Bringing the Household Back in: Family Wage Gaps and the Intersection of Gender,
Race, and Class in the Household Context." (2015). Doctoral Dissertations. 368.
https://doi.org/10.7275/6889164.0 https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_2/368

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Dissertations and Theses at
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@library.umass.edu.

BRINGING THE HOUSEHOLD BACK IN: FAMILY WAGE GAPS AND THE
INTERSECTION OF GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS IN THE HOUSEHOLD
CONTEXT

A Dissertation Presented
By
Melissa J. Hodges

Submitted to the Graduate School of the
University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
May 2015
Department of Sociology

© Copyright by Melissa J. Hodges 2015
All Rights Reserved

BRINGING THE HOUSEHOLD BACK IN: FAMILY WAGE GAPS AND THE
INTERSECTION OF GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS IN THE HOUSEHOLD
CONTEXT

A Dissertation Presented
By
MELISSA J. HODGES

Approved as to style and content by:
_________________________________________________
Michelle Budig, Chair
_________________________________________________
Naomi Gerstel, Member
_________________________________________________
Aline Sayer, Member

_____________________________________________
Janice Irvine, Department Head
Sociology Department

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would never have been able to complete my dissertation without the guidance and
support from several individuals. First and foremost, I would like to express my deepest
gratitude to my Advisor and committee chair, Michelle Budig. It was an honor and a joy
to collaborate with such a brilliant scholar and generous role model. I am eternally
grateful for all of her insight, encouragement, and patience throughout the course of my
graduate career. Without her guidance and support this dissertation would not have been
possible.
I am also hugely indebted to my committee members, Naomi Gerstel and Aline Sayer,
whose work has inspired me over the course of my development as a family scholar and
whose challenging feedback has strengthened my acumen as a researcher.
I would also like to express my thanks to the faculty of the Sociology department for the
excellent training I received during my time at the University of Massachusetts-Amherst.
Special thanks goes to Joya Misra, Donald Tomaskovic-Devey, and Sanjiv Gupta for
their participation and expert guidance on my previous comprehensive exam committees.
I would also like to thank the staff of the Sociology department for all their help
negotiating departmental and graduate school requirements, completing necessary
paperwork, and locating projectors for presentations.
I am also grateful to several of my graduate student colleagues and friends. I consider
myself extremely lucky to have been a part of an intellectual community of such length
and breadth in terms of scholarship and activism. Thank you to my oldest and dearest
friend, Christopher Sweetapple, who has been my intellectual touchstone since childhood
and played an integral role in my decision to attend UMass. I am also especially indebted
to the Simone de Beauvoir Distinguished Women’s Circle: Laura Heston, Irene
Boeckmann, Jill Crocker, Sarah Miller, Abby Templer, Sharla Alegria, and Chris Smith.
Thank you all for the sustenance, maintenance, and laughter during our time in the
Pioneer Valley.
I would also like to thank my parents and family for the infinite love, encouragement, and
cheerleading since I began this journey. I dedicate this dissertation to my brother, James,
who gave me my first insight into inequality and has taught me the meaning of humanity,
kindness, and perseverance.

iv

ABSTRACT
BRINGING THE HOUSEHOLD BACK IN: FAMILY WAGE GAPS AND THE
INTERSECTION OF GENDER, RACE, AND CLASS IN THE HOUSEHOLD
CONTEXT

MAY 2015

MELISSA J. HODGES, B.A., MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Michelle Budig
Using the 1980- 2008 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), this
dissertation examines how parenthood exacerbates gender wage inequality within
married, heterosexual households and across families stratified by race and social class.
The majority of research on motherhood penalties and fatherhood premiums investigates
how individual men and women’s earnings change after the arrival of children, yet it is
unclear how parental bonuses and penalties accrue within coupled households. Although
studies investigating child effects on individuals’ wages draw on theoretical explanations
that rely on the joint decision-making of couples, empirical analysis rarely situates the
effects of children on earnings within couples. This dissertation reveals that wage
inequality associated with parenthood not only amplifies the gender wage gap, but also
contributes to wage inequality among couples, net of couples’ work effort, educational
attainment, income level, and racial/ethnic group membership. Importantly, the degree to
which parenthood exacerbates gender wage inequality within the household varies by
educational attainment, work hours, and racial/ethnic group of coupled partners.
v
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION: BRINGING THE HOUSEHOLD BACK IN

Much academic and popular media attention has focused on the growth in income
inequality over the latter half of the 20th century to the present, citing increasing
polarization of the US wage structure (Levy and Murnane 1992; Autor, Katz, and
Kearney 2008; David and Dorn 2013) and a slowing of the rate of decline in both race
and gender wage gaps since the early 1980s (McCall 2001; Blau, Brinton, and Grusky
2006).1 Recent work documents a decline in the average gender wage gap among young,
childfree workers (Gap 2013; McGregor 2013), yet a substantial gender wage gap
persists in the United States. Thus, the persistence of the gender wage gap may be related
to processes of family formation and composition. In this dissertation, I argue that the
growth in earnings inequality overtime is shaped by and reflected through patterns of
family formation and examine how this inequality is situated within coupled households.
Very few researchers have considered how the alignment of child wage effects
within couples shapes wage inequality both within and across households. Prior research
on the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium provide an important starting
point for understanding and assessing how family composition contributes to earnings
stratification by gender. It is well documented that many women suffer significant pay
penalties for motherhood while fatherhood is associated with substantial wage premiums

1

Although some studies report that gender gaps have all but disappeared for young, childless workers (Gap
2013; McGregor 2013), using US census data, the National Women’s Law Center found that American
women continue to receive only 77 cents for every dollar paid to their male counterparts and these wage
gaps are even larger for men and women of color. While African-American men make 73 percent of what
white men’s pay, on average, African-American women make 64 percent. Meanwhile, Latinas make just 54
percent of white men’s earnings while Latino men make 61 percent (National Women’s Law Center 2013).

1

(Waldfogel 1997, 1998; Budig and England 2001; Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg
and Rose 2000; Glauber 2007). However, the majority of this scholarship investigates
how individual men and women’s earnings change after the arrival of children,2 but does
not consider how child penalties and bonuses accrue specifically within households and
shape within-couple gender earnings inequality. The literature demonstrates the
importance of family structure in shaping individual outcomes, but a focus solely on
individual outcomes conceals how families absorb and experience gender wage
inequality associated with parenthood differentially, particularly across households
stratified by social class and race/ethnicity.
Because the family remains a key site for the creation and continuation of gender
differentials (Hartmann 1981), family composition is likely an important mechanism
contributing to current labor market inequality. The goal of this dissertation is to
investigate the impact of parenthood on wage inequality among families through
examination of the gender wage gap, the motherhood penalty, and fatherhood premium
within and among different-sex married couples. In my second chapter, I assess how
gender wage gaps within couples are modified by the number of children net of spousal
differences in human capital and work hours and how these wage gaps vary across
couples with different degrees of household specialization. My third chapter traces the
distribution of child wage effects among families across income and educational degree
attainment to uncover how social class position affects children’s impact wage on
inequality among dual-earning couples with differential access to economic resources and
human capital. My fourth chapter delves further into differences in patterns of family

2

But see Killewald and Garcia-Manglano (2013).

2

composition by comparing within-couple wage gaps among black and white families.
Each empirical chapter assesses how the number of children shape gender wage gaps
within couples and how the composition of families contributes to larger wage inequality
among American households.
The key contribution of this dissertation to the work-family literature is “bringing
the household back in” to the investigation of wage stratification research by using
couples as the unit of analysis. Early status attainment and stratification work
investigating wage inequality (Blau and Duncan 1967) initially used the married couple
household as the unit of analysis. However, feminist scholarship critical of this approach
argued that as more women entered the workforce in the post-war period, focusing on the
household failed to account for women’s employment participation and differential
opportunities in the labor market, and assumed that women’s labor market position
mirrored that of her husband’s. This produced a shift in the stratification research to using
individuals as the unit of analysis to better assess women’s labor market opportunities
outside of the family. Studies began to control for family and household factors to isolate
average wage gaps experienced by men and women rather than examining how the
structure and relations within families produced gender wage inequalities. Yet, lost in this
shift to an individual analysis was the investigation of how labor market processes
produced within-couple inequalities, particularly in terms of earnings. This dissertation
moves the literature forward by directly examining how children shape both women and
men’s wages within different-sex, married couple households to better understand the
relationship between gender wage inequality within families and larger processes of
social stratification.

3

In my second chapter, I establish how the motherhood penalties, fatherhood
bonuses, and within-couple gender wage inequality that accrue to families vary by
couples’ division of paid work hours. Here I consider whether the distribution of the
effects of children on earnings vary based on couple differences in work-time tradeoffs.
Using couples as the unit of analysis enables a relational evaluation of primary theoretical
explanations for the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium. I draw on a body of
research that primarily relies on Becker’s (1981) economic theory of household
specialization to understand how within-household tradeoffs in paid and unpaid labor
shape wage outcomes of individuals associated with parenthood. Previous work modeling
child effects on wages at the level of the individual created a mismatch between
household-based theoretical explanations and the unit of analysis for testing these
effects.3 I find that overall, children affect women’s labor supply negatively but have
little effect on fathers’ employment participation. This supports previous work on
individuals that finds reducing work hours has some explanatory effect for the
motherhood penalty (Budig and England 2001; Budig and Hodges 2010; Glauber 2007),
while increasing work hours has not been found to be a primary explanatory factor
behind the fatherhood premium (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010).
Investigating how work time arrangements within couples shape child wage effects of
parents aligns examination of the theory of household specialization with the appropriate
unit of analysis.

3

Theories of parental behavior, such as household specialization, make predictions regarding the nonindependence (or the joint decision-making) between parents as potentially driving the differential effects
of children on earnings, thus individual-level analyses mask the non-independence between partners at the
crux of what researchers are attempting to understand.

4

In my third chapter, I investigate how the effects of children on the relative
earnings of spouses vary by socioeconomic status, as measured by family income and
spousal educational attainment. To date, no study considers how these processes vary by
social class in the couple context. The variation in the effects of children on wages among
different groups of fathers and mothers in terms of education (Avellar and Smock 2003;
Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2002; Hodges and Budig 2010) and position in the wage
distribution (Budig and Hodges 2010; Cooke 2013) suggest that socioeconomic class
may matter for how these child wage effects are experienced within coupled households.
Several qualitative studies have found that social class is an important predictor of how
dual-earning families “do gender” based on the ideologies of female caretaker and male
breadwinner (Blossfield and Drobnic 2001). Prior work also suggests that middle and
upper-class couples are most likely to change their division of labor after the arrival of
children (Blossfield and Drobnic 2001). Meanwhile, working class wives are more likely
to maintain employment based on financial necessity and working class families tend to
divide paid work more equitably than middle class families (Blossfied and Drobnic
2001). Unlike their working class counterparts, upper income families also have access to
more resources to better facilitate the combination of work and family for both parents
(Williams and Boushey 2010). Yet, the story is complicated based on how class is
measured, by educational attainment or wage level. Using wage level, some scholars find
that motherhood penalties tend to be largest for women at the low end of the earnings
distribution after controlling for an array of human capital characteristics (Budig and
Hodges 2010; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 2012). Using education, other work
finds that high school graduates tend to incur larger wage losses than high school drop-

5

outs or college graduates, since high school graduates are more likely to hold jobs with
high inflexibility that often require their presence during regular office hours (Anderson,
Binder, and Krause 2003). Meanwhile, more highly educated men garner higher
fatherhood bonuses, (Hodges and Budig 2010), and higher-earning men get a larger
bonus for fatherhood relative to lower-earning men (Cooke 2014). To sort out these
somewhat conflicting findings in the literature and to investigate how social class
structures within-couple earnings inequality by gender and parenthood, my third chapter
compares within-couple gender wage inequality associated with children by education
and family income level
The fourth chapter of this dissertation contributes to the literature by illustrating
how the effects of children within couples vary among white and black families. In doing
so, I contribute to feminist scholarship that has long maintained that processes of family
formation are deeply intertwined with workers’ experiences in the labor market and are
also central to systems of race, class, and gender (Collins 1998). Family organization is
shaped by interlocking systems of oppression and are also locations where such systems
are reproduced (Collins 1998). These processes are evidenced by wage differentials and
family formation patterns among white and black families. Differences in selection into
marriage and parenthood between white and black couples may therefore shape gender
wage inequality within households. Moreover, given the considerable labor market
disadvantage experienced by workers of color (Pager 2003; Kennelly 1999; Pager and
Quillian 2005), the effects of children on wages also shape inequality across race/ethnic
groups. Smaller motherhood penalties have been found for black women compared to
whites (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2007; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges

6

2013), while white men receive larger fatherhood earnings bonuses compared to black
men (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010). Additionally, recent work on the
fatherhood wage premium found that men are only rewarded when they have biological,
co-residential children, while fathers who do not co-reside with their biological children
and step-fathers do not garner premiums for fatherhood (Killewald 2013), regardless of
racial/ethnic group membership. Differences in patterns of family formation and labor
market experiences for workers of color suggest it is important to consider how wage
inequality associated with children is distributed across families by race/ethnicity.
Findings from each chapter also speak to current public debates over women
needing to “lean in” instead of “opting out” of paid employment to address gender wage
and labor market inequality and work-family conflict. Recently, popular media has
encouraged women to “lean in” (Sandberg 2013) to the world of paid work to reduce
gender wages gaps. This relatively new campaign encourages women to devote more
effort to paid work in part as a response to debates over whether highly educated women
were choosing to “opt out” or forego paid work to care for children at home (Belkin
2003; Stone 2007). Findings from each chapter of this dissertation illustrate that the
tensions between the structure of work and the structure of families that may be driving
the remaining gender wage gap and that these tensions affect families differently at
different social locations. Each chapter’s results reveal that there is substantial wage
inequality within households that remains unexplained. Prior research points to
differences in employer evaluations of workers with children as a contributing factor to
the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium. Experimental audit studies have found
that due to the gendered ideology of the “ideal worker” (Williams 2000), employers often
7

evaluate workers based on assumptions of employee care responsibilities (Ridgeway and
Correll 2004; Kennelly 1999). While mothers are viewed as being less committed or
productive workers, fathers are more likely to be viewed favorably (Correll, Benard, and
Paik 2007). Previous work has been unable to directly investigate employer
discrimination due to data limitations, but researchers have argued that after controlling
for human capital, labor supply, and job characteristics the residual penalties and
premiums result from employers evaluations of workers based on parental status (Budig
and England 2001; Glauber 2008a&b). If wage gaps within households occur based on
employers’ evaluations of mothers and fathers based on stereotypical notions of the
“ideal worker” (Williams 2000), calls for women to “lean in” do not appear to make
much sense for closing gender wage gaps occurring within families.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this dissertation use the 1980-2008 wave of the National
Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a nationally representative sample of workers collected by
the US Bureau of Labor Statistics. Using the NLSY aligns my results with the majority
of studies of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium that examine individual
wage outcomes associated with parenthood. The initial year of the survey, 1979, took
place when respondents were aged 14-21; in 2008, the ages of respondents range from 41
to 58. Respondents were interviewed annually until the 1994 survey and bi-annually
thereafter. The NLSY is a rich source of data on employment and households and follows
respondents through their careers, marital histories, and transitions to parenthood.
However, while the NLSY79 collects information about all members living in
respondents’ household, the data available for spouses obtained from the household roster
is less complete. Important factors affecting wage trajectories, such as work experience

8

and job seniority, are not available for respondents’ spouses. However, the data includes
measures of spouses’ education and work effort, which are the key factors necessary for
this analysis.
In each empirical chapter, I use dyadic random slopes models, a subset of multilevel models (Raudenbusch and Bryk 2002; Kenny 2006) to estimate both the gender
wage gaps and the effects of children on the natural log of couples’ wages. The model is
estimated at two levels with time in years nested within individuals. Individuals are then
nested within couples. At level-1, the units are the repeated responses over time (for
example, the log of wages) within each couple. At level-2, the unit of analysis is the
couple.4 The level 1 (within-dyad) model estimates the average differences in hourly
wages within couples at each time point, while level 2 estimates average gaps in wages
between couples. Thus, these models enable simultaneous estimation of the effects of
husband wage advantage and children within and among couples.
Chapter 2 investigates how the gender wage gap within couples varies by parental
status and how motherhood penalties and fatherhood premiums vary within the
household context, accounting for processes of assortative partnering by education and
spousal work effort. The analyses then turns to examining how much of the inequality in
wages among households is attributable to the effects of children across families based on
different degrees of couples’ specialization. I examine four types of dual-earning

4

Conceptually, the model contains 3-levels with two levels of nesting. Responses at each time point are
nested within individuals and individuals are nested within couples. However, at the level of analysis it is a
two-level model with a single level of nesting (responses nested within couples). This results from how
gender is handled in the dyadic model. Gender is a characteristic of the repeated responses (a fixed effect)
rather than a level in the model.

9

couples. First, I compare within-couple wage gaps where both spouses work full-time and
where wives work part-time while husbands work full-time. Next, I evaluate Winslow’s
(2009) finding that wage discrepancies are largest when one spouse works excessive
hours by comparing the within-couple wage gaps for couples where husbands work more
than 50 hours per week and wives work either full or part-time.
Chapter 3 examines how wage inequality associated with children within families
is stratified by socioeconomic class in terms of spouses’ income and educational
attainment. I investigate how the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium may
amplify or reduce gender wage discrepancies within couples based on wage level and
parental degree attainment across households. When both spouses are highly skilled (or
highly paid) workers, it is likely that men who garner the largest premiums are married to
women who incur the smallest penalties. Among couples with less education or income,
it is also possible that men who incur small fatherhood premiums may also be married to
women who receive small motherhood penalties. This would result in smaller gender pay
differences within households, but based on the differences in the tails of the income and
educational distributions, produce greater inequality across households. First, I compare
the distribution of the gender and child wage gaps within couples across seven different
quantiles of the family income distribution. Next, I assess how these gaps vary based on
the degree attainment of spouses. By using both wages and the educational attainment of
spouses, I am able to assess within-couple wage gaps among families across
socioeconomic class.
In my fourth chapter, I investigate the association between the gender wage gap
and the effects of children on married couples’ wages within white and black families to

10

assess how the effects of children on couples’ wages differ by racial group membership.
In the first set of analyses, I compare the effects of the number of children within couples
where both partners are identified in the NLSY as being non-Hispanic white or nonHispanic black, controlling for spousal age, education, and work effort. Given
differences in family formation patterns among white and black families, in the next set
of analyses, I consider whether the effects of children on wages vary based on parentchild relationships across different racial/ethnic groups. This chapter illustrates
differences in the distribution of gender wage inequality within households by
race/ethnicity.
The goal of this dissertation is to “bring the household back in” by situating
current US wage inequality within households based on family composition. Using the
1980-2008 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, each empirical chapter of
this dissertation investigates how gender wage inequality associated with children
contributes to the overall wage stratification across American families. There are several
potential pay-offs to approaching the examination of gender and family gaps in the
couple context. First, using couples as the unit of analysis enables better evaluation of
primary theoretical explanations for the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium.
While previous research investigating child wage effects among individual men and
women has used the theory of household specialization as a key theoretical explanation
for wage differences between parents and the childfree, these studies fail to appropriately
evaluate the theory by using individuals as the unit of analysis.
Second, using dyadic multi-level models reveals how processes of family
formation and composition contribute to the persistence of a gender wage gap in the US.
11

Although the gender wage gap appears to have all but closed among young, unmarried,
and childfree workers, I argue that much of the remaining gender wage gap is situated
within families. Assessing the alignment of motherhood penalties and fatherhood premia
within couples based on work-time tradeoffs may shed light on how the persistence of the
gender wage gap is generated by couples’ responses to work and family obligations.
Furthermore, findings may also be useful in speaking to current public debates regarding
the validity of encouraging working women to “lean in” in the face of inflexible spouses
and work structures.
Finally, the analyses in chapters three and four illustrate how processes of family
formation are central to systems of race, class, and gender (Collins 1998). Within-couple
wage inequality varies in significant ways among couples with different levels of
education and economic resources. Parental wage gaps also align differently based on a
family’s racial/ethnic status. The analyses uncover important differences in the
distribution of child wage effects within couples across education, income levels, and
racial/ethnic group membership that may provide insight into addressing current US
wage inequality. In order to address the growth in US wage inequality, this dissertation
demonstrates that it is necessary to consider how wage gaps associated with children vary
based on the diversity among US families.
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CHAPTER 2
ALL IN THE FAMILY: A COUPLES’ APPROACH TO UNDERSTANDING
GENDER AND CHILD WAGE GAPS

Much media attention has been given to a recent study documenting a decline of
the gender wage gap among young, childfree workers (Gap 2013; McGregor 2013).
Although this decline is indeed promising, a substantial gender pay gap persists in the
United States (Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006). While the pay gap has declined among
young men and women in the early stages of their careers, the question of which workers
continue to shoulder the remaining wage gap has yet to be fully answered. It is likely that
remaining gender wage inequality is situated within and borne largely by families.
Therefore, despite popularized solutions that encourage women to “Lean In” (Sandberg
2013) to the world of paid work to combat gender workplace inequality, the remaining
pay gap cannot be wholly addressed without taking workers’ familial obligations into
account. To fully understand and address gender wage inequality, it is necessary to
consider how the wage gap occurs not only among individuals but also within families
and across households.
To this end, feminist research that examines the effect of children on wages
provides insight into understanding the intersection of work and family life in the
production of gender wage discrepancies. It is well-established empirically that many
women suffer significant pay penalties for motherhood while fatherhood typically is
associated with substantial pay increases (Waldfogel 1997, 1998; Budig and England
2001; Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Glauber 2007). On average,
US mothers incur a wage penalty of roughly 7 percent (Budig and England 2001) while
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fathers garner an average earnings premium of 5 percent (Glauber 2008 a&b; Hodges and
Budig 2010). The considerable gender differences in wage effects associated with having
children suggest that some of the gender gap may be explained by the alignment of wage
effects associated with children within households. To directly address persistent gender
wage inequality, it is therefore necessary to consider to what degree the gender wage gap
is located within and among couples with children.
However, the majority of research on the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood
premium investigates how individual men and women’s earnings change after the arrival
of children,5 but does not consider how these individual child penalties and bonuses
accrue specifically within households to generate within-couple wage inequality. While
there are a diverse array of family forms in the US, fathers and mothers often live in
households together, thus it follows that couples jointly bear the pay penalties and
bonuses parenthood brings. The effects of children vary substantially among different
groups of parents based on the couples’ marital status, spouses’ human capital
characteristics and household work time arrangements (Budig and England 2001;
Ameudo-Durantes and Kimmel 2005; Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2002; Glauber
2007; 2008 a&b; Budig and Hodges 2010; Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose
2000). While the motherhood penalty, on average, is largely driven by women’s lost
work experience and reduced hours following the birth of a child, particularly among
married women (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2007; England, Bearak, Budig and
Hodges 2013), married men with more human capital and who co-reside with their
biological children garner the largest fatherhood premiums (Hodges and Budig 2010;

5

But see Killewald and Garcia-Manglano (2013).

14

Killewald 2013). Therefore, children may (or may not) exacerbate wage disparities
between husbands and wives based on couple differences in work effort and human
capital characteristics. The focus of examining child effects on individual’s wages in
previous work masks how families absorb and experience gender wage inequality.
Parental penalties and premia may also contribute to larger patterns of wage inequality
based on the distribution of these effects across households with different resources and
work time arrangements.
Moreover, much of the theorizing about the effects of children on earnings relies
on predictions of couples’ characteristics, joint decision-making, and work time tradeoffs
to explain why children are associated with gender discrepant earnings for mothers and
fathers. Thus, modeling child effects on wages at the level of the individual creates a
mismatch between household-based theoretical explanations and the unit of analysis for
testing these effects. Theories of parental behavior, such as household specialization
(Becker 1981), make predictions regarding the nonindependence (or the joint decisionmaking) between parents as potentially driving the differential effects of children on
earnings, thus individual-level analyses conceal the nonindependence between partners
which is what researchers are attempting to evaluate.
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the relationship between gender,
parenthood, and wage inequality through observation of the gender wage gap, the
motherhood penalty, and fatherhood premium within and among married couples. Using
the 1980-2008 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, I use dyadic multilevel models to understand how within-couple wage gaps change with the number of
children in the household and how potential husband wage advantage conditioned on
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children varies based on the work hour tradeoffs of dual-earning couples. Three research
questions drive this analysis: 1) how does the gender wage gap within married couples
vary by parental status? 2) How do motherhood penalties and fatherhood premia align
within the household context? And 3) How much of the inequality in wages among
households is attributable to the effects of children across families based on couples’
different work and family arrangements? I briefly review the literature on factors shaping
the wage inequality within couples and the gendered effects of children on parental
wages before moving to my empirical analysis.
Theorizing Parental Wage Inequality Within and Between Households
The literature on parental penalties and premiums identifies several possible
explanations behind variation in child effects on wages6 that involve processes occurring
both within and among couples. They include: processes of selection into marriage and
parenthood, assortative partnering and variation in human capital characteristics of
couples, and household specialization in spousal work effort. The last explanation also
usually cited for the residual effects of children on wages is differential treatment of
workers by employers based on an employee’s parental status (Ridgeway and Correll
2004; Correll, Benard and Paik 2007). Taking couples as the unit of analyses, I assess
how these factors shape the gender wage gap and the alignment of parental wage effects

6

The literature on parental earnings gaps finds variation in the motherhood penalty and fatherhood
premium across racial and ethnic groups (Budig and England 2001: Glauber 2007a; Glauber 2007b;
Hodges and Budig 2010). Budig and England (2001) found that the motherhood penalty was smaller for
African American and Latina mothers due to racial/ethnic variation in women’s attachment to paid labor.
England et al (2013) find that Black women’s motherhood penalties also tend to be smaller than white
women’s. Moreover, a large body of evidence points to minority men’s disadvantaged position in the labor
market. Glauber (2007) and Hodges and Budig (2010) find that African American and Latino fathers
typically garner lower premiums for fatherhood than white men. In my fourth chapter, I compare how
children influence wage inequality within black and white families.
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within and across households. Based on previous work on the wage effects of children, I
posit three initial hypotheses:
H1: Husbands will have a wage advantage within couples regardless of parental status.
H2: As the number of children increases, within-couple husband wage advantage will
also increase.
H3: The alignment of the wage effects associated with children within couples will
explain wage inequality (variation) across households.
Selection into Parenthood and Partnership Pathways
The effects of gender and children on wages have been found to vary by family
structure with important consequences for within and between-household inequality.
Therefore, as in all analyses of this dissertation, it is first important to consider processes
of selection into marriage and childbearing. Marriage gaps between middle and working
class couples has been linked to growing income inequality across US families (Cherlin
2014; Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos 2014). Most research finds that
marriage itself produces gender inequality within households (Gupta 1999; 2007; West
and Zimmerman 1987). Marriage is also linked to greater motherhood penalties (Budig
and England 2001; Glauber 2007; Misra et al. 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010), possibly
because married women’s greater family resources allow them to reduce their work effort
when children are young. If mothers are more likely to reduce time spent in paid work
following the birth of child, they experience not only a loss in terms of paid work time
directly following the birth, but also a reduction in experience and seniority on the job,
which also directly affects earnings (Budig and England 2001; England et al 2013).
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Meanwhile, only married men receive the premium associated with fatherhood (Glauber
2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010; Killewald 2013), with marriage explaining roughly
one-half of the fatherhood earnings bonus (Hodges and Budig 2010; Glauber 2008a&b).
Killewald (2013) also finds that only married, co-residential, biological fathers receive a
wage premium of 4 percent.7 Given the decline in marriage rates in recent decades
(Cherlin 2014; Krieder and Ellis 2011b; Bumpass and Lu 2000), by examining couples’
transition to parenthood after marriage, I am investigating a select group of families in
my sample. In results not shown, I initially tested for differences across marriages,
finding different selection processes at work in first versus subsequent marriages.
Therefore, I limit my sample to first marriages only.
In addition, as discussed in the literature on the motherhood penalty and
fatherhood premium, unmeasured factors, such as individual career ambition, that cannot
be captured by adding controls to the dyadic multi-level model can also influence withincouple wage inequality. Factors that influence wages may also shape a couple’s
likelihood of having children, thus making it difficult to assess causality. To address this
potential selection bias, researchers of parental penalties and premiums have primarily
employed fixed-effect models that provide estimates that are robust to unobserved
differences among respondents that do not change over time (Allison 2009). However,
the fixed-effects in multi-level dyadic models cannot control for unmeasured differences
among couples that influence the effect of children on earnings or that statistically
interact with another variable that influences these effects. Thus, time changing variables

7

I examine the role of biology and co-residency with children in further detail in Chapter 4.
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that could simultaneously influence both the likelihood of couples having children and
how much each spouse earns must be explicitly included in the model.
Labor Market Resources and Human Capital

Individuals may select spouses based on a variety of factors. However, research
investigating marriage and partnership patterns finds that couples are similar in terms of
age (Kalmijn 1998), educational attainment (Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Schwartz and
Mare 2005), and other human capital characteristics at the time of marriage (Rosenfeld
2007). Human capital characteristics have also been found to have important
consequences for the effect of children on wages, but findings vary. While some scholars
have found that high school graduates tend to incur larger motherhood penalties than
either low- or high-skill mothers due to differences in time constraints and flexibility on
the job (Anderson, Binder, and Krause 2003), others have found that mothers with the
lowest wages incur the largest penalties after controlling for education and work
experience (Budig and Hodges 2010; England et al 2013). Meanwhile, fathers with more
education and those employed in professional/managerial occupations, which tend to
have higher human capital requirements, garner the largest premiums (Hodges and Budig
2010). Although findings are inconclusive, prior scholarship on parental wage effects
suggest that it is necessary to consider how human capital may shape within-couple wage
inequality.
It is possible that wage gaps within couples may simply result from differences in
human capital characteristics between spouses. However, since individuals are more like
to marry based on educational similarity (Cherlin 2014), human capital characteristics

19

may have less explanatory power for gendered wage variation within couples, but explain
wage inequality across families. Winslow (2009) finds that having a bachelor’s degree or
higher is associated with higher odds of earning as much as or more than one’s spouse for
both men and women. Because spouses often select into marriage based on education, in
couples where both husband and wife have relatively high education, or similar degree
attainment, there may be a smaller wage gaps within couples. Highly educated wives,
who may incur the smallest wage penalties, are more likely to marry highly educated
husbands, who are more likely to earn the largest bonus, thus producing less withincouple inequality among highly-educated couples. Meanwhile, the reverse process may
occur among couples in which both spouses have less education. In less-educated
couples, wives are more likely to receive a higher penalty and men a smaller premium,
thus producing more wage inequality within couples with less education. Accounting for
age8 and education9 may explain some of the differences in wages within, but also across
couples. To address this, I include measures for the age and educational attainment of
spouses in my dyadic multilevel models.
H4: Including controls for age and education of each spouse in the model will decrease
husbands’ wage advantage and the effects of children on wages within couples.
H5: Including controls for age and education of each spouse in the model will decrease
wage inequality across couples.

8

Age also functions as a proxy measure for work experience. Unfortunately, the spousal data contained in
the household roster of the NLSY does include sufficient measures that allow for a construction of work
experience for spouses. I tested the effect of potential work experience as used by Killewald (2013).
Results were robust and available in Appendix Table A4.
9
I explore variation in the gender wage gap and differences in wage returns for having children within
couples across levels of education in more detail in the following chapter.
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Women’s Employment Participation and Household Specialization
The most widely tested explanation for the motherhood penalty and the
fatherhood premium is the theory of household specialization (Budig and England 2001;
Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Glauber 2007). According to Becker
(1981), women’s disadvantage in the labor market makes their specialization in
reproductive work rather than paid labor a potentially rational choice. Wives may thus be
more likely to incur a wage penalty for motherhood due to reduced time spent in paid
work or foregoing paid employment altogether after the arrival of children. Meanwhile, if
husbands are more likely to increase their work hours, they may in turn garner a bonus
relative to childfree husbands for their specialization in market work. Taking couples as
the unit of analysis allows for better interrogation of the theory of household
specialization by directly modeling the effects of children on couples’ wages to assess
how children shape gender wage inequality within families.
Previous work finds that couples are likely to engage in household specialization
after marriage (South and Spitze 1994; West and Zimmerman 1987; Gupta 1999; 2007)
and that children intensify this process (Lundberg and Rose 2001). Among dual-earning
couples, with the arrival of children it is often the case that one partner’s success at work
usually comes at the expense of the other (Moen 2003; Presser 1994; Becker and Moen
1999). Women are more likely to take non-traditional work arrangements, such as
working part-time to better blend work and family (Moen 2003, Bianchi, Robinson, and
Milkie 2006). Other studies also find that husbands’ careers are often taken into account
when making decisions among highly skilled, professional women (Stone 2007) and the
middle class (Becker and Moen 1999) to remain at work or reduce work time. Although
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prioritizing men’s careers is no longer universally the case, the husband’s career typically
takes top priority (Moen 2003; Abraham et al. 2010) and this may be reflected in
husbands’ wage advantage within households. However, wage gaps may be smaller
within dual-earning households where both spouses maintain full-time employment
following the birth of a child.
As with human capital, research findings on the relationship between work hours
and the effects of children on wages are also somewhat mixed. Reducing work hours has
some explanatory effect for the motherhood penalty (Budig and England 2001; Budig and
Hodges 2010; Glauber 2007). Winslow (2009) finds that the impact of motherhood on
women’s earnings relative to their husbands can be largely explained by mothers’ lower
labor supply relative to their childless counterparts. However, increasing work hours has
not been found to be a primary explanatory factor behind the fatherhood premium
(Glauber 2008; Hodges and Budig 2010). This suggests that while reducing work time
may have explanatory potential for mother’s wages, this may not necessarily be the case
for fathers. Including the work hours of both spouses in the model may therefore reduce
more of the motherhood penalty than the fatherhood premium. Although work hours
only partially explain the differential effects of children on parents’ earnings, to test the
theory of household specialization I include controls for usual weekly work hours and
annual weeks worked for husbands and wives in my models.
H6: Including weekly work hours and annual weeks worked for each spouse will explain
(reduce) more of the motherhood penalty than the fatherhood premium within couples.
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Although the effect of children on women’s employment has declined since the
1990s, regardless of marital status and educational attainment (Boushey 2008), variation
among couples in women’s labor force attachment patterns may also shape wage
inequality between households. While there has been considerable debate over whether
highly educated mothers are “opting out,” (Belkin 2003) of paid work, women overall
continue to have strong labor market attachment (Boushey 2008; Stone 2007; Carr 2005),
but are more likely to work part-time with the arrival of children (Bianchi, Robinson, and
Milkie 2006). However, Cha (2010) finds that in couples where husbands work excessive
hours, women’s likelihood of reducing hours or dropping out of employment increases.
This suggests that when husbands work long hours, wage inequality within households is
intensified. To assess the effect of one spouse reducing or working excessive hours in
more detail, I compare husbands’ wage advantage and child wage effects within-couples
by grouping couples based on spouses’ tradeoffs in work hours. I compare four separate
groups of couples: where both spouses work full-time, couples where husbands work
full-time (more than 35 hours per week) and wives work part-time (less than 35 hours),
and couples where husbands work excessively long hours (more than 50 hours) and
wives work either full-time or part-time (more or less than 35 hours per week)10. It is
likely that the wage gaps within couples generated by wives reducing work time may
become more pronounced in households where husbands work excessive hours.
H7: Husbands’ wage advantage will be largest within couples with children, but will be
amplified within couples where husbands work excessive hours.

10

I also ran models for couples that followed the breadwinner/homemaker model where one spouse (wife
or husband) was not employed, and thus reported a “0” on wages, as well as couples where the wife worked
full-time and the husband worked part-time. Results from models including all couple types are available in
Appendix Table A3.
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H8: The per child wage gap within couples will be smallest within full-time, dual-earning
couples, followed by couples with wives who work part-time, and largest in households
where husbands work excessive hours.
Factors outside the Household
The last explanatory factor behind the fatherhood premium and the motherhood
penalty cited in the literature is discriminatory employer evaluations that penalize or
reward men and women differently based on perceptions of job performance and parental
status. Experimental and audit studies have found employers are more likely to judge and
reward employees differentially by gender and parental status (Correll, Benard, and Paik
2007), with fathers being more likely to receive favorable evaluations compared to
childfree men and women while mothers are more likely to be viewed unfavorably in
terms of work performance (Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Kennelly 1999). However, the
NLSY does not contain information on employers and it is difficult to obtain data on
discrimination and match it to outcomes in large-scale national surveys. As with previous
work on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium (Budig and England 2001;
Glauber 2007; 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010; Budig and Hodges 2010), it is likely
that residual unexplained wage gaps that remain after controlling for other explanatory
factors could result from employer’s behavior located outside of the household in
workplaces.
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Data and Methods
I use the 1980-2008 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLSY), a national probability sample of individuals.11 Respondents were interviewed
annually until the 1994 survey and bi-annually thereafter. The initial year of the survey,
1979, took place when respondents were aged 14-21; in 2008, the ages of respondents
range from 41 to 58. All models in this chapter include all racial/ethnic categories in the
NLSY: non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic black, and Latino. The NLSY is an important
source of data on employment and households, however, spousal data obtained from the
household roster is less complete, but includes measures of spouses’ age, education and
work effort necessary for testing my hypotheses.
I construct a dyadic data set by identifying married couples12 with spouses over
the age of 18, not currently enrolled in schooling, and not in the military, with valid (nonmissing or “0”) scores on wages for least two time periods for each partner, as required
for multi-level analysis of dyads. Over the survey waves, the NLSY captures up to three
marriages of respondents.13 I follow couples from their first marriage until they divorce
(thus dropping out the sample), separate (one member leaves the household) or until the
last year of interview. Once a couple divorces or no longer lives together, they drop out

11

1979 is omitted from the analysis as there were too few couples (12 couple-years) available that met
sampling criteria.
12

Because data on cohabitation in the household roster is only available in the NLSY79 for years 1994 2010, I limit my analysis to married couples only.
13

Should a respondent remarry, I created another couple identification number and assigned the
corresponding measures to this new couple. I tested for differences in the effect of gender and children on
couple wages for second and third marriages. Results were only significant for second marriages and given
selection differences between first and second marriages, I only present the results for first marriages. Full
results available upon request.
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of the sample as they cease to be engaged in a co-residential relationship. The sample
contains a total of 5,769 couples for analysis (13,550 childfree and 47,740 parental
couple-years) across waves 1980-2008.14
Measures
The dependent variable used in this analysis is the natural log of hourly wage,
reported by each member of the dyad (see Table A1).15 I include both individual and
couple-level independent variables to investigate the effects of couples’ human capital
and household specialization on male wage advantage and the effects of children within
couples. First, I include a dichotomous measure for gender (male =1) to distinguish and
account for the discrepancy in hourly wages between husbands and wives. Next, I include
the primary independent variable, a continuous measure for number of children in the
household and its interaction term with gender. These measures allow me to estimate 1)
differences in husband wage advantage between fathers and childfree husbands and 2)
how children differentially impact the wages of mothers compared to fathers. In later
analyses, I also investigate variation in family size among couples with children by using
dummy variables for one, two, and three or more children and their corresponding
interactions with gender.
To test my fourth and fifth hypotheses, I include continuous measures for the age
(in years) and years of education of husbands and wives to capture each spouse’s human

14

See Table 2 for sample sizes in couple-years.

15

Multi-level dyadic discrepancy models require reorganization of the NLSY data into dyadic format.
Table A1 illustrates how the data is organized. The dependent variable includes a wage score for each
member of the dyad, or the outcome score for the natural logarithm of hourly wages in each dyad j. The
model uses both spouses’ scores on hourly wage to estimate the gender discrepancy within couples.
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capital (education and potential work experience). To assess my sixth hypothesis
regarding household specialization based on spouses’ work effort, I also include
continuous measures for the usual weekly work hours and annual weeks worked in the
main job for each spouse. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis are
presented in Table 1 in the results section.
I also compare the distribution of husband wage advantage and the effects of
children across couples categorized by work hour arrangements to test my seventh and
eighth hypotheses. For each couple, I created dichotomous measures (equal to 1) to
classify couples into categories with partners having part-time (less than 35 hours per
week), full-time (greater than 35 hours per week), or excessive work hours (50 hours per
week or more). Sample sizes for each couple type are presented in Table 2 in the results
section.

Dyadic Multilevel Models
I investigate couples’ wage gaps over time using longitudinal dyadic discrepancy
models, a subset of multi-level models (Raudenbusch and Bryk 2002; Sayer and Klute
2005). The level 1 (within-dyad) model estimates the average differences in hourly wages
within couples at each time point, while level 2 estimates average gaps in wages between
couples. The model is estimated at two levels with time in years nested within
individuals. Individuals are then nested within couples. At level 1, the units are the
repeated responses over time within each couple. At level 2, the unit of analysis is the
couple.16 To establish the gross discrepancy in wages within and between couples, I first
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Conceptually, the model contains 3-levels with two levels of nesting. Responses at each time point are
nested within individuals and individuals are nested within couples. However, at the level of analysis it is a
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fit an unconditional model that only includes a control for year of interview and the
gender discrepancy dummy at level 1. The unconditional level 1 and level 2 models are
as follows:
LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEAR1ij) + β2j*(MALE1ij) + rij
B0j = γ00 + u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
β2j = γ20 + u2j

LNWAGEj is the outcome score of the log of hourly wage for each member of the couple i
in each dyad j (see Table A1). I also include a control variable for year of interview to
reduce period effects. For each dyad, the responses of the members (spouses) are
regressed on an indicator variable, MALEij, or the variable that will capture the gender
gap, coded 1 for husbands and 0 for wives. The intercept represents the earnings score for
wives when the year is 1980, or when both MALE and YEAR are equal to zero.
At level 2, the coefficients from level 1 become the dependent variables and a
separate equation for each dependent variable (or level 1 coefficient) is estimated. The
term, B0j represents wages for women at year zero, while, γ00, represents the average
wives’ wage across all couples, and u0j is the unexplained residual variance in wives’
wages. The term, β1j is the gap in wages between husbands and wives, controlling for
year, and γ10 is the average wage gap across all couples. The term β2j represents the rate

two-level model with a single level of nesting (responses are nested within couples). This results from how
gender is handled in the dyadic model, since it is a characteristic of the repeated responses (a fixed effect)
rather than a level in the model.
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of change in wages, given a spouse’s gender, while the term γ20 is the average wage
relationship (rate of change) across all couples.
Each level 2 equation includes an intercept that represents the value of the
dependent variable for the average couple, plus a term that captures the unexplained or
residual variance for each dependent variable at level 2. This variance can be interpreted
as the heterogeneity across couples, or how each couple differs from the average couple.
Significant variance in the unconditional model indicates unexplained variability across
couples, thus allowing me to introduce other predictors of this variability into the model.
For example, if there is significant variation in husbands’ wage advantage in the
unconditional model, I can introduce dyad characteristics, such as number of children, to
explain this variance. Subsequent conditional models will test my hypotheses concerning
predictors (number of children and spouse’s characteristics) that may reduce or enlarge
the gender wage gap. The baseline model (model 2, Table 3) that introduces child effects
is as follows:
LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij) + β3j (NUMKIDS) +β4j*(MALE
*NUMKIDS) + rij
B0j = γ00 + u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
β2j = γ10 + u1j
β3j = γ20 + γ21 + u2j
β4j = γ30 + γ31 + u2j

I take an additive approach to my initial assessment of the variation in wages
across households. To test my first hypothesis, I run a gross model for the gender gap
within couples that only includes the variables for gender and year to estimate the initial
gender wage gap within married couples. Next, to test my second and third hypotheses
29

regarding the effect of children on within-couple wage gaps and wage inequality across
couples, my baseline model (model 2) includes the variable for number of children in the
household and it’s interaction with gender at level 2. Subsequent models include control
measures for spouse’s human capital and labor supply. Model 3 adds age and years of
education for each spouse to account for human capital characteristics. Lastly, model 4
accounts for work effort and includes measures for each spouse’s weekly work hours and
annual weeks worked. After examining the additive effects of children net of human
capital and household labor supply, my last set of analyses compare four separate models
for couples based on work hour arrangements to assess how household specialization
shapes the distribution of within-couple wage gaps associated with children across
couples.
Findings
Descriptive Results
To begin to assess wage inequalities within and across couples, Table 1 presents
descriptive results for both individual and couple-level measures used in the analysis. The
first panel of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the level 2 (between or jointcouple measures) variables used in the analysis. These measures capture the average
variation across couples based on differences in family composition. Chi-square and ttests for paired means were conducted to test for significant differences across couples by
parental status. Couples with children average higher hourly wages ($15.36) compared to
the childfree ($14.01).17 These averages provide some support to hypothesis two and

17

This is the dependent variable used in my multivariate analyses that is the combination of scores for each
member of the dyad. The dyadic models used in later analyses use each spouse’s score on wages in each
year to estimate the wage discrepancies within couples. Therefore, the dependent variable contains both
husband and wives’ wage scores.
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three that the gender wage gap grows with the arrival of children in the household and
that the alignment of child wage effects within couples will explain variation in wages
across households. While roughly 19 percent of couples remain childfree in the sample,
the average number of children living in the household is approximately 2 children
among parents. The proportion of couples that have one child is roughly 31 percent,
while 46 percent of couples have two children, and 23 percent have 3 or more over the
course of the survey period. Having two children is the modal category among couples,
followed by couples with only 1 child, followed by larger families with three or more
children.
The second panel displays the means, proportions, and standard deviations of
individual level (within-couple) measures by parental status. Chi-square and t-tests in the
second panel capture significant differences between husbands and wives by parental
status. Although husbands have higher hourly wages than wives regardless of parental
status, fathers garner the highest average hourly wage of $18.16, roughly $5.43 higher
than mother’s average wage of $12.73. Meanwhile, the gap within childfree couples is
smaller at $3.34 ($15.71-12.37). This also lends preliminary support to my first and
second hypotheses that husbands have a sizable and positive wage advantage within
couples and that children amplify this advantage. Despite recent reporting that the gender
gap in wages has closed among childfree unmarried workers, it does not appear to be the
case for childfree married couples. The results suggest that marriage itself continues to be
a contributing factor to gender inequality within couples (South and Spitze 1994; West
and Zimmerman 1987; Gupta 1999; 2007), but that children increase wage gaps within
marriages.
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There are also differences between couples in wives’ employment participation
between childless and parental households. In both childfree and parental couples,
husbands have a higher likelihood of being employed than wives, but wives’ type of
employment (part-time versus full-time) varies by parental status. A larger proportion of
mothers, 33 percent, work part-time (less than 35 hours per week) compared to only 20
percent of childfree wives. Since I limit my observations to couples where both spouses
report non-zero wage scores, I may be underestimating the overall wage penalty of
married women18 by excluding wives who drop out of the workforce after having
children. It appears that the likelihood of wives’ employment is indeed shaped by the
presence of children, but based on my sampling restrictions, the majority of mothers in
my sample maintain employment in some fashion after having children. However, it is
clear that mothers are much more likely to work part-time compared to childfree wives.
In terms of human capital, parents are more similar in terms of age and years of
education than spouses without children. While wives have more education on average
than husbands regardless of parental status, the gap within couples with children is much
smaller. These results suggest that parental couples should experience less within
household inequality than childfree couples as they are more similar on factors that shape
wage outcomes. Or, spouses who are more similar may be more likely to have children.
To evaluate this further, however, multivariate analyses are required.
Turning to measures of work hours and annual weeks worked, Table 1 suggests
that household specialization is occurring to a greater degree within parental couples.

Unfortunately, spouse’s wages in the NLSY contains a large amount of missing values. Since dyadic
multi-level models require valid (non-missing) values on wages, this has truncated the number of spouses
who would normally report a “0” for wages if not employed.
18
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Fathers work an average of roughly one hour more per week (45 hours) than husbands
without children (44 hours), while childfree wives work roughly 38 hours compared to
mothers’ 35 hours per week, reflecting mothers’ increased likelihood to work part-time.
Indeed, the average gap in hours within couples with children is considerably larger
(roughly 10 hours) compared to childfree couples (6 hours). The same pattern appears
when comparing annual weeks worked between childfree and parental couples. The gap
in weeks worked between childfree spouses is a little less than half (2 weeks) of the gap
of couples with children (5 weeks). This pattern provides initial support for the theory of
household specialization and indicates that the wider wage gaps within parental couples
may result from wives curtailing paid work time when they have children. Again, further
analysis using multi-leveling modeling is required to directly test my hypotheses.
To make better sense of how work hour tradeoffs are distributed within couples
and across families, Table 2 presents the proportion and sample sizes of couples by work
hour arrangement strategies and parental status. The majority of couples in the sample
become parents over the survey period, but full-time dual earning couples are the modal
category among couples, regardless of whether children are present in the household. In
roughly 71 percent of childfree couples both spouses work full-time compared to only 59
percent of couples with children. In the next most common category of parents (31
percent), husbands work full-time while wives work part-time (less than 35 hours per
week) compared to only 18 percent of childfree couples.19
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A smaller 10 percent of parents follow the breadwinner/homemaker model described by Becker (1981),
but this is true for only 7 percent of childfree couples, suggesting that children do increase the likelihood of
mothers leaving employment. The two least common couple-types, where husbands work part-time and the
wives works full-time, is 4 and 3 percent for childless couples and parents, respectively, followed by “nontraditional” breadwinner/homemaker couples at 3 percent among parents and 2 percent among those
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Overall, the table suggests that specialization is occurring to a greater degree
within households with children, as there are a substantial number of couples where
fathers working full-time are married to mothers who work part-time, but the modal
category is full-time dual-earning couples, regardless of parental status. The table also
shows that in 12 percent of couples without children, husbands work 50 hours or more
per week and wives work full-time, compared to 10 percent of couples with children.
Meanwhile, only 3 percent of childfree and 6 percent of parental couples have a husband
who works excessive hours while wives work part-time. It is surprising that a larger
proportion of couples with children where husbands work long hours have wives who
work full-time compared to part-time. It is possible that these couples are more likely to
purchase services to address work and family obligations (Treas and DeRuijter 2008).
Multivariate Results
Table 3 presents the results estimating the effect of husbands’ wage advantage
and number of children within and across couples. The first column presents the
unconditional model that estimates the gross gender discrepancy in wages within and
between couples before accounting for the effects of children. To calculate a percentage
change in the dependent variable for a 1-unit change in the number of children, I
exponentiate the coefficients from the models, subtract one, and multiply by 100. The
initial model that includes only a dichotomous measure to capture the gender of the
spouse (1=male) and year of interview reveals that husbands’ wage advantage within
couples is a staggering 35 percent higher than wives’ wages ([exp [.30]-1] *100). Since

without children. I do not include breadwinner/homemaker couples or couples where men work less than
full-time in the analyses. Proportions, Standard Deviations, and sample sizes for all couples are available in
Appendix Table A2.
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the variance for gender is significant in the second panel of the table, I next investigate
how children impact husband advantage within households.
To assess how the gender wage gap changes with the addition of the number of
children in the household, I next fit a baseline dyadic model that includes a dichotomous
measure for spouse’s gender (1=male), year of interview, a continuous measure for
number of children in the household, and an interaction term for gender and number of
children in the household. The second column of Table 3 shows that there is again
significant husband wage advantage within childfree households of roughly 21 percent
([exp [.19]-1] *100), but this advantage increases to 31 percent with one child ([exp [.19
+ .08]-1] *100) and to 42 percent in families with two children ([exp [.19 + .08 + .08]-1]
*100). The main effect for number of children in the household, which can be interpreted
as the effect of children for wives, reveals a 3 percent per child penalty for motherhood.
For fathers, there is a 5 percent premium ([exp [-.03 + .08]-1] *100) associated with each
additional child. This confirms my first and second hypotheses: Husbands’ wage
advantage within households occurs among parents and childfree couples, but this
advantage increases according to the number of children in the household.
To evaluate my third hypothesis, the random effects results that capture the
variation across couples are presented in the second panel of Table 3. By calculating the
proportional reduction in the variance components, the random effects in dyadic multilevel models tell us how much of the variation within and between couples is explained
after including control measures. The first row of the table presents the level 1 variance,
or variation around the average wage gap within couples. Comparing the gross to the
baseline model, it appears that including the effect of children and the interaction with

35

gender does explain a significant portion of the average wage gap within couples. Since
the variance around the within-dyad mean is reduced from .1205 to .0825, accounting for
children in the household explains roughly 31.5 percent of initial within-couple wage
variation.20 The random effects at level 2 gives us the variance in slopes across dyads (or
the disparity in wages between couples) in the gender wage gap and per child effects on
hourly wages. After adding number of children to the model, the variance around the
mean wages across couples is reduced from .1465 to .1444, only a 2 percent reduction in
the proportional variance. This confirms my third hypothesis that accounting for number
of children would explain some the variation across households, but this is a very small
decrease. Overall, it appears that the effects of children initially explain proportionally
more wage variation within couples than wage inequality between couples.
To assess my fourth and fifth hypotheses regarding assortative partnering and
human capital, the third column of Table 3 presents the results after including spouses’
age and education in the model.21 The pattern of the coefficients in the upper panel
remains the same as in the previous model, but the variance around the average gap
within couples increases slightly from .0825 to .0838, a proportional increase of roughly
2 percent. This disproves my fourth hypothesis that including controls for age and
education of each spouse in the model will decrease the gender and parental gap within
couples. The coefficients remain unchanged from the baseline model and the variance
within couples slightly increases, instead of declining as expected. These results indicate
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The formula for the proportional reduction in variance is as follows: ((.1205 -.0825)/.1205) * 100).

In results not shown, I included alternate measures for the proportion of spouses’ age and years of
education that yielded the same results for the gender gap and the effects of children. See Table A6 in
Appendix.
21
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that human capital actually has a suppressing effect on wage inequality within couples.
However, including controls for age and education of each spouse in the model explains
more wage variation across couples, supporting my fifth hypothesis. The variance around
the mean across dyads is reduced to .0989 from .1444, a 31.9 percent reduction in the
proportional variance across couples. In addition, controlling for human capital reduces
more of the variance around the motherhood penalty (11 percent) than the fatherhood
premium (6 percent), indicating that human capital has more explanatory power for the
effect of children on wives’ wages than for husbands. I explore variation in the
distribution of within couple wage gaps across education in more detail in the next
chapter. Overall, these results suggest that accounting for spouses’ age and education
does little to explain within-couple wage inequality, but does partially explain inequality
in wages across households.
To evaluate my sixth hypothesis regarding household specialization, the fourth
column of Table 3 presents the results from the full model after including controls for
weekly work hours and annual weeks worked for each spouse. This allows me to
investigate to what degree spouses’ work effort explains the variation in the wage gaps
within and among couples, controlling for age and educational attainment. Again, the
coefficient for husbands’ advantage within childfree couples remains unchanged.
However, the motherhood penalty is slightly reduced to 2 percent while fathers incur a
larger premium of 6 percent. Supporting my sixth hypothesis, it appears that the theory of
household specialization has more explanatory power for the motherhood wage penalty
than the fatherhood premium, but accounting for work effort produces only a small
reduction in the penalty.
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Turning to the variance components, accounting for labor supply again increases
the within-couple variation from .0838 to roughly .0867, a 3.2 percent increase in the
proportional variance, while the variation in wages across couples decreases by 7.5
percent, from .0989 to .0915, a smaller reduction than when age and education were
added to the model. These results suggest that after accounting for couple’s work effort,
the wage gap within couples is wider, but work effort differences explain more of the
wage inequality across couples. In terms of the effects of children, however, more of the
variance around the motherhood penalty (or the variance around number of children) is
reduced from .0083 to .0072 (13.3 percent reduction), while the variance around the
fatherhood premium is reduced from .0289 to .0284 (a 2 percent reduction), a
considerable difference. These results confirm my sixth hypothesis that adding work
hours would have more explanatory power for the motherhood penalty than the
fatherhood premium.
The last row in the lower panel of Table 3 shows very small reductions in the
residual variance with the addition of each set of controls in subsequent models. The
residual variance in the gross model declines from .2530 to .2402 (a 5.1 percent
reduction) in the baseline model, but increases slightly with the addition of human capital
measures to .2412. After including measures for spouses’ work effort, the variance
decreases to .2320, a 3 percent proportional reduction in the residual variance. A great
deal of unexplained variation remains around the error term in the full model. Although
human capital and work effort have some effect on reducing variation among couples,
these results indicate that these factors do not fully explain the wage inequality within or
across couples. It is possible that the remaining unexplained gender and child effects on
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wages may be in part the result of differential treatment by employers, but I cannot
account for this explanation with my data.
To visually demonstrate the wage gaps within couples, Figure 1 graphically
illustrates the results from the full model using dummy measures for one, two, or three or
more children in the household along with the corresponding interaction term with
husband’s wage advantage.22 Figure 1 shows that while childfree husbands garner a
substantial wage advantage of 23 percent, fathers garner no extra premium for having 1
child. However, with the arrival of the second child, it appears that the gender
discrepancy in wages grows to a staggering 58.3 percent premium, while the effect of
husbands’ advantage with 3 or more children is yet larger at approximately 68 percent.
The results reveal that there are important differences between families in how children
impact the gender wage gap within couples. It is possible that couples who only have one
child are differentially selected into marriage or that husbands and wives who are closer
in wages may stop having children after their first. Moreover, it is also possible that
wives who maintain full-time employment after the first child reduce work time with the
arrival of a second child.
Figure 2 presents the alignment of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood
premium associated each successive child within couples. As with Figure 1, there are
clear differences between families who only have one child and those who have two or
more. There is no significant motherhood penalty within couples associated with one
child (effect is non-significant), but a substantial bonus of 6 percent for fathers. This is
supported by previous work that finds small and non-significant wage penalties
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Full results available in Appendix Table A4.
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associated with the arrival of the first child for women in fixed effect models (see Budig
and England 2001, Appendix Table B: 223). Again, it may be the case that the arrival of
the second child may be when mothers who remained employed after their first child
leave paid employment (Stone 2007). For families with two children, the gap between
spouses grows. There is a motherhood penalty of 3.5 percent associated with two children
while the fatherhood premium grows to substantially larger 17.8 percent. Within couples
with three or more children the gap between spouses is again further amplified: the
motherhood penalty for wives increases to 8.5 percent, but the fatherhood premium
decreases slightly to 15.4 percent. Figures 1 and 2 indicate that while the initial child
does not have a significant effect on mothers’ wages, it could be the case that the arrival
of the second child is a “tipping point” for household specialization. Wives attempt to
maintain full-time employment after their first child, but reduce work time with the
arrival of the second, and reduce time even further with a third child. Overall, the results
reveal that wage inequality increases within couples as the number of children in the
household grows.
Household Specialization across Couples by Work Hour Arrangements
Table 4 presents the results for separate models for the effect of children on
couple’s hourly wages based on different work time arrangements, controlling for
spouses’ age and years of education. To assess Cha’s (2010) claims about the relationship
between spousal overwork and within-couple inequality, in addition to comparing
couples where both spouses work full-time to couples where wives work part-time, Table
4 also includes the results for couples where husbands work over 50 hours per week and
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wives work either part-time or full-time.23 As with Table 3, the first panel of the table
presents the results from the fixed effects and I exponentiate the coefficients to ease
interpretation.
Looking across all 4 types of couples, Table 4 reveals some unexpected findings
in terms of husband wage advantage and the alignment of parental penalties and premia
within couples. Figure 3 graphically presents the results for husband wage advantage
across couples from the first panel of Table 4. The results only partially support my
seventh hypothesis: husbands’ wage advantage is larger within couples with children, but
husbands’ wage advantage is not larger within couples when husbands work excessive
hours instead of standard full-time. Among couples where husbands work standard hours,
the gender wage gap within childfree couples when wives work part-time is a quite large
41.9 percent, but this advantage grows to a substantial 52 percent within parental couples.
Among couples where both partners work full-time, male wage advantage is significantly
lower (16.1 percent), but husbands in dual-earning parental households garner an 8
percent wage advantage over childfree men (22.1 percent). When wives work part-time,
wage advantage for husbands who work long hours is 32.3 percent within childfree
couples and 43.3 percent in couples with children. However, when women work fulltime, husband advantage within childfree couples is a non-significant 6.2 percent and
only a 13.9 percent for parents, considerably smaller than couples where wives work
reduced hours. The results indicate that husbands who work excessive hours do not
necessarily garner more advantage compared to husbands who work a standard 40 hour
work week, regardless of parental status. In terms of male wage advantage, the results do
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See Table A3 for results including all possible couple-types from initial analyses.
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not support Cha’s claims that excessive hours necessarily intensifying household wage
inequalities. The wage advantage for childfree husbands and fathers is smaller when
husbands work long hours. Overall, fathers in all couples experience substantial wage
advantage, but this advantage is reduced within couples where wives work full-time, and
particularly if husbands work long hours.
To assess my eighth hypothesis, Figure 4 graphically presents the results from
Table 4 for the alignment of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium within
couples working standard and excessive hours. I posited that the per child wage gap
within couples will be largest in households where men work excessive hours, followed
by couples with wives who work part-time, and full-time dual-earners will have the
smallest wage gaps associated with children. Again, the results only partially confirm my
hypothesis. Looking first at couples where husbands work standard full-time and wives
work part-time, the motherhood penalty is 2 percent, while the effect of fatherhood is
roughly 5 percent. Meanwhile, in couples where both husbands and wives work full-time,
the fatherhood premium is reduced to 2 percent and the motherhood penalty grows to 3
percent. This indicates that when wives work full-time, the fatherhood premium is
significantly smaller, but the motherhood penalty is slightly larger. However, as
expected, the gap within couples is larger when wives engage in part-time employment.
For couples where husbands work excessive hours, Figure 4 reveals that the
motherhood penalty is not significant for part-time wives, but significant and
substantially larger for wives who work full-time. Moreover, fathers do not incur larger
premiums for working excessive hours when wives work full-time (1 percent), but
receive the same premium when wives work part-time (5 percent) as if they worked

42

standard work hours. Here, the results do support Cha’s (2010) argument that long work
hours exacerbate gender inequalities within households. Across all households, husband
wage advantage is larger for fathers than childfree men, but the fatherhood premium does
not accrue based on fathers’ increased work time. Rather, it is the effect of children on
wives’ wages that amplifies within-couple wage inequality. Husbands who work
excessive hours do not garner more advantage for having children than husbands who
work standard hours. However, the size of the motherhood penalty varies based on both
wives and husbands’ work time. The results only partially confirm my last hypothesis, as
the wider wage gaps associated with children within couples appear to be primarily
driven by the penalties incurred by wives who work full-time, not part-time. This
indicates that the theory of household specialization does not fully explain the differential
gender effects for having children.
As with Table 3, however, there are significant residual effects within couples that
remain unexplained. It is likely that other factors not included in the analysis, such as
spouse’s work experience or occupation, may reduce some the of the unexplained gender
gap and child wage effects. I discuss these factors in more detail in the next section.
Moreover, as previous work on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium argues,
it is also possible that the remaining wage inequality within and between households
could result from differential treatment by employers based on gendered notions of the
“ideal worker” (Williams 2000; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Correll et al 2007).
Unfortunately, I can only speculate regarding employers since information on employer
behavior is not available in the data.
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Conclusion
While progress in the decline of the wage gap among childfree workers is
encouraging, a substantial gender pay gap remains among US workers. This paper
contributes to the literature on work and family and speaks to current debates regarding
the decline in the gender wage gap. The results from this chapter reveal a strong
relationship between gender, parenthood, and wage inequality within and across
households. Much of the remaining wage gap is situated within marriages and
compounded by the arrival of children. In terms of my first research question, within
households, husbands’ wage advantage increases substantially with the arrival of the
second child and grows with each additional child thereafter. In line with current
discussions about the stalled reduction in the gender wage gap (Blau et al 2006), within
married households, on average, husbands have substantial wage advantage over wives,
regardless of parental status, but this wage advantage is not fully explained by either
human capital or labor supply differences between spouses.
In terms of my second research question, the alignment of parental wage effects
within couples illustrate that on average, fathers enjoy substantial wage premiums while
mothers incur larger wage penalties as the number of children increases. Regardless of
spouses’ human capital and work effort, wage inequality within marriage is exacerbated
as more children enter the household. Prior work finds that husbands’ careers often take
precedent in work and home tradeoffs made between spouses and this appears to be the
case as more children enter the household. Spouses’ human capital characteristics explain
less of the variation in the effects of children on wages within households, but a large
proportion of the average wage variation across couples. Moreover, human capital and
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spousal work effort also explain more of the variation in the motherhood penalty than the
fatherhood premium. The results suggest that within-couple wage gaps are shaped by
wives’ characteristics more so than husbands,’ but these wage discrepancies are not fully
explained by either spouses’ human capital or work effort.
Finally, my last research question asked how much of the variation across
households could be explained by the presence of children based on couples’ work hour
arrangements. The results indicate that the theory of household specialization does not
fully explain the differential gender effects for having children across all households
based on couples work time tradeoffs. Moreover, Cha’s (2010) claims regarding
excessive work hours are informed by my results. The wider child gaps within couples
appear to be primarily driven by the penalties incurred by wives who work full-time.
When wives work full-time, husbands’ advantage and the fatherhood premium are
significantly smaller, but husbands who work excessive hours do not garner more
advantage for having children than husbands who work standard hours. Across all
households, wage advantage is larger for fathers than childless men, but as seen in
previous work, (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010) the fatherhood premium
does not accrue based on fathers’ increased work time., However, both wives and
husbands’ work time shape the size of the motherhood penalty. Regardless of whether
husbands work standard or excessive hours, when wives work full-time, wage penalties
are larger and premiums are smaller. When wives work part-time, fatherhood premiums
are larger, but motherhood penalties are small or non-significant.
The residual wage premiums for fatherhood and the motherhood penalty remain
largely unexplained. Although human capital and work effort have some effect on
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reducing variation among couples, the results indicate that these factors do not fully
explain the gender wage gap nor the family gap within and across couples. Prior work
had found that employers tend to evaluate workers based on assumptions regarding their
parental status. Correll et al (2007) find that fathers are more likely to be viewed
favorably by evaluators, followed by childfree women, childfree men, and lastly mothers
in terms of dependability and productivity. It is likely that the remaining unexplained
gender and child effects on wages may be in part the result from differential treatment by
employers.
There are some important limitations to my analyses. First, the variables available
for both spouses in the NLSY are limited. A number of measures for human capital and
job characteristics, such as work experience, job seniority and tenure, number of jobs
ever held, public/private sector, and self-employment, would have been useful as control
measures. Future research should investigate how other measures of human capital, such
as work experience, and job characteristics shape the wage inequality within married
couples with children. Also, since there are a large number of missing values on spouse’s
wage in the NLSY, thus truncating the number of unemployed wives who might report a
“0” for wages, my analysis is limited to couples reporting non-zero scores on wages. This
means that I am potentially missing couples where mothers “opt out” of paid employment
and that the results may understate wives’ motherhood penalty and the wage gap between
husbands and wives. Lastly, although it is likely that the residual unexplained variation in
my models may be caused by employer actions and behaviors, I cannot assess with
certainty the role of factors outside of households in shaping wage outcomes.
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However, the remaining unexplained variation both within and across couples
suggests that lack of flexibility in workplaces may play a role in maintaining gender wage
inequality. My analysis finds that is it wives, not husbands, who continue to adjust work
time in response to having children. While popular media encourages women to “lean in”
(Sandberg 2013), it appears that the structure of work continues to be a strong factor that
exacerbates work and family conflict, but also contributes to the reproduction of gender
inequality within and across families. Moreover, employers may also reward parents
differently based on gendered expectations about parents as employees as prior research
would suggest (Correll et al 2007). Therefore, calls for individual women to “lean in” do
not appear to make much sense if we are to close the gender wage gaps occurring within
families. Further research should also concentrate on investigating how work structure
and employer behaviors reproduce wage inequality within families. Overall, it is clear
that “brining the household back in” uncovers how gender wage inequality based on
family composition contributes to the gender wage gap both within and across married
couple households.
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CHAPTER 3
CLASS MATTERS: WAGE GAPS WITHIN COUPLES ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS
BY INCOME AND EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
In the previous chapter, I assessed the ways in which within-couple wage
inequality varies across couples based on spousal tradeoffs in work time. This chapter
seeks to situate those findings within couples across socioeconomic class by education
and income level. The motivation for this analyses stems from recent academic and
popular media attention paid to the growth of US income inequality in the latter half of
the 20th century. Recently, studies by Greenwood and colleagues (2014) and Cherlin
(2014) have found that a partial explanation for the growth in US earnings inequality is
based in partnership and marriage patterns among different socioeconomic groups. The
earnings gap between couples with relatively high and those with relatively low levels of
education has widened substantially since 1960 relative to the average household income
(Greenwood, Guner, Kocharkov, and Santos 2014) and marriage gaps between
socioeconomic groups have widened in accordance with widening wage inequality.
However, it is unclear how wage effects associated with parenthood contribute to these
trends. Since individuals are more likely to partner with those of similar educational
attainment (Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Swartz and Mare 2005) and income level, the
literature suggests that processes of family formation are important factors shaping
current wage inequality.
It is well documented that the processes affecting wage inequality are different for
high-skill and low-skill workers (Brown and Misra 2003; Williams 2010; Williams and
Boushey 2010; Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie 2006) and at different levels of income.
Highly educated and/or higher earning couples face different constraints and make
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different work-family decisions than couples with lower earnings and educational
attainment based on different job constraints (Williams and Boushey 2010; Williams
2010) and access to resources that better facilitate outsourcing of domestic services to
resolve work-family conflict. Since workers’ labor marking position has a direct effect on
family organization (Collins 1998), in this chapter I consider how within-couple wage
inequality is situated across families by social class and how processes of family
composition are related to the growth in US wage stratification.
As Chapter 2 demonstrated, wage inequality is not only shaped by marriage
patterns. Children also contribute to wage inequality between and among parents. On
average, children are associated with pay penalties for motherhood while fatherhood is
associated with wage premiums (Waldfogel 1997, 1998; Budig and England 2001;
Hodges and Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Glauber 2008a&b). While there has
been much debate regarding the appropriate unit of analysis and metric for studying wage
stratification (Sorenson 1994), both educational attainment and income level, two proxies
for social class position, are both important axes of variation for the motherhood penalty
and the fatherhood premium (Budig and Hodges 2010; Glauber 2008; Cooke 2014;
Anderson, Binder and Krause 2003). However, as discussed previously, the bulk of the
research examining child wage effects uses individuals as the unit of analysis and does
not consider how the effects of children on wages accrue within families. If wage
inequality can be partially attributed to processes of assortative partnering and family
composition, it is also important to consider the role child wage effects play in the wage
stratification process as well.

49

This study draws on feminist theoretical understandings of interlocking systems
of privilege and disadvantage (Collins 2006) to assess how wage inequality associated
with parenthood within couples is tied to socioeconomic stratification. Three research
questions guide this work: 1) how does husbands’ wage advantage (or the gender wage
gap) vary within households across income and educational attainment? 2) How do the
effects of children accrue within couples at different income and educational levels? And
3) Does within-couple wage inequality associated with children follow the same pattern
across the distribution of couples’ income and educational attainment? To date, there is
no study that considers how these processes within couples vary across socioeconomic
class by income and educational attainment.
I argue that due to processes of assortative partnering, wage gaps within couples
may be wider among couples at the tails of the income and educational distributions. In
couples who are highly skilled or high income workers, men who garner the largest
premiums are more likely to be married to women who incur potentially larger penalties.
Meanwhile, it is also possible that men who incur small fatherhood premiums may be
married to women who receive small motherhood penalties, resulting in smaller gender
pay differences within households, but greater inequality between households. The goal
of this paper is to assess how class structures gender and parental wage inequality within
couples and across households using dyadic multi-level models on the 1980-2008 waves
of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. I first discuss the different approaches
taken in the stratification literature to measuring class inequality before I review the
relevant literature that examines the effects of children by income level and educational
attainment among individuals. I then discuss my expectations regarding potential
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differences in the distribution of the gender wage gap and child wage effects across
income and education. I explain how I operationalize and test the arguments in my
analyses before moving on to the empirical section of my study.
Explaining Variation in Couples’ Wages across Class
There has been much debate among researchers regarding the appropriateness of
using either the family or the individual as the unit of analysis for measuring wage
stratification. Much of the debate hinges on the importance of women’s employment for
understanding hierarchies within and across households. The conventional approach
among early stratification and status attainment scholars (Becker 1981; Blau and Duncan
1967) used the family as the unit of analysis, assuming all family members’ class position
mirrored that of the male head of household. In other words, women’s class position was
assumed to be the same as her husband and children. Feminist scholars have since
critiqued this approach, arguing that it does not fully account for women’s own labor
market position or experiences. In response, the focus of scholarship shifted to using
individual women and men as the unit of analysis for measuring stratification. This
productive area of research has generated the majority of the literature investigating the
effects of children on wages.
The family itself is a primary site for the production of gender inequality
(Hartmann 1981; Collins 1994) and the labor market position of families directly shapes
both gender and parenting practices within households (Shows and Gerstel 2008; Lareau
2003). Thus, valuable insight can be gained from using the family as the unit of analysis
to understand wage inequality within married couples and macro-level wage inequality
across families. This chapter again “brings the family back in” through use of dyadic
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multi-level models that employs couples as the unit of analysis, but also simultaneously
accounts for individual spouse’s class position within families. Taking the wages of both
members of a couple into account makes it possible to address many questions that are
central to our understanding of wage inequality in the context of families.
Since social class can be measured along multiple dimensions, how to assess the
distribution of within-couple wage gaps across socioeconomic groups is not
straightforward. To structure my analysis, I draw on previous work examining child wage
effects at the individual level that have used both earnings and education to assess the
distribution of child penalties and premiums. Some scholars have found that motherhood
penalties tend to be largest for women at the low end of the wage distribution (Budig and
Hodges 2010; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 2012), while larger fatherhood wage
premiums are found at higher wage levels (Cooke 2014). In terms of educational
attainment, other work has found that high school graduates tend to incur larger wage
losses for motherhood than either low- or high-skill mothers (Anderson, Binder, and
Krause 2003),24 while married men who are college graduates and whose jobs emphasize
cognitive skills receive the largest fatherhood earnings bonuses (Hodges and Budig
2010). Taking married couples as the unit of analyses, I assess the variation in the gender
and parental wage gaps within and between households based on household income level
and the educational attainment of spouses. Previous work suggests that the distribution of
the effects of children will produce somewhat different patterns of within-couple wage
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The wage penalties for medium-skill mothers are thought to be due to differences in job and work time
constraints. High school graduates are more likely to hold jobs requiring their presence during regular
office hours, and are unlikely to gain flexibility by finding work at other hours or by taking work home in
the evening (Anderson, et al 2003).
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inequality across income and education. Based on previous findings from the literature, I
posit two initial hypotheses:
H1: Husbands will garner a wage advantage within couples regardless of parental
status, income level, and educational attainment.
H2: Husband wage advantage within couples will increase with the presence of children
in the household as income level and education level rises.
Within-Couple Wage Inequality by Family Income
What drives variation in the returns to children for parents at different income
levels? Couples’ family resources and income level are linked to women’s labor force
attachment and work effort (Williams and Boushey 2010) with consequences for wage
discrepancies within and among households. Despite the rise of the dual-earning couple,
the institutional context of work in which US families live has not changed accordingly to
accommodate workers’ family obligations (Moen 2003; Albiston 2007; Gornick and
Meyers 2005), thus producing differences in strategies for combining work and family
across socioeconomic groups (Williams and Boushey 2010). Among dual-earners, and
particularly among those with the highest earnings, one partner’s success at work often
comes at the expense of the other (Moen 2003; Presser 1994) after the arrival of
children,25 with wives more likely than husbands to take non-traditional work
arrangements, such as working part-time, to better blend work and family (Moen 2003).
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While there has been considerable debate in the past decade over whether highly educated mothers are
“opting out,” (Belkin 2003) of paid work, women overall continue to have strong labor market attachment
(Boushey 2008; Stone 2007; Carr 2005). Recent findings do not indicate that women have opted out in
significant numbers or that the phenomenon has increased (Goldin 2006). Since I am considering wage
gaps within in this analysis, I focus on households where women remain employed after having children,
but include consideration of how women’s work hours change in response to having children.
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Studies of highly skilled professional women find that husbands’ careers are often taken
into account when making their decisions to remain employed, reduce work time, or
leave employment (Stone 2007). Furthermore, those in upper income levels are more
likely to be employed in jobs with benefits that may better facilitate combining work and
family responsibilities (Williams and Boushey 2010; Stone 2007). Couples at the highest
earnings levels also tend to outsource care responsibilities by paying for services (Moen
2003; Treas and DeRuijter 2008) and are thus better able to address work and family
obligations. Meanwhile, for the poor and working class, reducing work time for either
spouse may not be an option due to economic necessity, suggesting that tradeoffs in time
spent working or providing care between spouses may be more likely to occur within
couples at higher versus lower income levels.
A new direction in the child wage effects literature uses quantile regression
models to assess how the wage penalties and premiums associated with parenthood vary
across men and women’s earnings distributions (Budig and Hodges 2010; Killewald and
Bearak 2014; Budig and Hodges 2014; England, Bearak, Budig and Hodges 2012; Cooke
2014). A recent study by England et al (2012) examining the motherhood wage penalty
using NLSY79 data finds that among white women, although the unadjusted wage
penalty is highest for mothers with high skills and high wages, net wage penalties are
higher for low-wage mothers (England et al 2012). High-wage/high-skill motherhood
penalties are largely driven by mothers lost work experience from taking time off after
having a child, but this is not the case for low-wage mothers.26 Using LIS data to
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As in the previous chapter, I use age as a proxy control measure for work experience. Unfortunately, the
spousal data contained in the household roster of the NLSY does include sufficient measures that allow for
a construction of work experience for spouses. In results not shown, I also tested the effect of potential
work experience as used by Killewald (2013). See Appendix Table A9 for results.
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compare fatherhood premiums in the US and UK, Lynn Prince Cooke also finds that the
fatherhood premium grows as earnings increase, such that the highest-earning men garner
the largest fatherhood premium, but low-earning fathers incur wage penalties (Cooke
2014). Taken together, these findings suggest that the gender wage gaps associated with
children will be widest in the upper tail of the income distribution, net of couples’ work
effort. Unfortunately, at this time there is no method for quantile regression using dyads
as the unit of analysis. To assess within-couple wage inequality across the income
distribution, I use the NLSY’s measure for net family income and run separate models for
couples as the bottom fifth (.05), the bottom tenth (.10), the twenty-fifth (.25), the median
(.50), the seventy-fifth (.75), the ninetieth (.90), and ninety-fifth (.95) percentiles of the
income distribution. As in all analyses in this chapter, I control for differences across
income in work-time tradeoffs by including measures for the effects of each spouse’s
weekly work hours and annual weeks worked in my estimates wage inequality within
couples by income level.
H3: I expect that net husbands’ wage advantage will grow larger within couples as
income rises.
H4: The net wage gaps within couples associated with children will be largest in the
upper half of the family income distribution.
Within-Couple Wage Inequality by Educational Attainment
As Greenwood et al (2014) and Cherlin (2014) demonstrate, processes of
assortative partnering in terms of age and along educational lines also have important
implications for wage inequality within and across households. Empirical studies of
marital sorting have found that education is a primary factor now shaping marriage
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patterns (Kalmijn 1998; Rosenfield 2007). High earning women are more likely to
partner with men with high expected future earnings and similar educational credentials
(Schwartz and Mare 2005). Winslow (2009) finds that regardless of work effort, for both
men and women, having a bachelor’s degree or more is associated with higher odds of
earning as much as or more than one’s spouse. If men who receive the largest premiums
tend to be married to women who incur the smallest penalties (because both are highly
skilled or highly educated workers), then this would result in smaller gender pay
differences within households with more education, but contribute to greater wage
inequality across households as child wage gaps may be larger among couples with less
education. Given the increased likelihood of individuals to select a spouse with similar
education, it is possible that the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium may
exacerbate both wage inequality within households, but also contribute to wage
inequality among coupled households across educational groups.
Previous work on the wage effects of children has shown that education matters
for the distribution of the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium. However,
findings are mixed. While Loghren and Zissimopoulous (2008) find no differences in the
penalty by education, previous work by Amuedo-Dorantes and Kimmel (2005) and
Taniguchi (1999) found higher penalties among less educated women. Waldfogel (1997)
found larger penalties among well educated women, while Anderson et al. (2002, 2003)
find larger penalties in the middle levels of education. Moreover, in terms of educational
requirements for jobs, Budig and England (2001) found that the penalty differs little by
occupational status, while Wilde, Batchelder and Ellwood (2010) find that mothers in
jobs with high skill requirements incur larger motherhood penalties than low-skilled
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women. Meanwhile, highly educated, professional/managerial fathers garner the largest
premiums (Hodges and Budig 2010). To sort out these mixed findings in the household
context, I compare couples’ in terms of spouses’ degree attainment to assess variation in
the gender wage gap and the influence of children on within-couple wage gaps across
levels of educational attainment.
H5: Husbands’ wage advantage within households will be smaller if wives have the same
or more education than husbands.
H6: The parental wage gaps will be widest in couples where wives have less education
than husbands.
Comparing Within-Couple Wage Inequality across Income and Education
Given that education is not perfectly correlated with income, I expect differences
in the distribution of within couples parental wage gaps across income and education.
Based on previous work (Budig and Hodges 2010; England et al 2013) motherhood
penalties, net of experience may be largest at the lowest income levels but should decline
as income rises. However, the opposite should be true of the fatherhood premium (Cooke
2014), with high-earning fathers garnering larger bonuses than low-earning fathers.
Therefore, within-couple wage inequality based on children should widen as income level
increases. In terms of education, previous findings are more inconclusive: while the
fatherhood premium should be largest amongst highly educated couples (Hodges and
Budig 2010), it is unclear whether motherhood penalties would be largest for less versus
more educated wives, net of spousal work effort. Based on the trajectory of the
fatherhood premium, previous work suggests that the child gaps within couples should be
widest in the tails of the educational distribution.
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H7: Wage gaps associated with children will be larger in the top half of the income
distribution, while the gaps within couples will be largest in the tails of the education
distribution.
Selection into Marriage and Parenthood
In addition to selection into marriage and parenthood based on education and
income, most research finds that marriage itself is linked to greater motherhood penalties
(Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2007; Misra et al. 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010),
possibly because married women’s greater family resources allow them to reduce their
work effort when children are young. Hodges and Budig (2010) and Glauber (2008a&b)
also find that the effect of marriage explains roughly one-half of the fatherhood earnings
bonus. Moreover, as discussed in the literature on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood
premium, factors that influence wages within couples may be due to unmeasured factors,
such as individual career ambition, that cannot be captured by adding controls to the
model. Also, factors that influence wages may increase or decrease a couple’s likelihood
of having children. As in my previous chapter, to address this, prior research has
primarily employed fixed-effect models that provide estimates that are robust to
unobserved differences among respondents that do not change over time (Allison 2009).
However, the fixed-effects in multi-level dyadic models cannot control for unmeasured
differences among couples that influence the effect of children on earnings or that
statistically interact with another variable that influences these effects. Thus, time
changing variables that could simultaneously influence both the likelihood of couples
having children and how much each spouse earns must be explicitly included in the
model.
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Factors outside the Household
As discussed in Chapter 2, another explanation for the fatherhood premium and
the motherhood penalty is discriminatory employer evaluations that penalize or reward
men and women differently based on perceptions of job performance and parental status.
Experimental and audit studies have found employers are more likely to judge and
reward employees differentially by gender and parental status (Correll, Benard, and Paik
2007). However, as in my previous chapter, because the NLSY does not contain
information on employers, I cannot capture employer effects in my data. In line with
previous work on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium (Budig and England
2001; Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010; Budig and Hodges 2010), I again
argue that any residual unexplained variation that remains within and between couples
after controlling for other explanatory factors could potentially result from employer’s
behavior.
Data and Methods
I use the 1980-2008 waves of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, a
national probability sample of individuals.27 Respondents were interviewed annually until
the 1994 survey and bi-annually thereafter. In 1979, the initial year of the survey,
respondents were aged 14-21; in 2008, the ages of respondents range from 41 to 58. All
models include all racial/ethnic categories in the NLSY: non-Hispanic white, nonHispanic black, and Latino. The NLSY is a rich source of data on employment and
households, however, spousal data obtained from the household roster is less complete,
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1979 is omitted from the analysis as there were too few couples available that met sampling criteria.
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but includes key measures of spouses’ age, education, and work effort necessary for this
analysis.28
I construct a dyadic data set by identifying married couples with partners over the
age of 18, not currently enrolled, and not in the military, with valid (non-zero) scores on
wages for least two time periods for each spouse. Over the survey waves, the NLSY
captures up to three marriages of respondents.29 I follow couples from their first marriage
until they divorce (thus dropping out the sample), separate (one member leaves the
household) or until the last year of interview. Once a couple divorces or no longer lives
together, they drop out of the sample as they cease to be engaged in a co-residential
relationship. The sample contains a total of 5,769 couples for analysis (13,550 childfree
and 47,740 parental couple-years).
Measures
The dependent variable used in this analysis is the natural log of hourly wage,
reported by each member of the dyad.30 I include both individual and couple-level
independent variables to investigate the effects of children on within-couple wage gaps
across income and education. First, I include a dichotomous measure for gender (male
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Because data on cohabitation is only available in the NLSY79 for years 1994 -2010, I limit my analysis
to married couples only.
29

Should a respondent remarry, I created another couple identification number and assign the
corresponding measures to this new couple. I tested for differences in the effect of gender and children on
couple wages for second and third marriages. Results were only significant for second marriages and given
selection differences between first and second marriages, I only present the results for first marriages.
30

Multi-level dyadic discrepancy models require reorganization of the NLSY data into dyadic format.
Table A1 in the Appendix illustrates how the data is organized for the analysis. The dependent variable
includes a wage score for each member of the dyad, or the outcome score for the natural logarithm of
hourly wages in each dyad j.
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=1) to account for the discrepancy in hourly wages. I also include a control variable for
year of interview to reduce period effects. Next, I include a continuous measure for
number of children in the household and an interaction term with gender. Continuous
control measures include age (in years) of husbands and wives and measures for the usual
weekly work hours and annual weeks worked in main job for each spouse. To compare
couples at different quantiles across the income distribution, I use a couple-level measure
for net family income provided in the NLSY household roster. I also created dichotomous
measures to capture spouses’ degree attainment for having less than a high school
diploma, high school graduate, and having a Bachelor’s Degree or higher. I compare
couples based on different combinations of spouses’ degree attainment.
Dyadic Multilevel Models
I investigate couples’ wage gaps over time using longitudinal dyadic discrepancy
models, a subset of multi-level models (Raudenbusch and Bryk 2002; Sayer and Klute
2005). The model is estimated at two levels with time in years nested within individuals.
Individuals are then nested within couples. At level 1, the units are the repeated responses
over time (for example, the log of wages) within each couple. At level 2, the unit of
analysis is the couple.31 The level 1 (within-dyad) model estimates the average
differences in hourly wages within couples at each time point, while level 2 estimates
average gaps in wages between couples. To establish the gross discrepancy within and
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Conceptually, the model contains 3 levels with two levels of nesting. Responses at each time point are
nested within individuals and individuals are nested within couples. However, at the level of analysis it is a
2 level model with a single level of nesting because responses are nested within couples. In the dyadic
model, gender is a characteristic of the repeated responses (a fixed effect) rather than a level in the model.
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between couples, I first fit an unconditional model that only includes a control for year of
interview and the gender discrepancy dummy at level 1. The unconditional level 1 and
level 2 models are as follows:
LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij) + rij

B0j = γ00 + u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
β2j = γ20 + u2j
LNWAGEj is the outcome score of the log of hourly wage for each member of the couple i

in each dyad j (see Table A1). I fix effects across time by including a control variable for
year of interview to reduce period effects. For each dyad, the responses of the spouses
are regressed on an indicator variable, MALEij, or the variable that will capture the gender
gap, coded 1 for men and 0 for women. The intercept represents the earnings score for
wives when the year is 1980, or when both MALE and YEAR are equal to zero.
At level 2, the coefficients from level 1 become the dependent variables and a
separate equation for each dependent variable (or level 1 coefficient) is estimated. The
term, B0j represents wages for women at year zero, while, γ00, represents the average
wives’ wage across all couples, and u0j is the unexplained residual variance in wives’
wages. The term, β1j is the gap in wages between husbands and wives, controlling for
year, and γ10 is the average wage gap across all couples. The term β2j represents the
relationship between time and wages, or the rate of change in wages, given a spouse’s
gender, controlling for the gender gap, while the term γ20 is the average wage relationship
(rate of change) across all couples.
Each level 2 equation includes an intercept that represents the value of the
dependent variable for the average couple, plus a term that captures the unexplained or
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residual variance for each dependent variable at level 2. This variance can be interpreted
as the heterogeneity across couples, or how each couple differs from the average couple.
Significant variance in the unconditional model indicates unexplained variability across
couples, thus allowing me to introduce predictors of this variability into the model. For
example, if there is significant variation in husband advantage in the unconditional
model, I can introduce dyad characteristics, such as number of children, to explain this
variance. Subsequent conditional models include predictors (number of children, it’s
interaction with gender, and spouse’s characteristics) that may reduce or enlarge the
gender wage gap. The baseline model that introduces child effects is as follows:
LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij) + β3j (NUMKIDS) +β4j*(MALE
*NUMKIDS) + rij
B0j = γ00 + u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
β2j = γ10 + u1j
β3j = γ20 + γ21 + u2j
β4j = γ30 + γ31 + u2j
I approach my analyses of wage inequality within and across couples by
categorizing couples according to family income level and educational degree attainment.
To ease comparison of the differences between education and income level in the
distribution of within-couple wage inequality, I use 7 quantiles to assess income
differences and also grouped couples into 7 categories based on spouses’ education. My
first set of analyses compares within couple wage gaps across seven income quantiles
(the .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, and .95). In my next set of analyses, I compare different
educational “couple-types” where: 1) both spouses have less than a high school diploma
(< 12 years completed); 2) couples where husbands have less than a high school diploma,
but wives have more education; 3) couples where wives have a high school diploma and
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husbands do not; 4) couples where both husband and wives are high school graduates (12
years of education); 5) couples where husbands have graduated high school, but wives
have obtained some education beyond high school; 6) couples where husbands have a
bachelor’s degree (or higher), but wives do not; and 7) couples where both spouses have
a bachelor’s degree (16 years completed) or more. I run models separately for each
education couple-type and income quantile.
Findings
Descriptive Results
Table 5 presents descriptive results for both couple and individual-level measures
used in the analysis. The first panel of Table 5 displays the means and standard deviations
for the between- couple variables used in the analysis. Chi-square and t-tests for paired
means were conducted to test for significant differences across couples by parental status.
As in my previous empirical chapter, couples with children average significantly higher
hourly wages ($15.36) compared to childfree ($14.01) couples.32 Couples with children
also have significantly higher net family income ($71,183.98) compared to childfree
couples ($67,374.41). Again, the average number of children living in the household is 2
children. As with the previous chapter, these averages demonstrate that husband wage
advantage grows when children are present in the household.
The second panel of Table 5 presents the means, proportions, and standard
deviations of individual, within-couple measures by parental status. The first row again
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This is the dependent variable used in my multivariate analyses that is the combination of scores for each
member of the dyad. The dyadic models used in later analyses use each spouse’s score on wages in each
year to estimate the wage discrepancies within couples. Therefore, the dependent variable contains both
husband and wives’ wage scores. See Table A1 in the Appendix.
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indicates that husbands will have a large and positive wage advantage within couples and
that having children will increase this advantage. Looking at hourly wages, husbands
have significantly higher wages than wives overall, but fathers garner the highest average
hourly wage of $18.16, compared to $15.71 for childfree husbands. The gap within
couples is larger among parents ($5.43 compared to $3.34) than childfree couples,
indicating that marriage itself continues to be a contributing factor to gender inequality
within couples (South and Spitze 1994; West and Zimmerman 1987; Gupta 1999; 2007),
but the presence of children amplifies within-couple wage gaps.
There are also differences in wives’ employment participation between childless
and parental households. As with my previous chapter, since I am concerned primarily
with estimating wage gaps within dual-earning couples, I limit my observations to
couples who have non-zero responses for wages. Thus, the sample primarily includes
couples with employed wives. Given that I am missing wives who drop out of the
workforce after having children, I may be underestimating the overall wage penalty of all
married women33 in the larger population. As expected, husbands are more likely than
wives to be employed regardless of whether they have children or not, but wives’ type of
employment (part-time versus full-time) varies by parental status. A larger proportion of
wives with children, 33 percent, work part-time (less than 35 hours per week) compared
to only 20 percent of childfree wives. It appears that the likelihood of wives’ employment
is indeed shaped by the presence of children, but based on my sampling restrictions, the
majority of mothers in my sample maintain employment.

Unfortunately, spouse’s wages in the NLSY contains a large amount of missing values. Since dyadic
multi-level models require valid (non-missing) values on wages, this has truncated the number of spouses
who would normally report a “0” for wages if not employed.
33
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Spouses with children are also more similar in terms of age and years of education
than those without children. While wives have more education than husbands within
childfree and parental couples, the gap between spouses with children is much smaller,
suggesting that since they are more similar on factors that can shape wage outcomes,
couples with children should experience less within-household inequality than childfree
couples, or that spouses who are more similar in terms of human capital may be more
likely to have children. The next four rows show differences in degree attainment by
gender within couples and by parental status. Regardless of parental status, husbands are
more likely to be high school dropouts than wives, with fathers at 18 percent and
childfree husbands at 14 percent, compared to wives’ 9 and 6 percent, respectively.
Among couples with less than a high school diploma, husbands’ likelihood is double that
of wives, regardless or parental status. Overall, wives are more likely to obtain degrees
within all marriages, with the exception of couples who have obtained a bachelor’s
degree or higher. Among the college-educated, there are very small differences in the
proportion of degree attainment between childfree couples and parents. Within childfree
couples, 36 percent of wives have a college degree compared to 39 percent of husbands.
Within parental couples, however, the gap in the proportion of obtaining a bachelor’s
degree is roughly the same (24-27 percent), but less overall than childfree couples,
suggesting that parents are, on average, less educated than childfree married couples. To
evaluate my fifth and sixth hypotheses, however, multivariate analyses are required.
In terms of household work effort, Table 5 reveals only slight variation in average
weekly work hours among husbands, regardless of parental status. Fathers work an
average of roughly one hour more per week than husbands without children. As expected,
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the reverse is true for wives: childfree wives work more hours than mothers, roughly 38
hours per week compared to mothers’ 35 hours per week. The gap in hours within
couples with children is significantly larger (roughly 10 hours) than the gap for childfree
couples (6 hours). The same pattern appears when comparing annual weeks worked
between mothers and childfree wives. Mothers work less weeks per year compared to
childfree wives, with little variation between fathers and childfree husbands. The gap
between childfree spouses in terms of annual weeks worked is also less than (2.5 weeks)
the gap of couples with children (6 weeks). As seen in the previous chapter, this pattern
indicates that the child gaps in wages result not from husbands increasing work effort, but
rather from wives curtailing work time when they have children. However, these withincouple tradeoffs in work time may vary across the distributions of education and family
income. Again, further analysis using multi-leveling modeling is required to directly test
my hypotheses regarding the variation in the gender and child wage gaps within couples.
Multivariate Results
Within-Couple Wage Inequality across Family Income
To evaluate variation in wage gaps within couples across family income, Table 6
presents the results from the fully specified model across couples’ income distribution.34
To calculate a percentage change in the dependent variable for a 1-unit change in the
number of children, I exponentiate the coefficients from the models, subtract one, and
multiply by 100. Following previous work that investigates the motherhood penalty and
the fatherhood premium across women and men’s wage distribution (Budig and Hodges

34

For variance components, see Table A7 in the Appendix.
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2010; Cooke 2014), I include results for estimating separate discrepancy models for the
following seven quantiles: the .05, .10, .25, .50, .75, .90, and .95.
Figure 5 graphically illustrates the variation in husband wage advantage by
parental status from Table 6. The results show that husband wage advantage and the
effect of children on parent’s wages net of couple work effort do indeed vary across wage
levels in distinct ways, but provide mixed support for my hypotheses. While it is clear
that childfree husbands’ and fatherhood wage advantage grows as net family income
increases, they do not follow the same pattern. Among couples at the bottom fifth and
tenth percentiles of family income, there is no significant gender wage advantage
afforded to childfree husbands. Meanwhile, fathers at the lowest fifth of the income
distribution incur a small wage penalty of roughly 2 percent. Contrary to my first
hypothesis, this indicates that among the poorest families, husbands do not garner wage
advantage over wives. At the tenth percentile of income, the results begin to fall in line
with expectations: although there is again no significant husband wage advantage within
childfree couples, fathers garner a large 30 percent wage advantage over wives.
Meanwhile, at the 25th percentile, there is significant wage advantage (roughly 39
percent) for husbands among childfree couples, but this advantage grows by only 1
percent in households with children. Overall, the results demonstrate that there is less
within-household wage inequality in the bottom third of the family income distribution,
based on the presence of children.
At the median of the family income distribution, within-couple wage inequality
grows, but to a smaller degree within parental couples. Childfree husbands’ wage
advantage is smaller (29 percent) than at the 25th percentile, but this advantage remains
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the same at 40 percent within couples with children. At the 75th percentile the gaps
between childfree and parental couples are similar: wage advantage within childfree
couples is 31 percent compared 39 percent within couples with children. It appears that
although husbands receive substantial wage advantage over wives at the middle of the
income distribution, there is little variation for fathers from the 25th to the 75th
percentiles. While childfree husbands have greater wage advantage at the 25th percentile,
the distributional pattern of husband advantage at the median and 75th percentile is
roughly the same.
However, among couples at the highest income levels, husbands’ wage advantage
grows significantly larger. At the 90th percentile, there is a 35 percent gap within childfree
couples compared to a substantial 47 percent gap within parental households. Among the
top fifth of the income distribution, the 46 percent gap within childfree couples grows to
a staggering 58 percent within couples with children. The results illustrate that among the
highest earners, husbands make significantly higher wages than wives, net of work effort,
and children increase within-couple wage inequality. Table 6 and Figure 5 reveal stark
variation in within- couple wage gaps across the family income distribution. The results
confirm hypotheses three: husbands’ wage advantage within couples grows as income
rises and within-couple wage inequality is largest amongst households at the highest
income levels. However, contradicting my first hypothesis, not all husbands receive
higher wages than their wives. In the bottom tenth of the family income distribution,
childfree husbands do not earn more than wives while fathers’ wage advantage increases
from the tenth percentile and up.

69

To evaluate my fourth hypothesis, Figure 6 graphically presents the results from
Table 6 for the distribution of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium on
wages within couples across the family income distribution. As with Figure 5, there is
distinct variation across households in terms of the effects of children on parent’s wages
between the bottom and top half of the income distribution. However, it appears that the
fatherhood premium varies to a lesser degree across income levels compared to the
motherhood penalty. While the largest fatherhood premium of roughly 4 percent occurs
at the median, the premium only varies slightly (from roughly 2 to 3 percent) across all
other quantiles. Wives in the bottom fifth of income incur a larger penalty of 4 percent
that decreases to approximately 3 percent at the tenth and 25th quantiles. The penalty
returns to 4 percent at the median and 75th quantiles, but grows to approximately 6
percent among the top tenth of the income distribution. Clearly, couples in the bottom 5
percent of income and those above the median have the largest gaps between parents. The
motherhood penalty is largest within couples at the highest and the very lowest income
levels, but the fatherhood premium varies only slightly across the distribution. The
comparable wage gaps within couples at the bottom fifth and top half of the distribution
partially contradicts hypothesis 2 and 4 that predicted that child wage gaps would be
largest only in the upper half of the income distribution. Most noteworthy, however, is
that parental wage inequality within couples is driven by different effects for children
(e.g. motherhood or fatherhood effects) by gender at different levels of income. While the
fatherhood premium is relatively stable across the family income distribution, the
motherhood penalty is largest among couples in the top tenth of the distribution, possibly
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reflecting wives higher likelihood of reducing work time after children at higher income
levels.
Within-Couple Wage Inequality across Education
Measuring socioeconomic class in terms of education rather than family income
reveals differences in the distribution of within-couple wage inequality. Table 7 presents
the results from the multi-level dyadic discrepancy models across all seven educational
couple-types.35 To get a visual sense of the results, Figure 7 graphically presents the
exponentiated coefficients from the results in Table 7. The results confirm my first
hypothesis that husbands would garner wage advantage over wives regardless of parental
status and educational attainment. The table also confirms my fifth hypothesis that
predicted that husbands’ wage advantage would be smaller in couples where wives had
the same or more education as their husbands. Looking first at couples in the lower half
of the education distribution, within couples where both spouses have less than a high
school diploma, childfree husbands’ advantage is 21.4 percent compared to 33.6 percent
within households with children. Meanwhile, within couples where husbands have not
graduated high school but their wives have, their wage advantage is a smaller 15 percent
and does not vary by parental status. Most surprising, husbands’ wage advantage is
largest within households where husbands have graduated high school but wives have
not, but this advantage does not vary by parental status. It appears that within couples
where at least one spouse has not obtained a high school diploma, husbands maintain
wage advantage over wives, but fatherhood is less likely to confer greater wage
advantage. Furthermore, the results also indicate that obtaining a high school diploma is a
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For variance components, see Table A8 in the Appendix.
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key factor that raises wages for both men and women, as evidenced by the large wage
advantage for high school graduate husbands over wives who have not and the smaller
gaps within couples where wives, but not husbands, have graduated. These results
support my prediction that husbands have less wage advantage within couples when
wives have the same or more education than husbands.
Within-couple wage gaps in the upper half of the education distribution also
support to hypothesis 5. The wage advantage husbands receive when both spouses have
both graduated high school is a large 37 percent and is amplified by the presence of
children in the household (50 percent). The results for the next four couple-types also
reveal the importance of wives educational attainment for wage inequality within
households. The gender gaps are considerably smaller in the next set of columns for
couples where wives have more education than their high school graduate husbands:
there is an advantage of 17 percent for childfree couples compared to 23 percent for
parents. Meanwhile, when husbands have a college degree but wives do not, husbands
earn 36 percent more in households without children, but the advantage for fathers is the
same as for high school graduate couples at 50 percent. Finally, in couples where spouses
both have a Bachelor’s degree, husbands’ advantage is smaller for both childfree couples
(28 percent) and parents (46 percent). The results confirm that across education, husband
wage advantage occurs within all couples, but this advantage also varies based on wives’
educational attainment. If wives have more education than their husbands, husbands still
enjoy wage advantage, but the within-couple gender gaps are smaller. However, it
appears that husband wage advantage within couples is highest within couples at lower
levels of education, regardless of parental status.
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To fully assess my second and sixth hypothesis, Figure 8 shows the results from
Table 7 examining the distribution of the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood
premium within couples by couples’ degree attainment. As with Figure 7, important
differences are revealed by using education as the metric for investigating variation in the
effects of children by social class. The wage advantage associated with fatherhood is
clearly apparent, but not within all couples. There are no significant motherhood penalties
within couples where one or both spouses have less than a high school degree. The
fatherhood premium is a large 6.6 percent in couples where both spouses have less than a
high school diploma, but there are no significant premiums within couples where both
spouses have not completed high school or where wives have a high school diploma and
husbands do not. Reflecting the substantial wage advantage for husbands regardless of
parental status at lower levels of education, the results also indicate that the impact of
children on within-couple wage inequality is reduced in couples where one or both
spouses have not graduated from high school.
Among couples at higher levels of education, the distribution of child wage
effects are dramatically different. When both spouses are high school graduates, the
premium is 4.7 percent, while the motherhood penalty is a significant 3.4 percent. In
couples where husbands have graduated high school and wives have more education,
child effects are considerably smaller. The fatherhood premium decreases to 1.5 percent
and the motherhood penalty also declines to 2.7 percent. Looking at the college-educated,
in couples with husbands that have a bachelor’s degree but his wife does not, the
motherhood penalty is a large 6.6 percent, but the fatherhood premium grows to roughly
3 percent. When both spouses have college degrees, however, the within-couple wage
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gap is largest: wives incur a 3.8 percent motherhood penalty, while fathers receive an 8.7
percent premium. The results support hypothesis 6 that predicted parental wage gaps will
be largest in couples where wives have the same or less education as husbands, but it
appears that the widest parental gaps occur within couples when both spouses are
college-educated.
Income vs Education: Measuring Within-Couple Inequality across Class
Comparing the distributions of the effects of children within couples by income
level and couple’s education suggests that since income is not perfectly correlated to
education, it is important to consider multiple means of assessing class inequality across
families. To ease comparison, Figure 9 presents the distribution the wage effects of
children across income and couple education categories. The X-axis in the figure is
labeled 1-7 corresponding to the 7 quantiles I use to assess income differences and the 7
educational categories of couples. Clearly, the patterns in the distribution the motherhood
penalty and the fatherhood premium are different across income and education. The wage
gaps associated with motherhood and fatherhood follow a more stable pattern of growth
across income, with the widest gaps among the highest earning families. Meanwhile, the
child wage gaps are amplified in the middle and the tails of the education distribution.
Here, my seventh hypothesis is confirmed, but also informed. The alignment of child
wage effects within couples creates greater inequality within couples in the upper half of
the incomes distribution, but also among families at the lowest levels of income.
Meanwhile, within-couple parental wage gaps are largest in the tails of the educational
distribution as well. This supports the findings of Greenwood et al (2014) that the
earnings gap between couples with relatively high and those with relatively low levels of
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education has widened substantially since 1960 relative to the average household income.
Moreover, the results illustrate that although marriage gaps between the middle and
working class are associated with the growth in US wealth inequality (Cherlin 2014),
family composition also contributes to wage inequality among married couples. These
findings also help to clarify prior work in the motherhood penalty and fatherhood
premium literature regarding differences in education and income level. Gender wage
inequality associated with children is most pronounced amongst the most privileged
families both in terms of income and education.
As in my previous chapter, in both sets of analyses, there are substantial residual
effects that remain after including controls for spousal work effort in the models. As
previous work on the motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium argues, it is also
possible that the remaining wage inequality within and between households could result
from differential treatment by employers based on gendered notions of the “ideal worker”
(Williams 2000; Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Correll et al 2007). Unfortunately, I can
only speculate regarding employers since information on employer behavior is not
available in the data.
Conclusion
To date, there is no study that considers how these processes within couples vary
across socioeconomic class by income level and educational attainment. Using the 19802008 wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, the goal of this chapter was to
assess how the gender wage gap, the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium are
distributed within married households and across couples by social class. The motivation
for the analyses is that simply investigating the average effects of parenthood for all
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couples obscures significant variation within couples across families. The results
illustrate that gender wage inequality within households is compounded by parental
status, but the wage gaps associated with children also vary among different
socioeconomic groups and contribute to between-household wage inequality.
I first examined variation in the distribution of within-couple wage inequality
based on family income. Husbands’ wage advantage conditioned on fatherhood grows
within couples as family income increases, suggesting that gender wage inequality is
exacerbated within and among wealthier households. However, in low-income families,
not all husbands receive higher wages than their wives. At the fifth and tenth percentiles
of income, there is no significant wage advantage of husbands over wives within
childfree households, while fathers in the tenth quantile of the income distribution have a
30 percent wage advantage over mothers.
Meanwhile, the alignment of parental wage effects across income reveals stark
differences across class in within-couple wage inequality. Across income, with the
exception of couples in the bottom fifth of the distribution, wage gaps associated with
children are slightly wider These results support previous work by Cooke (2014) that
finds that while low-earning fathers incur wage penalties, the premium grows as income
increases. However, motherhood penalties also grow as income level rises. Overall, in
terms of my first research question, within-couple wage inequality is largest amongst
households in the top half of the income distribution and this inequality is exacerbated by
the presence of children in households.
Next, I considered variation in terms of the distribution of husband wage
advantage and child wage effects within couples across levels of education. This set of
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analyses reveals that wage inequality within couples is more pronounced in the tails of
the distribution. Within all couples, husbands earn more than wives, but for couples
where spouses have completed high school or above, wage advantage conditioned on
children is primarily larger when husbands have more education than wives. If wives
have more education than their husbands, husbands still enjoy wage advantage, but the
gaps are considerably smaller. Moreover, the results demonstrate that gender wage
inequality within families varies in distinct ways for low versus highly educated couples.
Within couples with low educational attainment (where one or both spouses have not
graduated high school), with the exception of couples where both spouses did not
graduate, husbands’ wage advantage does not increase with the arrival of children in the
household.
There are also key differences in the distribution of child effects across levels of
education. However, this depends on whether spouses have more or less than a high
school education. There are no significant fatherhood premiums at the .10 and .25
quantiles or significant motherhood penalties in the bottom third of the distribution. This
suggests that much of the wage inequality generated by the differential wage effects
associated with children appears to be occurring primarily among couples with at least a
high school education or more, perhaps because within these couples, wives are more
likely to face tougher job constraints or reduce work time in response to having children
(Anderson et al 2003; Waldfogel 1997; Stone 2007). The results also support England et
al.’s (2013) work that finds higher penalties for high skill and high earning women.
Does the variation in the wage gap and the effects of children follow the same
pattern across the distribution of couples’ wage and educational attainment? Here it is
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apparent that how socioeconomic class is conceptualized and measured is important. The
results in Figure 9 reveal that the distribution of the wage gap and the effects of children
by educational attainment do not follow the same pattern as within couple gaps across
couple income levels. While the distribution of the effects of motherhood and fatherhood
follows a more stable pattern across income, the parental wage gaps are largest in the tails
of the education distribution. This supports the finding of Greenwood et al (2013) that the
earnings gap between couples with relatively high and those with relatively low levels of
education has widened substantially since 1960 relative to the average household income.
It appears that couples who are already disadvantaged in the labor market are not
necessarily penalized or rewarded for having children, while those in the middle and
above experience more within-couple inequality.
The residual wage premiums for fatherhood and the motherhood penalty after
adding controls for work effort and human capital differences remain largely
unexplained. These unexplained residual effects may result from factors located outside
of households and suggest that other factors occurring in work places, such as employer
discrimination, are contributing to the remaining gender wage inequality within families.
It is possible that employers are rewarding parents differently based on gendered
expectations about parents as employees as prior research would suggest (Correll et al
2007). Further research investigating employer behaviors would help to shed light on
these processes.
As with the previous chapter, there are some limitations to my analyses. First,
although it is likely that the residual unexplained variation in my models may be caused
by employer actions and behaviors, I cannot assess with certainty the role of factors
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outside of households in shaping wage outcomes. Also, a number of measures for human
capital and job characteristics, such as work experience, job seniority and tenure, number
of jobs ever held, public/private sector, and self-employment, would have been useful as
control measures. While this chapter considers variation in couple wage inequality across
social class, this analysis does not account for how the gender gap and child wage effects
may vary by race/ethnicity. In my next chapter, I assess how children influence inequality
both within and between families given the labor market disadvantage experienced by
workers of color. Moreover, my analysis is limited to employed persons. This means that
I am missing couples where mothers “opt out” (Belkin 2003; Stone 2007) of paid
employment and that these results understate wives’ motherhood penalty and the wage
gap between husbands and wives.
This project speaks to broad patterns of inequality regarding how class shapes
gender wage inequality across families, both in terms of wages and educational
attainment and contributes to the literature on social stratification, the gender wage gap,
as well as work and family policy. These findings have important implications for
understanding where the revolution has “stalled” (Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006) for
the gender wage gap. Although much attention has been paid to the growth in income
inequality since the 1960s, but less consideration has been given to the role of family
patterns in shaping this inequality. Little work has been done to date to directly situate
these effects within couples or to unpack variation in within-couple inequality across
households by social class. The results illustrate how the differential impact of children
on parent’s wages within couples contributes to wage inequality within married couples,
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but also how children contribute to overall wage stratification across married couple
households.
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CHAPTER 4
THE INTERSECTION OF GENDER, RACE, AND PARENTAL STATUS
WITHIN AND ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS

In previous chapters of this dissertation I have established that parenthood
amplifies husbands’ earnings advantage over wives within heterosexual married couples,
and that this within-couple male earnings advantage is further moderated by spousal work
hours, education, and family income. In this chapter, I bring my analysis to bear on the
question of whether these findings hold across racial groups. Specifically, I consider how
the impact of parenthood on within-household male earnings advantage varies between
black and white couples. Using the 1980-2008 waves of the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth (NLSY), I examine factors contributing to husbands’ earnings advantage
and parental wage effects among black and white families, including assortative
partnering, household specialization, and relational ties to children.
My contribution is assessing whether differences in gender and parenthood wage
gaps among married couple households hold across racial groups. In contrast to my focus
on the wages of married couples, the majority of research on the wage effects of having
children has concentrated on individuals’ earnings. Some of this literature addresses
differences by racial/ethnic group. For example, black women receive smaller
motherhood penalties and for having two or more children compared to white women,
who incur a larger penalty with the first child onward (Budig and England 2001; Glauber
2007; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 2013), possibly resulting from black
women’s lower likelihood of experiencing work interruptions after having children than
white women. But does this lower motherhood penalty imply lower male and parenthood
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advantages within black married households, compared to whites? My analysis will
address this question. And while past research finds that white men receive larger
fatherhood earnings bonuses compared to black men (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and
Budig 2010), even after including work hours and human capital characteristics, it is
again unclear whether this indicates lower male and parenthood earnings advantages
within black coupled households, compared to whites. Finally, a recent study by
Killewald (2013) finds that the fatherhood premium is conferred only on fathers who coreside with their biological children, but finds no variation in the effect of fatherhood by
race/ethnicity. Yet given the lower likelihood of black children to co-reside with their
biological fathers (Furstenberg 1988; Krieder and Ellis 2011a), does this also imply lower
couple earnings inequality within black households compared to white households? To
date, how the varying sizes of fatherhood bonuses and motherhood penalties are aligned
within dual-earner coupled households by racial group remain unexamined.
I anticipate that varying constellations of interfamilial relationships among black
and white families may produce differences in the distribution of husbands’ wage
advantage and parenthood wage effects within couples. For example, marital status of coresiding couples matters: The marriage gap between high earning and highly educated
couples and low-income, less educated couples has grown in the latter half of the 20th
century (Cherlin 2014). Marriage is linked to greater motherhood penalties (Budig and
England 2001; Glauber 2007; Misra et al. 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010) and only
married men garner a fatherhood premium (Glauber 2007a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010;
Killewald 2013). However, declines in marriage rates have been more pronounced among
blacks than whites (Carlson, McLanahan, and England 2004; Harknett and McLanahan
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2004; Western and McLanahan 2000), suggesting that due to differential selection into
marriage, the penalties and premiums within black couples may align differently than
within white couples. Working class black women are less likely to marry in response to
a pregnancy or to delay early child-bearing (Krieder and Ellis 2011b; Edin and Kefalas
2005; Pagnini & Morgan 1996) than their white counterparts. Since working class
couples are less likely to marry or delay children until after marriage (Cherlin 2014; Edin
and Kefalas 2005), these differences in marriage rates and the timing of marriage and
childbirth indicate stronger selection into marriage among black couples, particularly
among couples with more human capital and resources. Positive selection into marriage
based on earnings potential may also be stronger among black women given black
women’s greater competition in the marriage market or the greater rarity of
“marriageable” black men. This greater selectivity into marriage among black couples
with more human capital implies that black wives’ wages may be more commensurate
with their husbands’ compared to white couples. Thus, I expect that within-couple wage
gaps may be smaller within married black households.
The distribution of child penalties and premiums within couples may also vary
between black and white households due to different patterns of co-residence with
children among black families (Krieder and Ellis 2011a; Furstenberg 1987; 1988).
Although racial/ethnic differences were non-significant in her results, Killewald (2013)
demonstrates that the effects of children on wages are mediated by whether children are
biologically related to and co-residing with parents. However, prior research on the
fatherhood premium finds that co-residential white fathers garner a substantially larger
bonus compared to co-residential black fathers (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig
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2010). To date, there is also no study that investigates variation in the motherhood
penalty by biological and residential status of children, since most children are more
likely to co-reside with mothers. To address this puzzle, I examine how the effects of
children vary by race/ethnicity within couples who co-reside with biological children,
have biological children living outside of the household, or have co-residential stepchildren. Exploring how the patterns of gender wage discrepancies associated with
children within households vary by relational ties and co-residence among white and
black married couples may clarify how wage inequality within families is linked to the
reproduction of wage inequality between racial/ethnic groups.
In this chapter I review previous scholarship on gender wage gaps within
racial/ethnic groups and how these gaps relate to within-household inequality. I then
draw on the central findings in the literature that examines variation in the motherhood
penalty and the fatherhood premium by race/ethnicity to make predictions for the
distribution of wage effects within white and black married couples. I next consider how
wage variation among families based on co-residence and relational ties to children may
shape within-couple wage inequality for black and white couples. As with my two
previous empirical chapters, I also theorize how other factors known to shape parental
wage effects, including educational attainment and household specialization, may also
shape wage variation within couples between white and black families. Lastly, I discuss
the potential role of employer discrimination based on assumptions regarding an
employee’s race/ethnicity, gender and parental status as an explanation for residual wage
gaps within couples that persist in the fully-specified models. I explain how I
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operationalize and test the arguments in my analyses before moving on to the empirical
section of this study.
Explaining Gendered Wage Variation within Couples by Race/Ethnicity
To date, there is no study that considers how male earnings advantage and
parental wage gaps vary within married couples by race/ethnicity. However, evidence
suggests that these gaps should be larger within white couples compared to black couples.
Most studies of wage gaps at the individual level have documented a consistent and
strong pattern of gender gaps within racial/ethnic groups (Brown and Misra 2003), such
that the gender gap between white men and white women is larger than gender gap
between black men and black women. Researchers argue that within-group gender wage
discrepancies result from differential returns to human capital characteristics for white
and black workers and the gender and racial composition of jobs (Tomaskovic-Devey
1993). These differences in wage returns to education and the over-representation of
minority workers in lower-earning occupations are linked to more compressed wage
structures (Grodsky and Pager 2001) and truncated wage trajectories for black compared
to white workers. These findings imply that there may be less wage variation (or smaller
wage gaps) within black couples compared to white couples. Therefore, I expect the
differences in gender wage gaps among black and white men and women to characterize
the gap between husbands and wives within black and white married couples.
Moreover, since the 1960s, much of the reduction in the gender wage gap has
resulted from stagnation among middle and working class men’s wages (Bernhardt,
Morris, and Handcock 1995; Fortin and Lemieux 2000). Yet, during this period, highincome white men’s wages have increased dramatically relative to all women and black
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men (Bernhardt, et al 1995), while the growth in black men’s wage rates have not kept
pace with black women (Autor, Katz, and Kearney 2008). These findings suggest that
husbands are likely to experience wage advantage over wives within their respective
racial/ethnic group. However, given that black men’s wages have not grown in tandem
with white men’s and that gender wage gaps tend to be wider among white workers
compared to black workers, it is likely that husbands’ wage advantage will be wider
within white households than black households. Therefore, I expect that:
H1: The gender wage gap (i.e., husbands’ wage advantage) will be wider within white
couples, relative to black couples.
Racial/Ethnic Variation in Parental Premia and Penalties
Previous research on the fatherhood premium shows that not all men benefit from
marriage and parenthood in the same way (Glauber 2008a&b). While both white and
black husbands receive wage premia for fatherhood, black fathers garner smaller returns
for having children than white fathers (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010).
Hodges and Budig (2010) found that with the transition to fatherhood, black fathers
receive the smallest earnings premiums compared to Latinos and white fathers even after
accounting for educational attainment, work effort, and job characteristics. Using fixedeffects models, Glauber (2008a&b) also found that for married white and black men, the
birth of the first child is associated with an increase of hourly wages of roughly 8 percent,
but with the second child, wage increases are considerably smaller for married black
fathers (9 percent compared to 14 percent for white fathers). These differences in size of
the fatherhood premium by race and number of children suggest that male wage
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advantage associated with children within married black couples may be lower than
within married white couples.
Race differences in the motherhood penalty also occur among married women
(Glauber 2007). Individual-level work on parental wage effects find smaller motherhood
penalties for black women compared to white women and differences in the penalty
based on the number of children within households (Waldfogel 1997; Budig and England
2001; Glauber 2007; England, Bearak, Budig, and Hodges 2013). While all married
white mothers pay a wage penalty for each successive child, only married black mothers
with more than 2 children pay a wage penalty (Glauber 2007). Budig and England (2001)
also found that black women have smaller penalties for higher order births compared to
their white counterparts. Since married white fathers tend to garner the largest wage
premiums while married white mothers incur larger wage penalties, the alignment of
parental wage effects within couples may produce wider parental gaps within white
couples. Furthermore, within-couple parental gaps may widen as the number of children
in the household increases. Based on these findings, I hypothesize that:
H2a: Within-couple male wage advantage (or the gender wage gap) will increase with
the number of children in both black and white households, but to a lesser degree within
black couples.
H2b: The degree of husbands’ advantage increase in H2a will be larger within white
couples than within black couples, such that white fathers will garner larger wage
premiums than black fathers, while white mothers will experience larger wage penalties
than black mothers.
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Biological Ties and Co-residency of Children
Less than 60 percent of children live with married, biological parents, and this is
tied to race, such that black children are less likely to co-reside with both biological
parents than white children (Krieder and Ellis 2011a). Race differences in the size of
parental wage gaps within couples may result from variation in parents’ residential status
and relational ties with children. Killewald (2013) finds that the fatherhood premium is
only conferred to married fathers who co-reside with their biological children, while no
premium is associated with biological children living outside the household or stepchildren. Furthermore, she claims that these findings hold across racial/ethnic groups. Coresidency and biological ties with children thus appear to be a requirement for garnering
increased wage advantage associated with fatherhood.
However, given that other work on the fatherhood premium finds important
differences across groups (Glauber 2008a&b; Hodges and Budig 2010), Killewald’s
(2013) finding of no differences by race in the returns to residential/biological fatherhood
or other fatherhood types is rather surprising. Both Glauber (2008a&b) and Hodges and
Budig (2010) find that the fatherhood bonus for married, co-residential black fathers was
smaller relative to married white fathers, possibly due to black fathers’ higher likelihood
of living with non-biological or step-children (Furstenberg 1988). Moreover, the
residential and biological status of children has yet to be examined in relation to the
motherhood penalty, perhaps because mothers are more likely to co-reside with children
than fathers (Kreider and Ellis 2011). To explore Killewald’s claims, I consider how
relational ties and co-residence of children influence within-couple wage inequality
between white and black families. I hypothesize that:
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H3: Husband’s wage advantage will be larger within couples who co-reside with
their biological children than among those who co-reside with non-biological children
(e.g., stepchildren).
H4: The wage gaps associated with residential biological children will be smaller
within black couples compared to white couples.

Race, Assortative Partnering, and Educational Attainment:
In my previous chapters, I first assessed how assortative partnering along
educational lines shaped within-couple wage inequality and then how within-couple wage
inequality varied across couples by socioeconomic class. Assortative partnering also
occurs along the dimension of race and ethnicity. Prior work suggests that individuals are
more likely to choose spouses within their respective racial/ethnic group (Kalmijn 1998;
Blackwell and Lichter 2004; Schwartz and Mare 2005).36 This tendency towards samerace/ethnicity marriages has implications for within-couple wage inequality because there
remain persistent racial gaps in educational attainment, work experience, and wages. In
addition to these gaps, there are differences in the wage returns to human capital among
white and black workers (Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). To unpack these differences by
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Rates of intermarriage across racial/ethnic groups have steadily increased over time, but continue to
comprise a small portion of married couples. Compared to 3.2 percent in 1980, the share of mixed-race
marriages reached an all-time high of 8.4 percent in 2010 (Wang 2013). I compare differences in wage gaps
between couples where both spouses identify as non-Hispanic black or non-Hispanic white.
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race/ethnicity, I include years of education and potential work experience of each spouse
in my models.37
The results from my previous two chapters suggest that wage gaps within couples
are largest among households in the tails of the education distribution, but it is unclear
whether this holds across racial groups. Individual level analyses have found that the
relationship between education and parental wage effects vary by racial group
membership. In fixed effects models, Anderson and colleagues (2002) find that black
high-school and college graduates receive no significant motherhood penalty for one
child, but the penalty for two or more children is similar to the penalty of white women
(Anderson et al 2002). College-educated fathers and those employed in
professional/managerial occupations, which typically have higher educational
requirements, also garner the largest premiums (Hodges and Budig 2010), but this is
primarily the case for white husbands. The premium for married black fathers does not
vary by educational attainment (Hodges and Budig 2010): Married black fathers receive
the same premium regardless of degree acquisition. Given the variation across levels of
education in the distribution of penalties and premia among black and white parents at the
individual level, I expect that education will explain a larger proportion of within-couple
wage gaps for white couples.
H5: Including age and education will reduce the wage gaps within couples, but more so
within white couples, relative to black couples.

37

I use age in years of both spouses as a measure of potential work experience. In results not shown, I also
ran models including an alternative control for the relative education of spouses. Results are available in
Appendix Table A14 and A15.
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Selection into Marriage and Parenthood for Black and White Couples
Differential selection into marriage and parenthood for white and black couples is
another potential source of variation in within-couple wage gaps by race/ethnicity. By
assessing the impact of the transition to parenthood within married couples, I am
examining a highly select set of couples, particularly in the case of black families.38
Marriage itself is associated with greater motherhood penalties (Budig and England 2001;
Glauber 2007; Misra et al. 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010), possibly because married
women’s greater family resources allow them to reduce their work effort when children
are young. Marriage is also an important factor for the fatherhood premium: Hodges and
Budig (2010) and Glauber (2008a&b) find that marriage explains roughly one-half of the
earnings bonus, while Killewald (2013) finds that only married fathers garner a wage
premium for co-residential, biological children. The literature suggests that since the
decline in marriage has been more pronounced among blacks than whites (Carlson,
McLanahan, and England 2004; Harknett and McLanahan 2004; Western and
McLanahan 2000), there are fewer black households comprised of married parents and
their biological children. These differences in marriage patterns by race imply greater
positive selection into marriage and parenthood among black couples.
Given the greater rarity of “marriageable” black men and black women’s greater
competition in the marriage market, positive selection into marriage based on earnings
potential may be stronger among black women. However, social class position also plays
an important role shaping family formation patterns (Cherlin 2014; Carlson, McLanahan,
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Multiple marriages occur among NLSY respondents over the course of survey waves. As with my
previous empirical chapters, I limit my analyses to first marriages.
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and England 2004; Harknett and McLanahan 2004; Pagnini & Morgan 1996; Edin and
Kefalas 2005; Furstenberg 1987), such that couples who transition to parenthood after
marriage may be more positively selected in terms of human capital and family resources.
Indeed, coinciding with the growth in overall US wage inequality, the marriage gap
between middle and working class couples has increased in the post-war period (Cherlin
2014). Among the working class, black mothers are less likely than white mothers to
postpone having children until after marriage or to marry in response to a pregnancy
(Pagnini & Morgan 1996; Edin and Kefalas 2005; Furstenberg 1987). Moreover, for
working class black mothers, early childbearing has less of an impact on wages, as they
are already likely to have a truncated earning trajectories prior to having children (Edin
and Kefalas 2005; Furstenberg 2003).39 On the other hand, since delayed motherhood is
associated with smaller motherhood penalties (Amuedo-Durantes and Kimmel 2005),
black wives who postpone childbearing may also incur smaller penalties similar to their
white counterparts. Prior work also finds that black fathers are less likely to co-reside
with their biological children than white fathers (Kreider and Ellis 2011a; Furstenberg
1988); suggesting that black fathers may garner smaller fatherhood premia. While both
black husbands and wives are more highly selected into marriage than white spouses,
black wives may incur smaller motherhood penalties while black fathers garner smaller
premiums. Differences in selection into marriage and parenthood between white and
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Since child penalties tend to be largest for married mothers, the penalty for the select group of
married black mothers I examine may be larger than the penalty for unmarried black mothers, but smaller
than the penalty for married white mothers. Since I include only married couples in my sample, I cannot
directly test this possibility in my analysis.
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black couples serve to reinforce my previous hypotheses that within-couple wage gaps
will be wider within white couples compared to black couples.
The literature on child penalties and premia also suggests that factors that
influence wages within couples may be due to unmeasured factors that cannot be
captured by adding controls to the model. Factors that influence wages may also shape a
couple’s likelihood of having children, making assessment of causality difficult.
Researchers of parental penalties and premiums have primarily employed fixed-effect
models that provide estimates that are robust to unobserved differences among
respondents that do not change over time (Allison 2009) to address unmeasurable
selection. However, the fixed-effects in multi-level dyadic models cannot control for
unmeasured differences among couples that influence the effect of children on earnings
or that statistically interact with another variable that influences these effects. Thus, time
changing variables that could simultaneously influence both the likelihood of couples
having children and how much each spouse earns must be explicitly included in the
model.
Race and the Household Division of Labor
As in my previous chapters, I also consider how processes of household
specialization shape the distribution of gender and parental wage gaps within black and
white couples. According to Becker (1981), due to women’s disadvantage in the labor
market, their specialization in reproductive work in the household rather than paid labor
is potentially a rational choice for enhancing household utility. Women are thus more
likely to incur a wage penalty for motherhood due to reduced time spent in paid work or
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foregoing paid employment altogether after the arrival of children. Meanwhile, the
fatherhood premium is thought to occur because men may increase their work hours in
response to a birth and in turn garner a bonus relative to childfree men for their
specialization in market work. Although it is the most widely tested explanation for the
motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium (Budig and England 2001; Hodges and
Budig 2010; Lundberg and Rose 2000; Glauber 2007), household specialization has
drawn much criticism from feminist scholars. Critics argue that the theory assumes a
white, middle class breadwinner/homemaker model of the family that comprises only a
small proportion of existent family forms.
Research findings in terms of the explanatory power of household specialization
for the motherhood penalty and the fatherhood premium are also mixed. Accounting for
work time only partially explains the motherhood penalty (Budig and England 2001;
Glauber 2007; Budig and Hodges 2010) and the fatherhood premium (Glauber 2008a&b;
Hodges and Budig 2010). In Chapter 2, I found that the portion of the parental wage gap
within couples explained by household specialization was due to wives reducing paid
work time, rather than husbands altering their work effort. Yet, the degree of household
specialization also varies across households by race/ethnicity (Budig and England 2001;
Glauber 2007; 2008a&b; Lundberg and Rose 2001). Black couples typically have a
weaker division of labor and share household responsibilities more equally compared to
white couples (Shelton and John 1993; Kamo and Cohen 1999). Black women’s
historically higher rates of employment compared to white women (Winkler, McBride,
and Andrews 2005; Winslow-Bowe 2006) also suggest that black mothers are more likely
to be economic as well as care providers for their children, thus they incur smaller
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motherhood penalties relative to white mothers. Glauber (2008a&b) also found that the
birth of a child is associated with an increase in annual time spent at work for white
fathers, but not married black fathers. Thus, household specialization may have more
explanatory power for wage gaps within white families. I test the theory by including
control measures for both spouses’ work hours and annual weeks worked in my multilevel models.
H6: The inclusion of measures for spousal work effort will explain more of the wage gap
within white couples than black couples.

Gendered and Racialized Employer Discrimination
Another key explanation in the literature for variation in the fatherhood premium
and the motherhood penalty lies in the differential treatment of workers by employers.
Experimental and audit studies provide convincing evidence that employers are more
likely to judge and reward employees differentially by gender and parental status
(Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007) based on erroneous assumptions of the impact of these
characteristics on work performance. Correll et al.’s (2007) study demonstrates that
evaluators of job applicants discriminate against mothers and in favor of fathers,
compared to childless women and men, in hiring, wage offers, and evaluations of work
commitment. Furthermore, it is well documented that employer discrimination in hiring
against minority workers persists in the labor market (Pager 2003; Pager and Quillian
2005) and this discrimination is shaped by gendered and racialized conceptions of a
worker’s family status (Kennelly 1999). Unfortunately, I cannot capture employer
behaviors in my data. It is possible that residual wage gaps within couples might result
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from employer’s discriminatory evaluations of workers, or from other unmeasured
factors.
Data and Methods
For this chapter’s analysis, I again use the 1980-2008 waves of the NLSY79, a
national probability sample of individuals.40 Respondents were interviewed annually until
the 1994 survey and bi-annually thereafter. The initial year of the survey took place when
respondents were aged 14-21; in 2008, the ages of respondents range from 41 to 58. As in
my previous chapters, I construct a dyadic data set by identifying married couples41 with
partners over the age of 18, not currently enrolled, not in the military, and with non-zero
scores on wages for at least two time periods for each spouse. Since I limit my sample to
couples with wage scores above zero, I am not observing couples where mothers leave
paid employment following the arrival of children, which may lead to underestimating
the total wage penalty for all women. These selection criteria produced a sample of 774
black couples and 2,288 white couples for analysis.
For this analysis, I compare married, same-race couples with the goal of assessing
wage effects within multi-racial households in future work. I created a variable that
captures the race of the respondent’s first spouse42 using a retrospective variable from the
2008 wave of the survey that records the race of all the respondent’s past and current

40

1979 is omitted from the analysis as there were too few couples available that met sampling criteria.

41

Because reliable data on cohabitation was only made available in the NLSY79 beginning in 1994, I limit
my analysis to married couples only.
From 1979-2006, the NLSY did not collect information on the race/ethnicity of respondents’ spouses.
Moreover, the variable for spouse’s race in the household roster does not include a category for Hispanic
spouses. For this analysis, I compare only households where both spouses are listed as either Non-Hispanic
white or Non-Hispanic black.
42
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spouses. Over the course of the survey respondents in the NLSY divorce and remarry
multiple times.43 I follow couples in their first marriage until they divorce (thus dropping
out the sample), separate (one member leaves the household) or until the last year of
interview. Once a couple divorces or no longer lives together, I do not continue to
observe them in my data as they cease to be engaged in a co-residential relationship.
The NLSY79 is a rich source of data on employment and households, however,
spousal information contained in the household roster is less complete. As with my
previous two chapters, there are a number of measures for human capital and job
characteristics that would be useful for this analysis, such as work experience, job
seniority and tenure, number of jobs ever held, public/private sector, and selfemployment that are unavailable for respondents’ spouses.
Measures
The dependent variable used in this analysis is the natural log of hourly wage
reported by each member of the couple or dyad.44 I also include a control measure for
year of interview to control for time period effects over the course of the survey. As with
my previous chapters, I include both individual and couple-level independent variables to
investigate the effects of couples’ human capital characteristics and household
specialization on husbands’ wage advantage and the effects of children on within-couple
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As with my previous chapters, should a respondent remarry, I created another couple identification
number and assign the corresponding measures to this new couple. I tested for differences in the effect of
gender and children on couple wages for second and third marriages. Results were only significant for
second marriages and given selection differences between first and second marriages, I only present the
results for first marriages.
44

Table A1 in the appendix illustrates how the data has been reorganized into dyadic format for the
analysis. The dependent variable includes a wage score for each member of the dyad, or the outcome score
for the natural logarithm of hourly wages in each dyad j.
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wage gaps. Initial models include a dichotomous measure for gender (male =1) to analyze
the extent of male advantage within the household as measured by the discrepancy in
spousal hourly wages. I also include a continuous measure for number of children in the
household, and an interaction term for the effect of number of children and gender. These
models allow me to estimate 1) differences in male advantage between fathers and
childfree husbands and 2) how children differentially impact the wages of mothers
compared to fathers.
Next, I include continuous measures for the age and years of education of
husbands and wives to account for the impact of assortative partnering and education on
within-couple wage gaps. Years of education and age serve as both as an indicator of
human capital and an indicator of assortative mating.45 To assess household
specialization based on spouses’ work effort, the fully-specified model includes
continuous measures for the usual weekly work hours and annual weeks worked in the
main job for each spouse.
I also consider differences between households based on the residential status and
relational ties of children. Using respondent’s annual reports of household composition
and the usual residence of children, I construct dichotomous measures to capture the
effects of biological residential/nonresidential children and step-children within
households and subsequent interactions with gender and race. The reference category in

The NLSY does not include adequate measures for creating a variable capturing spouse’s work
experience, an important explanatory factor found in the literature on parental wage effects. In
supplementary analyses, I constructed a measure for potential experience, as suggested by Killewald (2013)
by subtracting each spouse’s years of education from their age in years and subtracting 5 (since most US
children begin schooling at age 5). Potential labor market experience adjusts for the life-cycle pattern of
wages, but is exogenous to parenthood, unlike actual labor market experience. Results were unchanged
when this measure was added to the model in place of age and years of education. Results from sensitivity
tests are available in Appendix Table A15.
45
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the dyadic discrepancy model are white, childless couples. In my last set of analyses, I
conduct tests for robustness based on variation in family size among couples with
children by including dummy variables for one, two, and three or more children in the
model.
Dyadic Multilevel Models
I investigate couples’ wage gaps over time using longitudinal dyadic discrepancy
models, a subset of multi-level models (Raudenbusch and Bryk 2002; Sayer and Klute
2005). The level 1 (within-dyad) model estimates the average differences in hourly wages
within couples at each time point, while level 2 estimates average gaps in wages between
couples. The model is estimated at two levels with time in years nested within
individuals. Individuals are then nested within couples. At level 1, the units are the
repeated responses over time (for example, the log of wages) within each couple. At level
2, the unit of analysis is the couple.46 To establish the gross discrepancy (or the gender
gap) within couples, I first fit an unconditional model that only includes a control for year
of interview and the gender discrepancy dummy at level 1. The unconditional level 1 and
level 2 models are as follows:
LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij) + rij

B0j = γ00 + u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
β2j = γ20 + u2j

46

Conceptually, the model contains 3-levels with two levels of nesting. Responses at each time point are
nested within individuals and individuals are nested within couples. However, at the level of analysis it is a
two-level model with a single level of nesting (responses nested within couples). This is because gender is
treated as a characteristic of the repeated responses (a fixed effect) rather than a level in the model.
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LNWAGEj is the outcome score of the log of hourly wage for each member of the couple i

in each dyad j (see Table A1). I also include a control variable for year of interview to
control for period effects. The YEAR variable is an estimate of the change in wages for
each member of the couple. Thus, a 1-unit change in YEAR is a β1 change in LNWAGE,
given a spouse’s gender. For each dyad, the responses of the members (spouses) are
regressed on an indicator variable, MALEij, or the variable that will capture the gender
gap, coded 1 for men and 0 for women. The intercept represents the earnings score for
wives when the year is 1980, or when both MALE and YEAR are equal to zero.
The coefficients from level 1 become the dependent variables at level 2 and a
separate equation for each dependent variable (or level 1 coefficient) is estimated. The
term, B0j represents wages for women at year zero, while, γ00, represents the average
wives’ wage across all couples, and u0j is the unexplained residual variance in wives’
wages. The term, β1j is the gap in wages between husbands and wives, controlling for
year, and γ10 is the average wage gap across all couples. The term β2j represents the
relationship between time and wages, or the rate of change in wages, given a spouse’s
gender, controlling for the gender gap, while the term γ20 is the average wage relationship
(rate of change) across all couples.
Each level 2 equation includes an intercept that represents the value of the
dependent variable for the average couple, plus a term that captures the unexplained or
residual variance for each dependent variable at level 2. This variance can be interpreted
as the heterogeneity across couples, or how each couple differs from the average couple.
Significant variance in the unconditional model indicates unexplained variability across
couples, thus allowing me to introduce predictors of this variability into the model. For
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example, if there is significant variation in male advantage in the unconditional model, I
can introduce couple characteristics, such as number of children, to explain this variance.
Subsequent conditional models will test my hypotheses concerning predictors (number of
children and spouse’s characteristics) that may reduce or enlarge the gender wage gap. 47
The baseline model that introduces child effects is as follows:

LNWAGEij = β0j + β1j*(YEARij) + β2j*(MALEij) + β3j (NUMKIDS) +β4j*(MALE
*NUMKIDS) + rij
B0j = γ00 + u0j
β1j = γ10 + u1j
β2j = γ10 + u1j
β3j = γ20 + γ21 + u2j
β4j = γ30 + γ31 + u2j
I first approach my assessment of the variation in wages across households by
estimating separate models for black and white same-race couples. In results not shown, I
also ran pooled models including race interactions for the effects of being male, being a
parent, and being a male parent to confirm significant differences between groups. In all
additive models, I found significant effects across groups.48 My nested modeling strategy
first estimates a gross model for the effect of gender within households, followed by a
second model (baseline model) that accounts for the number of children in the household.
Model 3 includes controls for spouse’s age and education to assess how spouse’s human
capital characteristics shape wage effects within couples. I next compare the distribution
of male wage advantage and the effects of children across couples controlling for spousal
work effort in model 4. The next set of analyses investigates the effect of co-residence
47

For variance components for all models, see Tables A11-A13 in the Appendix.

48

See Tables A16-A18 in Appendix.
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and relational ties of children in the fully specified pooled interactive model.49 To test the
robustness of my results, in my last set of analyses I assess how estimates of model 4
vary based on the presence of one, two, or three or more children in the household.
Findings
Descriptive Analysis
Table 8 includes descriptive results for both individual and couple-level measures
used in the analysis. The first panel presents the means, proportions, and standard
deviations of couple-level measures, including the dependent variable for couples’ wages,
continuous and dichotomous measures for the number of children, and dummy variables
for the relational and residential status of children for black and white couples. In the first
panel, chi-square and t-tests for paired means were conducted to test for significant
differences across couples by racial/ethnic group. The first row of the table shows that
white couples have significantly higher average wages ($16.67) than black couples
($14.24), demonstrating initial wage inequality between black and white couples,
unadjusted for other factors.
In terms of family size, the number of children in the household is slightly higher
for black couples than white couples (2.07 compared to 1.96). There are also significant
differences in the distribution of number of children across families. While a similar
proportion of both black and white couples have one child in the household (25 compared
to 24 percent), white couples are more likely to have two children (35 percent of white
couples compared to 31 percent of black couples). Black couples are also about 7 percent

49

Estimates from the 2-way interactive model are reported in Table 11. Full results from 3-way interactive
model are available in Table A18 in Appendix.
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more likely to have 3 or more children (23 percent) compared to 16 percent of white
couples. These differences in number of children between groups suggest that variation in
family size between black and white families may shape the alignment and size of wage
gaps within couples.
Table 8 also shows that within married couples, the likelihood of co-residing with
biological children also varies across groups. Approximately 63 percent of children coresiding with married black parents are biological children compared to 67 percent within
married white households. Although having biological children living outside of the
household is rare for all couples, it is significantly more likely for black couples: 14
percent of black couples compared to 5 percent of white couples have biological children
residing outside of the household. The likelihood of step- children is also significantly
larger for black couples at 6 percent compared to 4 percent for whites. The table
illustrates variation among married couples in residential status and familial ties to
children by race/ethnicity that may shape the distribution of parental wage effects within
couples.50
The second panel of Table 8 presents the means, proportions, and standard
deviations of individual-level measures for each spouse used in the analysis. T-tests in the
second panel capture significant differences between husbands and wives within each
group. White husbands garner the highest average wages of $19.48, compared to white
wives’ average of $13.86, while black husbands average $15.68, compared to black
wives’ $12.80. The gender gap between white spouses is the largest, at $5.62, while black

50

However, as previously discussed, given differentials in the rate and timing of marriages across groups, I
may be selecting out a larger proportion of black mothers and fathers in the sample.
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couples have a smaller wage gap of $2.88. This provides preliminary support to my
predictions that husbands’ wage advantage will be larger within white households.51
Comparing within-couple differences in educational attainment reveals that
average differences in education within couples are similar across groups. White and
black wives have approximately 14 years of education, while black and white husbands’
average roughly 13 years of education. However, differences within and across couples
average years of education are not substantively different. Since wives, on average, have
slightly more schooling than husbands across all groups, the wage advantage of husbands
over wives in both groups suggests that education does not necessarily translate into
higher wages for wives. The results imply that if returns to education are the same for
black and white husbands and wives, then there should be no differences in the effect of
education on couples’ wages between groups. Yet, given the disparity in average wages
both within and between black and white couples, the results indicate that education may
not confer the same wage returns to black husbands and wives compared to white
spouses.
Looking at the distribution of work hours within couples suggests that household
specialization is more salient within white families. Black wives work roughly 38 hours

51

Wage differences presented in the second panel of Table 8 do not result from significant differences
employment patterns within couples. Roughly 97 percent of white husbands in the sample are employed
compared to 94 percent of black husbands. There also is only slight variation among wives across groups in
terms of employment. 91 percent of black wives in the sample are employed compared to 92 percent of
white wives. While previous work finds that black women typically have higher rates of employment
compared to white women, they are roughly the same in this sample. However, because the sample is
limited to persons with non-zero scores on wages, I am potentially missing a large proportion of women
who leave paid employment following the arrival of children.
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per week and 47 weeks annually, compared to black husbands 44 hours per week and 49
weeks per year. White husbands work 45 hours per week and roughly 50 weeks per year,
while white wives average 35 hours and 46 weeks, respectively. The difference in work
hours within couples is largest for whites (roughly 10 hours), while blacks couples have a
difference of only 6 hours. In the case of annual weeks worked, the difference among
husbands is not significant: both white and black men average approximately 49 weeks
per year, but black husbands work approximately two weeks more than their wives while
white husbands work four weeks more than their wives. The smaller differences in work
time within black couples suggest that wage gaps are likely smaller within black couples
compared to white couples. Although there are differences in wages by race and gender,
overall, Table 8 demonstrates that there is less variation in factors known to affect wages
across groups, suggesting that mechanisms located outside of households may be driving
the remaining gender and racial wage gaps. However, to better test causal mechanisms,
multivariate analyses are required.
Multivariate Analyses
To test my theoretical arguments and hypotheses, I turn to multivariate analyses
to examine the wage gaps within black and white couples. Table 9 presents the results
from nested dyadic multi-level models for the gender wage gap and the effect of children
within households for white and black couples, separately. To calculate a percentage
change in the dependent variable for a 1-unit change in the number of children, I
exponentiate the coefficients from the models, subtract one, and multiply by 100. The
first column of the table presents the results for the gross gender wage discrepancies
within couples, not accounting for number of children. Confirming my first hypothesis,
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initially there is substantial wage advantage over wives for both white (54 percent ([(exp
[.43])-1]*100) and black husbands (26 percent ([(exp [.23])-1] *100), but white
husbands’ advantage is close to double that of black husbands. Clearly, initial withincouple gender wage gaps are substantially larger for white couples.
The baseline estimates after accounting for children in the model are presented in
the next column of Table 9. Again, I discuss the exponentiated coefficients to ease
interpretation. Adding number of children in the household and the interaction with
gender also reveals clear differences in parental returns to having children across groups.
The model shows that after accounting for children in the model, the wage advantage for
childfree husbands in the first row is reduced from 26 percent to roughly 17 percent for
black husbands and is also reduced from 54 to 35 percent for white husbands. However,
supporting hypothesis 2a, husbands’ wage advantage over wives increases with the
number of children. White husbands’ wage advantage grows with fatherhood to roughly
48 percent while black husbands receive smaller returns for the first child of 23 percent.
These differences grow even larger with the arrival of the second child, where white
fathers earn 62 percent ([exp [.30 + .09 +.09]-1] *100) more than their wives while black
fathers earn a smaller 30 percent ([exp [.16 + .05 +.05]-1] *100) more than their wives
under the condition of two children.
Next, to assess the alignment of the penalties and premia associated with children,
I interpret the interaction from the model in the other direction. For both black and white
wives, the initial motherhood penalty (the main effect of number of children in the
model) is a substantial 4 percent, but the effects of fatherhood are substantially different
by race, producing differences in the gender wage gap within couples. While black
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fathers receive a small wage premium of 1 percent ([exp [-.04 + .05]-1] *100), white
fathers garner a five percent premium (exp [-.04+ .09]-1] *100). Supporting hypothesis
2b, the results clearly show that parental wage gaps are larger within white couples and
the degree of increase associated with children is larger within white couples. In the
baseline model, however, differences in the gaps by race are primarily driven by variation
in the fatherhood premium while the motherhood penalty is initially the same for white
and black wives.
To control for the impact of assortative partnering, potential work experience and
education on couples’ wages, the next model includes measures for both spouses’ age and
education. For black couples, adding controls for age and education reduces the
motherhood penalty from -.04 to -.03, but the coefficient for fatherhood remains
unchanged at .05. For white couples, the effect of fatherhood for white husbands also
remains unchanged at .09, but adding age and education to the model increases the
motherhood penalty for wives by one percentage point, from -.04 to -.05. This indicates
that education has a suppressor effect on the penalty for white wives, such that white
wives with more education have slightly higher wage penalties. This disconfirms my fifth
hypothesis that controlling for age and education would explain a larger portion of the
wage gap within white couples. It appears that controlling for education does little to
reduce male advantage within all households, regardless of racial group membership, but
also explains less of the motherhood penalty for white wives.
The last set of results in Table 9 includes controls for household specialization
within couples. Adding measures for work hours and annual weeks worked to the model
reduces the gap within both black and white couples, but also affects spouses’ wages

107

differently across groups. The effect of fatherhood within black couples is reduced from
.05 to .04 while the motherhood penalty for black wives remains unchanged at -.03.
Meanwhile, the fatherhood coefficient remains unchanged for white fathers at .09, but the
penalty for white mothers is reduced from -.05 to -.04. Weekly hours and annual weeks
worked appear to matter more for black husbands and white wives in terms of explaining
the child wage gaps within married couples.52 This disconfirms hypothesis six that
predicted including controls for spousal work hours would explain more of the wage gap
within white couples. Within-couple wage gaps are reduced for both groups to a similar
degree, but for opposite reasons. The fatherhood premium is reduced within black
couples while the motherhood penalty is reduced within white couples, indicating that
work effort explains different portions of the gap for black and white couples. While I
found that household specialization was explained more so by wives’ work time in both
Chapters 2 and 3, these results suggest that household specialization works differently
within couples by race. Husbands are more likely to alter work behavior within black
couples while wives change their work effort within white couples. However, the
difference in the size of within-gaps remains, with wider gaps occurring within white
couples. The results in the last model also reveal that there are substantial unexplained
effects that remain for both groups.
To graphically illustrate the distribution of net wage differences within couples in
the fully-specified model, Figure 10 shows the distribution of husbands’ wage advantage
and child wage effects within couples by race/ethnicity from the full models in Table 9.

52

In the pooled model, the interaction term for black motherhood is not significant at the p<.05 level, thus
it appears that the per child motherhood penalty is the same for both black and white married wives after
controlling for household specialization (See Table A16 in Appendix). Effects of fatherhood were robust.
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To ease interpretation, the results presented in the figures are exponentiated coefficients
from the table. Figure 10 clearly shows that white men garner the largest within-couple
wage advantage and that the within-couple wage gap is amplified when there are children
present in the household. Husbands’ wage advantage is largest within white households
at 34.6 percent, but this advantage grows to 47.7 percent with the addition of children.
Within childfree black households, husbands earn roughly 17.8 percent more than wives
that grows to 23.4 percent in households with children, but this advantage is considerably
smaller than the gaps within white couples.53
To visually demonstrate how the effects of children align within black and white
couples, Figure 11 graphically presents the exponentiated average per child effect on
wages within couples based on the results from Table 9. The graph illustrates that
parental wage gaps are larger within white couples compared to black couples. While
white fathers are rewarded with a significant bonus of 5.2 percent, white mothers incur a
penalty of 4.2 percent, producing a wage difference of roughly 9 percent within white
couples per child. For black couples, there is less disadvantage associated with
motherhood, but also less advantage associated with fatherhood. Black mothers incur a
penalty of 2.9 percent and black fathers receive a significantly smaller premium of 1.5
percent, a gap of roughly 4 percent per child. Again, more within-couple wage inequality
associated with children occurs within white families, such that black mothers incur
smaller per child penalties than white mothers while black fathers garner smaller
premiums than white fathers.

53

Results were robust in the pooled interactive model (See Appendix Table A16).
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Table 10 presents the results from the pooled interactive model including both
black and white couples to evaluate the role of biological ties and residential status of
children. Figures 12-14 graphically depict the exponentiated results from Table 10.
Figure 12 shows that husbands’ advantage among childfree couples is largest within
white couples at roughly 35 percent compared to a 17 percent gap within childfree black
couples. The largest gender gap occur, however, within white couples with biological, coresidential children. Figure 12 shows that within white couples, male advantage increases
from 35 to staggering 54 percent with the addition of residential biological children. The
wage advantage within black couples with residential, biological children is less at 33
percent. Husbands’ wage advantage associated with non-residential/biological or stepchildren children is also not significantly different from childfree husbands within both
white and black couples. Confirming hypothesis 3, Figure 12 illustrates that male wage
advantage is largest for married white fathers who co-reside with their children. Other
parental ties to children are not associated with a wage premium. However, the gap
between white and black fathers (or the relative premia for whites) is widest among those
who live with their children, white husbands earn a larger premium in all groups.
Figures 13 and 14 present the distribution of child penalties and premia within
white and black couples. Figure 13 again shows that there are significant motherhood and
fatherhood wage effects associated with biological, co-residential children, but also a
significant motherhood penalty for biological, non-residential children. Within white
households, the fatherhood premium is a significant 8.2 percent for residential, biological
children while the penalty is roughly 5 percent for white wives, producing a wide wage
gap within white couples. Meanwhile, there is no significant premium for fatherhood and
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a 9.5 percent penalty associated with non-residential, biological children. Again, the
effects for step-children are not significant for either group in the pooled model.
Meanwhile, Figure 14 shows that within black couples, the motherhood penalty is not
significantly different from white wives. It appears that parsing out the motherhood
penalty along children’ relational status renders the penalty non-significant for these
subgroups. I conclude that while black mothers experience a motherhood wage penalty
(see Figure 11), it does not vary by the residential or biological status of their children.
This might be an artifact of small sample sizes for these subgroups. For black fathers, the
fatherhood premium revealed in Figure 11 appears here to be driven by the slightly
smaller 7.3 percent premium for co-residential, biological children and there is no
significant premium for biological, co-residential children or step-children.
In terms of my third and fourth hypotheses, the results show that male advantage
and the fatherhood premium are larger within couples who co-reside with their biological
children than among those who co-reside with non-biological children. However, these
effects are not significantly different by race. My fourth hypothesis that the effects of
residential biological children may be smaller within black household is fully not
confirmed. Result from the pooled model show that black fathers’ premiums do not
significantly differ from white fathers across parental subgroups, but that husband
advantage conditioned on children within white households is higher than within black
households. It appears that among married, homogamous households, the distribution of
child wage effects by race/ethnicity does not vary significantly based on the type of
parent-child relationship. Co-residential, biological children are primarily what drive the
largest gaps in terms of child premia and penalties within couples, but this is not the case
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for step-children. Non-residential, biological children are also associated with significant
wage penalties, but these penalties also do not vary across racial groups.
Robustness Analysis
To test whether measuring parenthood in a different way, with dummy variable
indicators for one, two, and three or more children, produces different results from using
total number of children as a linear variable above, the following set of results tests for
differences between couples in the effects of specific number of children on wages. Table
11 presents the results for the effects of one, two, and three or more children on couple
wages from the baseline and full models across groups. I again exponentiate the
coefficients from the model for the ease of interpretation. The results reveal the specific
family sizes at which greater male and parenthood advantages emerge, and how this
varies by racial group. In the baseline model in Table 11, there are no significant
motherhood penalties within black households for one or two children, but a large penalty
of roughly 14 percent (exp [-.0135]-1] *100) for three or more children. Meanwhile, the
fatherhood premium within black households is also not significant for one child, but
grows to 6 percent for two children and decreases to 2 percent for three or more children.
This illustrates that the wage gaps associated with children within black couples become
significant after the arrival of the second child and the alignment of the motherhood
penalty and the fatherhood premium amplify the wage gap when couples have three or
more children.
The baseline model in Table 11 for white couples also shows that there are clear
differences in wage gaps between groups. Unlike black couples, within white couples
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there is a small, but significant motherhood penalty of one percent associated with one
child that grows to roughly 7 percent with two children. The motherhood penalty within
white couples is also largest at 17 percent within couples with three or more children.
However, white fathers garner substantial premiums that widen the within-couple wage
gap with the addition of children to the household. One child is associated with a 7
percent premium that grows to 16 percent with two children. For three or more children,
the premium is a slightly smaller 11 percent. Unadjusted for other factors, it is clear that
the alignment of child penalties and premia produce larger wage gaps within white
couples and that these gaps widen according to the number of children in the household.
The distribution of wage gaps within couples changes very little with the addition
of control measures to the models. While the motherhood penalty for three or more
children declines to roughly 12 percent within black couples, the fatherhood premium
associated with two and three or more children remains unchanged. Meanwhile, within
white couples, the motherhood penalty for one child becomes insignificant, suggesting
that controlling for age, education, and couple household specialization explains the
small penalty associated with one child for white wives. However, the penalty associated
with two children is roughly 6 percent while the penalty for three or more children is 16
percent. This supports the results found in Chapter 2 that having a second child produces
the motherhood penalty. The second child may be the “tipping point” at which mothers
who attempt to maintain full-time employment after the first child seek alternative work
hour arrangements. However, as with the results from Table 9, adding controls to the
model does not alter the size and distribution of the fatherhood premium within white
couples.
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To illustrate these within-couple gaps graphically, Figure 15 and Figure 16
present the alignment of motherhood penalty and fatherhood premium for one, two, and
three or more children from the full model for white and black couples, respectively. The
graphs clearly show how wage inequality associated with family composition varies
across racial/ethnic groups. Figure 15 shows that parental wage gaps within white
couples grow with the addition of more children to the household. For white mothers
there is no significant motherhood penalty, but a large fatherhood premium of 7 percent
for having one child. This gap is further amplified with the arrival of the second child.
While white mothers incur a penalty of 6 percent for two children and 14 percent for
three or more children, within-couple wage inequality is further compounded by large
fatherhood premiums associated with two children of 16 percent and 12 percent for three
or more children.
Comparing Figure 16 to Figure 15 also illustrates that the alignment of penalties
and premia vary significantly between black and white couples based on the number of
children within households. Overall, there are insignificant or smaller parental wage gaps
within black families compared to white families based on the number of children in the
household. Figure 16 shows that there are no significant wage effects associated with one
child within black couples, but for two children, the motherhood penalty is not
significant, but black fathers garner a 5.2 percent premium. The motherhood penalty and
the fatherhood premium for three or more children produce the widest gaps within black
couples. In black households with three or more children there is a substantial penalty of
10.3 percent that coincides with a smaller fatherhood premium of roughly 4 percent. This
differences in the distribution of the child penalties and premium suggests that having
114

one child may not require as much care commitment for both white and black mothers,
but having 2 children appears to produce motherhood penalties within white households.
Meanwhile, having one child seems to impart fatherhood status (a potential signal to
employers) on husbands in both groups, but white fathers are rewarded to a greater
degree than black fathers.
Overall, the results demonstrate the intersection of gender and race within
families in shaping wage outcomes. Wage inequality varies within and among couples by
racial/ethnic group membership. Across all analyses, male wage advantage for childfree
couples is larger within white households. The motherhood penalty and the fatherhood
premium also align differently to produce wider wage gaps within white compared to
black couples. While black mothers tend to incur less wage disadvantage associated with
children, black fathers do not garner the same rewards associated with children as white
fathers. And while only co-residential biological children significantly impact parental
wages, these children amplify wage inequality to a greater degree within white families.
However, there are substantial wage gaps that remain after accounting for factors known
to affect wages, such as age, education, and spouses’ work effort. These residual effects
suggest that employers may possibly by rewarding employees differently based on the
gender, race, and parental characteristics of workers.
Conclusion
The goal of this chapter was to assess the distribution of male wage advantage and
the alignment of parental wage effects within black and white married couples. The
results show that while all husbands receive substantially higher wages than their wives
within each group, white husbands’ wage advantage is also substantially larger than black
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husbands’ across all analyses. White husbands’ wage advantage is also compounded to a
greater degree by the number of children in the household. Robustness analyses reveal
that within white couples, fathers receive significant premiums from the first child on,
while mothers receive substantial wage penalties for having 2 or more children. The
parental gap within black households is much narrower, however, and occurs primarily
when couples have two or more children. Black wives incur non-significant child
penalties for the first and second child and smaller penalties for having three or more
children while black husbands receive non-significant premiums for one child or smaller
premiums for two or more children. The results confirm my first three hypotheses and
show that the gender wage inequality associated with having children is much larger
within white families based on the distribution of larger penalties and premiums within
white couples that amplify as number of children increase. The gap between black
spouses also increases with children, but not to the same degree.
What explains this variation in the effects of children on within-couple wage
inequality? I first included measures for years of education and age in my models,
predicting that education would explain more of the wage gap within white couples.
Including education and age does little to reduce male advantage within all households,
regardless of racial group membership. However, while effects for wives are not
significant in the pooled model (see Table A16), education affects white and black
couples differently based on the relationship between wives’ education and the
motherhood penalty. Education acts as a suppressor for the effect of children on the
wages for white wives, indicating that white wives with more education have slightly
higher wage penalties. Given assortative partnering based on educational attainment, this
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suggests that wage gaps are wider within white couples with highly-educated wives.
These findings are supported by the work of England et al (2014), who find that highly
skilled (or highly educated) white women have the highest motherhood penalties, while
black women, on average, incur smaller wage penalties than their white counterparts.
However, effects are not significant in the pooled model (see Table A16), thus the
differential impact of age and education within white and black couples should be viewed
with caution. Yet, accounting for age and education does little to alter variation in the
alignment of parental wage effects within black and white couples.
The results also demonstrate that the theory of household specialization (Becker
1981) also has differential explanatory power within couples across racial/ethnic groups,
but does little to alter the size of parental gaps in both black and white couples. As found
in the two previous chapters, accounting for spouses’ work hours and annual weeks
worked does not fully explain within-couple wage inequality for all couples. Spousal
work hours and annual weeks worked have more explanatory power for the motherhood
penalty in white households but are more predictive of the fatherhood premium within
black couples. This may reflect white mothers’ higher likelihood of decreasing work
hours after having a child relative to black women, while black fathers may be increasing
work time in response to the birth of a child more so than white men do. However,
accounting for spousal work hours only decreases child effects on wages by one
percentage point within couples in both groups. The wage advantage for white fathers
does not change across all models, suggesting that white husbands’ wages are not
explained by their labor market behavior. My analysis suggests that the form of
household specialization may differ by race/ethnicity and support previous research that
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finds differences across groups in the degree couples engage in specialization (Shelton
and John 1993; Kamo and Cohen 1999). Among white households, greater specialization
may be attained by women reducing work hours (while white men maintain their work
hours). Among black households, it is men who appear to change behaviors to achieve
specialization, by black men increasing their work hours (while black women maintain
their work hours). This pattern supports prior research on the motherhood penalty and the
fatherhood premium, with one exception: Glauber (2008a) found that the premium for
black fathers did not vary based on work time. However, the reductions in child wage
effects are small and substantial residual effects remain in both black and white couples.
Another main finding of this chapter is that specific types of familial relationships
also shape the wage inequality associated with children within white and black families.
While previous work has not investigated variation in relational ties to children on the
motherhood penalty, this chapter adds to the literature by situating these effects within
couples and estimating how motherhood and fatherhood impact wages within couples.
My third and fourth hypotheses predicted that male wage advantage would be largest
within couples who co-reside with their biological children and that these wage gaps
would be larger in white compared to black households. Confirming my third hypothesis,
the results support Killewald’s (2013) findings that the fatherhood premium is afforded to
married fathers who co-reside with their children. However, the results from this analysis
reveal that there is a significant motherhood penalty associated with co-residential and
non-residential biological children. In line with Killewald’s (2013) findings, confirming
my fourth hypothesis, it appears that gender wage inequality is largest within married
couples who co-reside with their biological children regardless of racial/ethnic group
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membership. However, husband wage advantage is not as pronounced within black
couples. The results from Table 8 also illustrate that there are fewer black families in the
sample that consist of married couples co-residing with only their biological children,
while white families have lower likelihoods of having step-children or biological children
living outside of the household. This indicates that white fathers receive larger wage
premia associated with co-residential, biological children than black fathers while black
mothers incur wage penalties similar to white mothers.
The residual unexplained wage effects within couples suggest that other processes
outside of the household may explain some of the remaining male wage advantage within
couples, possibly because employers are evaluating employees differently based on their
gender, race, and status as parents. Pager’s (2003) work finds that employers are more
likely to view white men positively over black men, even when white men have a
criminal record (Pager 2003). Kennelly’s (1999) research also finds that employers typify
black women employees, assuming that all black women employees are single mothers.
Meanwhile, Correll et al (2007) find that fathers are more likely to be viewed favorably
by evaluators, followed by childfree women, childfree men, and lastly mothers, in terms
of dependability and productivity. It is possible that employers view white fathers as
being most closely associated with the “ideal worker” or “breadwinner” (Williams 2000),
but assume that black fathers are not involved in the support of children and are thereby
less likely to reward black fathers to the same degree as whites. Employers may also
assume that married white mothers are more likely to take time off or leave jobs to take
on domestic obligations, but presume that black women are less likely to do so based on
assumptions that black women employees are single mothers who are solely responsible
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for the economic support of children. At this time, there is no study that directly tests
employer treatment of workers based on gender, race and parental status. Although it is
possible that the residual unexplained variation in my models may be caused by employer
actions and behaviors, I cannot assess with certainty the role of employers in shaping
wage outcomes within couples. Future research into the role of employers would help to
shed light on these unexplained differences in the wage returns for children by gender
and race.
There are also some limitations to my analyses that provide directions for future
research. First, because the sample is limited to couples where both spouses have nonzero values on wages, the results may be understating the total child wage gaps between
husbands and wives by omitting couples where mothers drop out of the labor force
following the arrival of children. Given that black mothers are more likely than white
mothers to maintain employment after having children, by excluding male breadwinner
families it is likely that I am not observing couples where white women more often
reduce hours for extended periods of time or exit employment after the birth of a child,
which would contribute to a wider gender gap within white relative to black couples.
However, given that dual-earning families have increasingly become more prevalent in
the US (Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie 2006), the results in this study likely reflect what
is occurring among a large portion of married couples in the US.
Another explanation for wage inequality for black women is differential returns to
human capital characteristics (Kilbourne et al. 1994; England et al. 1999) compared to
white women, an explanation that has often been cited as a potential reason the smaller
motherhood penalties black mothers incur. England et al (2014) suggest that work
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experience, a key explanatory factor behind the motherhood penalty also matters: Highly
skilled, low-wage women have the lowest rates of return to experience and the lowest
motherhood penalties, compared to their highly skilled, high-wage counterparts (England
et al 2014). Unfortunately, the NLSY does not have adequate measures available for
spouses in the household roster to directly test the effects of work experience within
couples. I attempted to capture the effects of potential work experience by including both
spouse’s age in my models. Future research investigating the motherhood penalties
within couples should expand the investigation of the effect of human capital on withincouple wages gaps, including consideration of work experience.54
In his most recent work, Andrew Cherlin (2014) concludes that the growth in the
marriage gap between couples with more versus less education is driven by differential
access to well-paying jobs among the working class. Thus, variation in wage gaps
between white and black families may also arise due to differences in the job
characteristics, such as the gender and racial composition of jobs (Tomaskovic-Devey
1993), which I cannot account for in my models due to data limitations. Scholars have
argued that in addition to human capital characteristics, another key source of racial wage
inequality is the exclusion of black workers from desirable jobs (Tomaskovic-Devey
1993; Huffman and Cohen 2004) and that black women’s wages are more adversely
affected by working in low-paying, predominantly female occupations (Kilbourne et al.
1994) compared to white women. While white wives may be more likely to reduce work

Using Killewald (2013) as a guide, in supplementary models I included controls for husband and wives’
potential labor market experience to adjust for the life-cycle pattern of wages that is exogenous to parental
transitions. Including this control measure for potential experience yielded no change in the overall pattern
of results. See Table A14 for results from models including potential work experience.
54
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hours or spend more time out of the labor force, the over-representation of black women
in predominantly female occupations, which tend to have lower wages and higher
turnover compared to other jobs, may explain black women’s smaller penalties compared
to white women. Unfortunately, the variables available for both spouses in the NLSY are
limited. A number of measures for job characteristics, such as public/private sector, selfemployment, the percent female, and percent black of occupation would be useful in
future research to investigate how job characteristics contribute to within-couple wage
gaps. 55
Exploring variation in gender wage discrepancies within families among different
racial/ethnic groups allows for further examination of how families are linked to the
reproduction of US wage inequality. The key finding of this chapter is that the effects of
children produce smaller within-couple wage gaps within black couples compared to
white couples. Black husbands with and without children do not receive the same
advantage over wives compared to white husbands, while black wives incur smaller
penalties compared to white wives. The results clearly demonstrate that family
organization is shaped by interlocking systems of oppression and are also locations where
such systems are reproduced (Collins 1998). The gender wage gap within different-sex
married households is exacerbated by the arrival of children. However, gender wage
inequality within black couples is less pronounced than wage inequality within white
couples. While future research in is needed to explore these processes in more detail
among multi-racial families, this chapter illustrates that family composition itself is an
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Some researchers argue that it is inappropriate to include measures of job characteristics as they are
endogenous factors. However, given that much of the race wage gap has been attributed to job segregation
among workers, testing these effects could be useful in future work.
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important factor shaping current US wage stratification and must also be taken into
consideration in order to reduce gender and race/ethnic wage inequality.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: FAMILY COMPOSITION AND WAGE INEQUALITY
WITHIN AND ACROSS HOUSEHOLDS

In this dissertation, I argue that the growth in earnings inequality overtime is
shaped by and reflected through patterns of family formation and examine how this
inequality is situated within coupled households. The growth in income inequality and a
slowing of the rate of decline in both race and gender wage gaps since the early 1980s
(McCall 2001; Blau, Brinton, and Grusky 2006) has garnered much academic and
popular media attention. However, recent work documents a decline in the average
gender wage gap among young, childfree workers (Gap 2013: McGregor 2013). The
results from each empirical chapter demonstrate the persistence of the gender wage gap is
related to processes of family formation and composition in the United States.
In the three preceding empirical chapters, I examine the distribution of the gender
wage gap and the alignment of child wage effects within married, different-sex couples to
assess how within-household wage inequality varies across households in terms of
spousal work time, socioeconomic class, and race/ethnicity. My analyses reveal that
although husbands’ wage advantage occurs in all households, gender wage inequality
within households is not experienced in the same manner for all couples in terms of
household composition, spousal work behavior, educational attainment, income level,
and race/ethnicity. Directly examining how family composition shapes both women and
men’s wages within heterosexual married couples uncovers the relationship between
gender wage inequality located within families and larger processes of social
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stratification. In this chapter, I review the main findings and discuss their broader
implications for addressing work/family conflict and labor market inequality.
The primary contribution of this dissertation is “bringing the household back in”
to the investigation of wage stratification research by using couples as the unit of
analysis. The results from Chapter 2 reveal a strong relationship between gender,
parenthood, and wage inequality within and among married couple households. Gender
wage inequality is not just a matter of individual differences, rather, the results
demonstrate that substantial gender wage gaps are situated within marriages and
compounded by the arrival of children. Husbands’ wage advantage over wives occurs in
all households, but increases with the arrival of the second child and grows with each
additional child. Although progress in the decline of the wage gap among childfree
workers is encouraging, these results are in line with current discussions about the stalled
reduction in the gender wage gap (Blau et al 2006). However, net of human capital, the
wage advantage afforded to husbands conditioned on children varies among couples
based on wives’ work hours while husbands’ work time has little effect. On average,
within married households husbands have substantial wage advantage over wives, but
this wage advantage is not fully explained by either human capital or labor supply
differences between spouses.
Chapter 2 also exposes the alignment of the motherhood wage penalty and
fatherhood premium within married couples. I find that overall, parental wage effects
produce considerable wage gaps within marriages that are amplified as more children
enter the household, net of spouses’ human capital and work effort. Fathers enjoy
substantial wage premiums over mothers that grow as the number of children increases,
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while the motherhood penalty appears with the birth of the second child and increases
with the arrival of subsequent children. The results again show that having children
affects women’s labor supply negatively but has little effect on fathers’ employment
participation. Thus, wide parental gaps are shaped by wives’ characteristics more so than
husbands’, but again, these wage discrepancies are not fully explained by either spouses’
human capital or work effort. These findings are in line with previous individual-level
work that finds reducing work hours has some explanatory effect for the motherhood
penalty (Budig and England 2001; Budig and Hodges 2010; Glauber 2007), but
increasing work hours has not been found to be a primary explanatory factor behind the
fatherhood premium (Glauber 2008a; Hodges and Budig 2010). The results demonstrate
that household specialization only partially explains the wage gaps within couples with
two or more children.
Moreover, Chapter 2 also provides insight into what happens to within-couple
wage inequality when husbands work long hours. Comparing couples with different
work-time arrangements shows that, across all households, wage advantage is larger for
fathers than childfree men, but the fatherhood premium does not accrue based on fathers’
increasing work time or working excessive hours. Instead, when wives work full-time,
husbands’ wage advantage and fatherhood premium are significantly smaller. The size of
the motherhood penalty varies based on both wives and husbands’ work time, with the
wider child gaps within couples being primarily driven by the penalties incurred by wives
who work full-time. Husbands who work excessive hours (50 hours per week or more)
do not garner more wage advantage for having children than husbands who work
standard hours, but when wives work full-time, wage penalties for motherhood are larger
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and wage premiums for fatherhood are smaller. Overall, the results from Chapter 2
indicate that within- couple work time tradeoffs shape the distribution of wage inequality
across households, but this is mainly driven by wives’ who work full-time.
However, within couple work time tradeoffs and decision-making between spouses occur
in the context of an unequal labor market. The growth in income inequality and the
marriage gap between socioeconomic groups (Cherlin 2014) in recent decades suggests
that wage gaps resulting from children within households are not evenly distributed
across families by socioeconomic class for several reasons. First, social class has been
cited as an important factor that shapes how dual-earning families “do gender” based on
the ideologies of female caretaker and male breadwinner. Middle and upper-class spouses
are also most likely to change their division of labor after the arrival of children
(Blossfield and Drobnic 2001). Meanwhile, working class wives are more likely to
maintain employment based on financial necessity and working class families divide paid
work more equitably than the middle class (Blossfied and Drobnic 2001). In Chapter 3, I
uncover important variation in the distribution of child wage effects within couples across
education and family income levels. To date, this is the only study that considers how
parental wage effects vary by socioeconomic class in the couple context
The results reveal that family composition exacerbates wage inequality across
households at different income levels, but that gender wage inequality within couples
tends to be most pronounced at the middle income levels and above. Overall, husbands’
wage advantage and the gaps produced by effects of children on mothers’ and fathers’
wages grow as income rises. However, there are a few exceptions: not all husbands
receive higher wages than their wives at all income levels. Among couples at the bottom
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tenth of the family income distribution, there is no significant wage advantage for
husbands over wives within childfree households. Husband advantage conditioned on
fatherhood is also associated with a small wage penalty of 2.3 percent within families at
the bottom fifth of the income distribution. These results support previous work by Cooke
(2014) that finds that low-earning fathers incur wage penalties, possible due to the types
of jobs available at the lowest income levels, which are more likely to be contingent with
higher turnover rates.
In terms of parental gaps within couples, the fatherhood premium is largest at the
median of income, but is rather stable across all income levels. The motherhood penalty,
however, is the largest among the couples at the median of income and above. The widest
wage gaps within parental couples are driven by the motherhood penalties among
households with more resources. The results support England et al.’s (2013) work that
finds higher penalties for high earning women before controlling for work experience. It
appears that within-couple wage inequality grows with family income and is largest
amongst households at higher income levels. It is among these couples where Becker’s
theory of household specialization is most salient: Husbands receive large wage
premiums but do not increase work effort, while the largest motherhood penalties are
incurred by wives who work full-time.
Chapter 3 also shows that there are also differences in the distribution of withincouple wage gaps across levels of education. In terms of the distribution of husbands’
wage advantage, all husbands earn more than wives within all couples, but wage
advantage conditioned on children is primarily larger when husbands have more
education than wives. If wives have more education than their husbands, husbands still
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enjoy wage advantage, but the gaps are smaller. However, class position matters here: the
size of parental wage gaps depend on whether spouses have obtained more or less than a
high school education. Within couples where one or both spouses have not graduated
high school (with the exception of couples where both spouse have not completed high
school), husbands’ wage advantage does not grow with the arrival of children in the
household. Thus, within less-educated households, husbands are not rewarded for
fatherhood, while wives do not incur motherhood penalties. Meanwhile, the widest
within-couple wage gaps generated by children occur primarily among the college
educated, perhaps because college-educated wives are more likely to reduce work time in
response to having children.
The results from Chapter 3 makes apparent that the patterns in the distribution of
both male advantage conditioned on children and the motherhood penalty and the
fatherhood premium are somewhat different. The distribution of the wage gap and the
effects of children by educational attainment does not follow the same pattern across
couple income levels, illustrating that how class is measured is important for assessing
the distribution of within-couple wage inequality. While the distribution of the effects of
motherhood and fatherhood follows a more stable pattern across income, significant
parental wage gaps are widest at the lowest and highest levels of education in the tails of
the distribution. The combined results suggest, however, that the effects of children on
earnings further compound between-household wage inequality. It appears that couples
who are already disadvantaged in the labor market are not necessarily penalized or
rewarded for having children, while those in the middle have more within-couple
inequality that increases among the highest earners.
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Chapter 4 illustrates the interlocking structures of gender and race in the
production of wage inequality within and across households, revealing distinct variation
in the distribution of the effects of children within and between households for black and
white families. Moreover, differences in selection into marriage and parenthood between
white and black couples appears to shape gender wage inequality within households.
While all husbands enjoy substantially higher wages than wives, white husbands garner
the largest within-couple wage advantage, and this advantage is amplified with children.
Meanwhile, the gender wage gap is smaller in childfree black families and the presence
of children increases black husbands’ wage advantage to a lesser degree. Moreover,
more wage inequality associated with having children occurs within white families based
on larger penalties and premiums for white mothers and fathers. However, parental wage
effects vary according to the number of children. For black mothers, there are no
significant wage effects for the first two children while white mothers receive penalties
for two or more children. Meanwhile, white fathers receive significant fatherhood
premiums from the first child on, but black fathers garner much smaller premiums for
two or more children. Given the considerable labor market disadvantage experienced by
workers of color (Pager 2003; Kennelly 1999; Pager and Quillian 2005), the effects of
children on wages also shape inequality across race/ethnic groups.
Another main finding of this chapter is that specific types of familial relationships
also shape the wage inequality associated with children within white and black families.
While previous work has not investigated variation in relational ties to children on the
motherhood penalty, this chapter adds to the literature by situating the effects of both
motherhood and fatherhood within couples. The results support Killewald’s (2013)
130

findings that the fatherhood premium is afforded to married fathers who co-reside with
their children and this is regardless of racial/ethnic group membership. However,
husband wage advantage is not as pronounced within black couples. The results also
reveal that there are significant motherhood penalties associated with co-residential and
non-residential biological children for both white and black wives. White fathers receive
larger wage premia associated with co-residential, biological children than black fathers
while black mothers incur wage penalties similar to white mothers.
What explains this variation between racial groups in the effects of children on
within-couple wage inequality? Including education and age does little to reduce male
advantage or variation in the alignment of parental wage effects within all households,
regardless of racial group membership. My analysis does suggest, however, that the form
of household specialization may differ by race/ethnicity. Supporting prior work (Shelton
and John 1993; Kamo and Cohen 1999), the results demonstrate that household
specialization (Becker 1981) has differential explanatory power within couples across
racial/ethnic groups, yet does not greatly reduce the size of parental gaps in both black
and white couples. Spousal work hours and annual weeks work have more explanatory
power for the motherhood penalty in white households but are more predictive of the
fatherhood premium within black couples. This may reflect white mothers’ higher
likelihood of decreasing work hours after having a child relative to black women, while
black fathers may be increasing work time in response to the birth of a child more so than
white men do. The wage advantage for white fathers does not change across all models,
suggesting that white husbands’ wages are not explained by their labor market behavior.
Among white households, greater specialization may be attained by women reducing
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work hours (while white men maintain their work hours). Among black households, it is
men who appear to change behaviors to achieve specialization, by black men increasing
their work hours (while black women maintain their work hours). However, the
reductions in child wage effects are small and substantial residual effects remain in both
black and white couples.
While there has been some encouraging news about the closing of the wage gap,
it is clear for some families, the “revolution has stalled” (Blau et al 2006). The result
clearly demonstrate that gender wage inequality is most pronounced among the most
privileged families. The patterns revealed in this analysis have important implications for
understanding work-family conflict. Couples where both spouses white, collegeeducated, and at higher levels of income have the most pronounced wage gaps. This does
not vary according to husband’s behavior, but wives’ work effort mediates this slightly. It
appears that the wage gap within couples is exacerbated by the wage penalties incurred
by working mothers. However, since my sample is limited to only employed persons, my
analysis may understate wives’ motherhood penalty and the wage gap between husbands
and wives. By excluding male breadwinner families it is likely that I am not observing
couples where mothers may “opt out” of paid employment after the birth of a child.
However, given that dual-earning families have increasingly become more prevalent in
the US (Bianchi, Robinson, and Milkie 2006), the results in this study likely reflect what
is occurring among a large portion of US families. Overall, the results indicate substantial
wage gaps occur within marriages, regardless of parental status, but the arrival of
children contributes more to gender wage inequality within more privileged families.
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Findings from each chapter speak to current academic debates over whether
women should “lean in” (Sandberg 2013) instead of “opting out” (Belkin 2003; Stone
2007) to address gender wage inequality and as a means of dealing with work and family
conflict. Across all three chapters, the residual wage premiums for fatherhood and the
motherhood penalty remain largely unexplained. Although human capital and work
effort have some effect on reducing variation among couples, the results indicate that
spousal characteristics factors do not fully explain the gender wage gap nor the family
gap within and across couples. Although popular media encourages women to “lean in”
(Sandberg 2013) to the world of paid work to reduce gender wages gaps, findings from
each empirical chapter illustrate that the conflict between the structure of work and the
structure of families may largely be driving the remaining gender wage gap. Research
documenting the effects of children on parents’ earnings points to differences in
employer evaluations of workers with children based on the gendered ideology of the
“ideal worker” (Williams 2000) as a contributing factor to the motherhood penalty and
fatherhood premium. Experimental studies have found that due employers often evaluate
workers with care responsibilities, who are more likely to be women, in a negative light
(Ridgeway and Correll 2004; Kennelly 1999), while fathers are more likely to be viewed
favorably (Correll, Benard, and Paik 2007). While previous work has been unable to
directly investigate employer discrimination due to data limitations, researchers have
argued that residual penalties and premiums result from employers evaluations of
workers based on parental status (Budig and England 2001; Glauber 2008a&b).
Moreover, the results indicate that it is the most privileged married women that work fulltime who incur the largest wage penalties. Therefore, calls for women to “lean in” do not
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make much sense if we are to close the gender wage gaps occurring within families.
Something is occurring in work places to reproduce gender wage inequality within
families, but further research investigating employer behaviors would help to shed light
on these processes.
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Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Individual and Couple-Level Measures
by Parental Status: NLSY 1980-2008ab
Childfree
Parents
Couple Characteristics
Couple Hourly Wage

13,550
14.01a

47,740
15.36a

(12.90)

(14.95)

Ln Couple Hourly Wage

2.34

a

2.44a

(0.82)

(0.83)

Number of Children in Household

1.99
(0.90)
0.31
(0.46)
0.46
(0.50)
0.23
(0.42)

One Child
Two Children
Three or More Children
Spousal Characteristics
Husbands

Wives

Husbands

Wives

6,775

6,775

23,870

23,870

ab

12.73ab

(17.13)

(11.65)

Total N
Hourly Wage

15.71

ab

(14.44)
Currently Employed

0.97

Part-time

a

(0.20)

(0.30)

ab

0.33ab

(0.20)

(0.45)

13.29

ab

ab

(3.83)
44.00

ab

(0.40)
32.70

ab

(8.63)
13.99

ab

(3.26)
38.41

ab

0.04

36.75

ab

(8.87)
12.98

ab

(4.58)
44.77

35.35ab
(7.98)
13.39ab
(4.05)

ab

34.73ab

(11.02)

(10.36)

(12.31)

ab

ab

ab

44.48ab

(10.18)

(13.82)

(14.02)
p <.05, two tailed significance test for differences across couples.
b
p < .05, two tailed significance test for differences within couples.
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0.20

(10.97)
49.09

a

0.89a

ab

(8.45)

Annual Weeks Worked

0.96

a

(0.26)

34.61

Weekly Hours

0.92

a

ab

(0.24)

Years of Education

(10.90)

18.16

(0.17)
0.06

Age

12.37

ab

46.92

(11.19)

49.42

Table 2. Proportions, Standard Deviations, and Sample Size of Couples by Parental Status and Work Hour
Arrangements
Total N
Childfree
Parents
(Couple-Years)
Total N (Couple-Years)
6,775
23,870
Proportion
Proportion
(SD)
(SD)
Dual Earners
Full-Time Dual Earners

4725

FT Husband/PT Wife

3067

0.71
(0.45)
0.18
(0.38)

0.59
(0.49)
0.31
(0.46)

0.12
(0.33)
0.03
(0.16)

0.10
(0.30)
0.06

Excessive Hours
Husband > 50 Hours/FT Wife

1610

Husband > 50 Hours/PT Wife

880

(0.24)

Note: Couples’ work hour arrangements shift from year to year across survey waves, therefore, the total number of couples do not add to the total
number of couples (5,769) in the sample.
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Table 3. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children within Married Couples a,b,c
Fixed Effects
Human
Capital
5769
0.19
**
(0.01)
0.03
**
(0.00)
-0.03
**
(0.01)
0.08
**
(0.01)

Work Effort

0.0825 ** 0.0838 **
(0.0038)
(0.0038)

0.0867 **
(0.0039)

Baseline

Gross
Couple N
Husband Advantage (Childfree Gender Gap)
Year

5769
0.30
**
(0.01)
0.05
**
(0.00)

Number of Children (Motherhood Penalty)
Number of Children * Husband Advantage
(Fatherhood Premium)
Level 1 Variance
Within Couple Mean

0.1205
(0.0039)

Level 2 Variance Components
Husband Advantage * Number of Children
(Fatherhood Premium)
Number of Children (Motherhood Penalty)
Mean Across Couples
Residual

**

5769
0.19
(0.01)
0.05
(0.00)
-0.03
(0.01)
0.08
(0.01)

0.0307
(0.0024)
0.0093
(0.0011)
0.1465 ** 0.1440
(0.0063)
(0.0061)
0.2530 ** 0.2402
(0.0021)
(0.0021)

**
**
**
**

**

0.0289
(0.0023)
** 0.0083
(0.0010)
** 0.0989
(0.0051)
** 0.2412
(0.0021)

**
**
**
**

5769
0.19
(0.01)
0.03
(0.00)
-0.02
(0.01)
0.08
(0.01)

0.0284
(0.0023)
0.0072
(0.0009)
0.0915
(0.0049)
0.2320
(0.0020)

**
**
**
**

**
**
**
**

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Gross model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview. bBaseline model includes dummy variable for
gender, year of interview, number of children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children. cModel includes all measures
from the baseline model plus measures for age in years and years of education. Model contains all measures from the human capital model, plus weekly
hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the couple/dyad.
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Table 4. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children within Couples by Work Hour Arrangement a
Dual Earners
Excessive Hours
Husband FT/Wife Husband FT/Wife
Husband > 50
Husband > 50
PT
FT
Hours/Wife PT
Hours/Wife FT
3067
4725
880
1610
Husband Advantage (Childfree Gap)
0.35
**
0.15
**
0.28
**
0.06
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.07)
(0.04)
Number of Children (Motherhood Penalty)
-0.02
*
-0.03
**
-0.03
-0.06
**
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Number of Children * Husband Advantage
0.07
**
0.05
**
0.08
**
0.07
**
(0.01)
(0.01)
(Fatherhood Premium)
(0.03)
(0.02)
Level 1: Variance Components
Within Couple Mean
0.1127
0.0937
**
**
0.1817
0.0185
(0.0083)
(0.0046)
(0.0243)
(0.0132)
Level 2: Variance Components
Husband Advantage * Number of Children
0.0169
**
0.0167
**
0.0000
0.0103
**
(Fatherhood Premium)
(0.0032)
(0.0021)
(0.0000)
(0.0042)
Number of Children (Motherhood Penalty)
0.0057
0.0059
**
**
0.0000
**
0.022
**
(0.0015)
(0.0010)
(0.0000)
(0.0021)
Mean Across Couples
0.0862
0.0909
**
**
0.0689
**
0.0817
**
(0.0086)
(0.0056)
(0.0187)
(0.0132)
Residual
0.2368
0.1939
**
**
0.3074
**
0.2695
**
(0.0041)
(0.0023)
(0.0149)
(0.0096)
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender, control for year of interview, number of children in household and it’s interaction
with gender, plus measures for age in years and years of education for each member of the couple/dyad.
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Table 5. Means and Standard Deviations for Individual and Couple-Level Measures
by Parental Status: NLSY 1980-2008ab
Childfree
Parents
Couple-Years
13,550
47,740
Couple Characteristics
14.01a
(12.90)
2.34a
(0.82)
$67,374.41a
($84,351.50)

Couple Hourly Wage
Ln Couple Hourly Wage
Net Family Income
Number of Children in Household

15.36a
(14.95)
2.44a
(0.83)
$71,183.98a
($77,277.90)
1.99
(0.90)

Spousal Characteristics
Husbands Wives Husbands Wives
6,775
6,775
23,870
23,870
ab
ab
ab
15.71
12.37
18.16
12.73ab
(14.44) (10.90) (17.13) (11.65)
0.06ab
0.20ab
0.04ab
0.33ab
(0.24)
(0.40)
(0.20)
(0.45)
a
a
a
0.97
0.92
0.96
0.89a
(0.17)
(0.26)
(0.20)
(0.30)
34.61ab
32.70ab
36.75ab
35.35ab
(8.45)
(8.63)
(8.87)
(7.98)
ab
ab
ab
13.29
13.99
12.98
13.39ab
(3.83)
(3.26)
(4.58)
(4.05)
ab
ab
ab
0 .18
0.14
0.06
0.09ab
(0.35)
(0.24)
(0.38)
(0.29)
ab
ab
ab
0.29
0.34
0.37
0.42ab
(0.45)
(0.47)
(0.48)
(0.49)
ab
ab
ab
0.39
0.36
0.27
0.24ab
(0.49)
(0.48)
(0.44)
(0.43)
ab
ab
ab
44.00
38.41
44.77
34.73ab
(10.97) (11.02) (10.36) (12.31)
49.09ab
46.92ab
49.42ab
44.48ab
(14.02) (11.19) (10.18) (13.82)

Person-Years
Hourly Wage
Part-Time
Currently Employed
Age
Years of Education
High School Dropout
High School Graduate
Bachelor’s Degree or Higher
Weekly Hours
Annual Weeks Worked
a
b

p <.05, two tailed significance test for differences across couples.
p < .05, two tailed significance test for differences within couples.
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Table 6. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children Within Couples by Income Levela
Quantile

0.05

0.1

0.25

0.5

0.75

0.9

0.95

Couple N
Husband
Advantage

880

972

2068

3072

3120

2100

1313

Year

-0.089

0.216

0.325

(0.053)

(0.040)

(0.023)

0.030

**

(0.004)
Number of
Children

-0.042

0.066

# of Children

(0.032)

**

(0.003)
*

(0.020)
Husband
Advantage *

0.016

-0.032

*

0.049
(0.020)

-0.032

**

0.057
(0.011)

**

0.017

**

-0.042

**

0.079
(0.009)

**

0.013

**

-0.043

**

0.061
(0.009)

**

0.013

**

-0.058

**

0.081
(0.012)

**

0.039
(0.003)

**

(0.009)
**

0.378
(0.037)

(0.002)

(0.006)
**

0.303
(0.024)

(0.001)

(0.006)
**

0.268
(0.018)

(0.001)

(0.008)
*

0.255
(0.018)

(0.002)

(0.015)
*

0.016

**

-0.062

**

(0.014)
**

0.077

**

(0.018)

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household and an
interaction term for gender * number of children, and., age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the
dyad. See Appendix Table A7 for variance components.
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Table 7. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number Children within Couples by Educational Attainment Levela,b

Both <
High
School
Couple N
Husband Advantage
(Childfree Gap)

Husband <
High
School/Wife
Higher
413

381
0.194

**

(0.070)
Year

Number of Children
(Motherhood
Penalty)
Husband Advantage
* Number of
Children
(Fatherhood
Premium)

0.049

0.140

**

(0.048)
**

0.027

Husband
High
School/Wife
Lower
375
0.537

**

(0.064)
**

0.038

Both High
School

1450
0.317
(0.024)

**

0.041

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.004)

(0.002)

-0.033

-0.026

-0.025

-0.034

(0.023)

(0.017)

(0.021)

(0.009)

0.040

0.028

0.080

(0.025)

(0.028)

(0.011)

0.096

(0.028)

**

**

Husband
High
School/Wife
Higher
970
0.164

**

(0.031)
**

0.041

-0.027

**

0.042

(0.015)

554

933

0.307

**

0.043

*

-0.068

**

0.101

(0.024)

**

0.043

**

(0.003)
**

(0.017)
**

0.247
(0.031)

(0.005)

(0.011)
**

Both
Bachelor's

(0.043)

(0.003)
**

Husband
Bachelor's/Wife
Less

-0.038

**

(0.013)
**

0.121

**

(0.016)

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and its
interaction term for gender * number of children, plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad. b See Table A8 in
Appendix for variance components.
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Table 8. Means and Standard Deviations for Individual and Couple-level Measures
by Race/Ethnicity: NLSY 1980-2008a,b
Black
White
Couple N
774
2,288
Couple Characteristics
14.24a
(10.72)
2.42a
(0.75)
2.07a
(0.98)
0.25a
(0.43)
0.31a
(0.46)
0.23a
(0.42)
0.63a
(0.48)
0.14a
(0.34)
0.06a
(0.24)

Couple Hourly Wage
Ln Couple Hourly Wage
Number of Children in Household
One Child
Two Children
Three or More Children
Residential, Biological Children
Non-Residential, Biological Children
Step-Children

16.67a
(15.14)
2.53a
(0.81)
1.96a
(0.86)
0.24a
(0.43)
0.35a
(0.48)
0.16a
(0.37)
0.67a
(0.47)
0.05a
(0.21)
0.04a
(0.19)

Spousal Characteristics
Person-Years
Hourly Wage
Age
Years of Education
Currently Employed
Weekly Hours
Annual Weeks Worked
a
b

Husbands
3,494
15.68ab
(11.41)
36.73ab
(9.30)
13.17ab
(5.37)
0.94ab
(0.24)
43.88ab
(10.21)
49.23b
(8.54)

Wives Husbands
3,494
13,973
ab
12.80
19.48ab
(9.77)
(16.82)
35.38ab
37.49ab
(8.93)
(8.48)
ab
13.67
13.46ab
(4.31)
(3.89)
0.91ab
0.97ab
(0.28)
(0.18)
ab
38.36
45.04ab
(8.76)
(10.27)
46.85ab
49.73b
(11.75)
(10.16)

p <.05, two tailed significance test for differences across couples by race/ethnicity.
p < .05, two tailed significance test for differences within couples by gender.
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Wives
13,973
13.86ab
(12.63)
35.77ab
(7.87)
13.92ab
(3.81)
0.92ab
(0.27)
34.97ab
(12.47)
45.57ab
(12.62)

Table 9. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children Within Married Couples by Racial Group a,b,c,d,e
Black
White
Couple N
774
774
774
774
2,288
2,288
2,288
2,288
Assortative
Household
Assortative
Household
Grossa
Baselineb Partneringc Specializationd
Grossa
Baselineb Partneringc Specializationd
Husband
Advantage
0.23 ** 0.16 ** 0.16 **
0.16
**
0.43 ** 0.30 ** 0.30 **
0.30
**
(0.02)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.03)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.02)
Year
0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.05 **
0.04
**
0.05 ** 0.05 ** 0.05 **
0.05
**
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
(0.00)
Number of
Children
-0.04 ** -0.03 **
-0.03
**
-0.04 ** -0.05 **
-0.04
**
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
Husband
Advantage *
Number of
Children
0.05 ** 0.05 **
0.04
**
0.09 ** 0.09 **
0.09
**
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Gross model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview. b Baseline model includes dummy variable for
gender, year of interview, number of children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children . c Model includes all measures
from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of education. d Model includes all measures from the human capital model plus weekly
hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad. e See Table A11 in Appendix for variance components.
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Table 10. Effect of Husband Advantage within Married Couples by Biological and
Residential Status of Children and Racial Groupa,b
Total Couple N
3062
Husband Advantage
Year
Husband Advantage * Black
Residential Biological Children
Residential Biological Children * Black
Residential Biological Children * Husband Advantage
Non-Residential Biological Children
Non-Residential Biological Children * Black
Non-Residential Biological Children* Husband Advantage
Step-Children
Step-Children * Black
Step-Children * Husband Advantage

0.30
(0.01)
0.05
(0.00)
-0.14
(0.03)
-0.05
(0.01)
-0.06
(0.03)
0.13
(0.02)
-0.10
(0.04)
-0.05
(0.17)
0.04
(0.05)
-0.12
(0.07)
-0.05
(0.40)
0.14
(0.08)

**
**
**
**

**
*

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model. bSee Table A12 in Appendix
for variance components.
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Table 11. Effect of Husband Wage Advantage and Number of Children Within
Married Couples by Racial Groupa,b,c
Black
White
Couple N
774
774
2,288
2,288
Baseline
Full
Baseline
Full
Husband Advantage
0.159
** 0.160 **
0.298
** 0.299 **
(0.037)
(0.037)
(0.020)
(0.020)
Year
0.048
** 0.043 **
0.047
** 0.047 **
(0.001)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
One Child
-0.022
-0.018
-0.013 *
-0.008
(0.032)
(0.031)
(0.017)
(0.016)
Two Children
-0.033
-0.022
-0.065 ** -0.063 **
(0.035)
(0.033)
(0.017)
(0.017)
Three or More
-0.135 ** -0.109 ** -0.159 ** -0.150 **
(0.041)
(0.039)
(0.024)
(0.024)
Husband * One Child
0.054
0.055
0.077
** 0.077 **
(0.043)
(0.043)
(0.022)
(0.022)
Husband * Two Children
0.096
*
0.095 *
0.212
** 0.213 **
(0.044)
(0.044)
(0.022)
(0.022)
Husband * Three or
More
0.150
** 0.147 **
0.266
** 0.267 **
(0.050)
(0.050)
(0.031)
(0.031)
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Baseline model includes dummy variable for gender, year of interview, number of
children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children. b Model includes all
measures from the baseline and human capital model plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each
member of the dyad. c See Table A13 in Appendix for variance components from Table 14.
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Figure 1. Husband Wage Advantage by Number of
Children within Couples
80.0%
67.8%

70.0%
58.3%
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30.0%

23.3%

22.9%

Childless

One Child

20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
Two Children

Three Children

Note: Results from full model using dummy variables for one child, two children, and three or more
children including measures for human capital and household specialization.

Figure 2. Motherhood and Fatherhood Effects on
Hourly Wages within Couples
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5.0%

Fathers
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-0.3%
-5.0%

-3.5%

-10.0%
One Child

Two Children

-8.5%
Three Children

Note: Results from full model using dummy variables for one child, two children, and three or more
children including measures for human capital and household specialization.
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Figure 3. Husband Wage Advantage within Couples
by Work Hour Arrangments
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52.2%
50.0%

43.3%

41.9%
40.0%
32.3%
30.0%
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H FT/W PT

H FT/W FT

H > 50/ W < 35

Childfree

H > 50 /W > 35

Parents

Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the
household plus measures for age in years and years of education, for each member of the dyad.

Figure 4. Motherhood and Fatherhood Effects on
Hourly Wages within Couples by Work Hour
Arrangements
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-6.0%
-8.0%
H FT/W PT

H FT/W FT

H > 50/ W < 35

H > 50 /W > 35

Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the
household plus measures for age in years and years of education for each member of the dyad.
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Figure 5. Husband Wage Advantage within Couples
by Parental Status and Income Level
70.0%
60.0%
50.0%
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39.7%
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24.2%
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-8.5%
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0.1

0.25

0.5

Childless

0.75

0.9

0.95

Parents

Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the
household plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for
each member of the dyad.

Figure 6. Motherhood and Fatherhood Wage Effects
within Couples by Income Level
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0.75
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the
household plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for
each member of the dyad.
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Figure 7. Husband Wage Advantage within Couples by Parental Status and
Educational Attainment
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Husband Both Bachelor's
School/Wife Bachelor's/Wife
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Less

Parents

Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the household plus measures for weekly hours and
annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.
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Figure 8. Motherhood and Fatherhood Wage Effects within Couples by
Educational Attainment
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the household plus measures for weekly hours and
annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.
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10.0%

Figure 9. Distribution of Motherhood and Fatherhood Wage
Effects across Couples by Educational and Income Level
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Mothers INC

Fathers INC

Mothers ED

Fathers ED

Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the household plus measures for weekly hours and
annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad. Models estimating parental wage effects across income also include controls for age in years and
years of education for each spouse.
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Figure 10. Husband Wage Advantage within
Households by Parental Status and Racial Group
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17.8%

10.0%
0.0%
Black

White
Childless

Parents

Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the
household plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for
each member of the dyad.

Figure 11. Motherhood and Fatherhood Wage Effects
within Couples by Racial Group
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-2.9%
-4.2%
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model using measure for number of children in the
household plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for
each member of the dyad.
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Figure 12. Husband Wage Advantage Within Couples by Biological
and Residential Status of Children and Racial Group
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Black
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Step-Children
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked
for each member of the dyad.
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Figure 13. Motherhood and Fatherhood Wage Effects
by Biological and Residential Status of Children
Within White Couples
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Mothers

Step-Children
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of
education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.

Figure 14. Motherhood and Fatherhood Wage Effects
by Biological and Residential Status of Children
Within Black Couples
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of
education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.
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Figure 15. Motherhood and Fatherhood Wage
Effects by Number of Children within White Couples
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of
education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.

Figure 16. Motherhood and Fatherhood Wage Effects
by Number of Children within Black Couples
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Note: Model includes all measures from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of
education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.
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APPENDIX
FULL RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY TESTS

Table A1. Dyadic Data Structure
COUPLE ID
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
7
7
7
7

LNWAGE
$13.73
$21.98
$9.87
$26.44
$9.62
$5.81
$7.00
$16.54
$25.00
$9.89
$7.81
$19.23
$18.03
$15.86
$16.82
$9.62

HUSBAND
MALE YEAR NUMKID HOURS
0
0
93
1
40
1
93
1
0
0
104
2
45
1
104
2
42
1
93
1
0
0
93
1
0
0
98
1
44
1
98
1
44
1
100
2
0
0
100
2
46
0
98
2
46
1
98
2
0
0
93
1
42
1
93
1
42
1
94
1
0
0
94
1

156

WIFE
HOURS
35
0
35
0
0
40
40
0
0
30
34
34
36
0
0
37

Table A2. Proportions, Standard Deviations, and Sample Sizes of
Couples by Parental Status and Work Hour Arrangements
Childless
6,775

Total N (Couple-Years)

Breadwinner/Homemaker
FT Husband/Not Emp Wife

1697

Not Emp Husband/ FT Wife

633

Dual Earners
Full-Time Dual Earners

4725

FT Husband/PT Wife

3067

PT Husband/FT Wife

657

Proportion
(SD)

Parents
23,870
Proportion
(SD)

.07
(0.25)
0.02
(0.15)

0.10
(0.30)
0.03
(0.17)

0.71
(0.45)
0.18
(0.38)
0.04
(0.20)

0.59
(0.49)
0.31
(0.46)
0.03
(0.17)

0.12

0.10

(0.33)

(0.30)

0.03

0.06

Excessive Hours

Husband > 50 Hours/FT
Wife

1610

Husband > 50 Hours/PT
Wife

880

(0.16)
(0.24)
Note: Couples’ work hour arrangements shift from year to year across survey wages. Therefore,
the total number of couples in each category do not add to the total number of couples (5,769) in
the sample.
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Table A3. Effect of Male Advantage and Number of Children on Couple’s Hourly Wages by Work Arrangements a
Breadwinner/Homemaker
Fixed Effects

Husband Advantage

Traditional

0.38
-0.05

0.08

Husband
FT/Wife FT

0.12

0.35

0.32

0.15

*

(0.05)
**

(0.01)
Number of Children *
Husband Advantage

Dual Earners
Husband PT/Wife
FT

**

(0.03)
Number of Children

Non-Traditional

Husband
FT/Wife PT

-0.06

(0.02)

(0.02)
**

-0.02

(0.02)

(0.01)

0.04

0.07

(0.02)

(0.01)

**

**
*

**

**

(0.07)

(0.01)

-0.02

-0.03

(0.03)

(0.01)

0.05

0.05

(0.04)

(0.01)

**

Excessive Hours
Husband > 50
Husband > 50
Hours/Wife PT
Hours/Wife FT
0.28

**

(0.07)
**

**

0.06
(0.04)

-0.03

-0.06

(0.02)

(0.02)

0.08

**

(0.03)

0.07

**

**

(0.02)

Random Effects
Level 2
Husband Advantage

3.53e-13

4.40e-22

(4.47e-10)
Number of Children

1.36e-16
.0652282

**

(0.0032)
**

(1.76e-1)
Mean Across Couples

0.0169

**

(.0108643)

2.58e-19

0.0057

.

(0.0015)

.0578527

0.0862

.

(0.0086)

**
**

.0525155

0.0167

(.0169205)

(0.0021)

2.02e-17

0.0059

(3.84e-17)

(0.0010)

.0025599

0.0909

(.0279323)

(0.0056)

**

0.0000

0.0103

(0.0000)
**

0.0000

**

(0.0000)
**

**

(0.0042)
0.022

**

(0.0021)

0.0000

0.0103

(0.0000)

(0.0042)

0.1817

0.0185

**

Level 1 Variance
Within Couple Mean

.1699227

**

(.0135762)
Residual

.2733978
(.0083599)

.1490768
.

**

.2018393
.

0.1127

**

(0.0083)
0.2368

**

(0.0041)

.3621256

0.0937

(.046425)

(0.0046)

.3731797

0.1939

(.0235748)

(0.0023)

**

(0.0243)
**

0.3074
(0.0149)

(0.0132)
**

0.2695

**

(0.0096)

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender, control for year of interview, number of children in household and it’s interaction
with gender, plus measures for age in years and years of education for each member of the couple/dyad.
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Table A4. Effect of Male Advantage and Number of Children
Within Couples
Couple N
5769
Full
Husband Advantage
0.26 **
(0.01)
Year
0.05 **
(0.00)
One Child
-0.02
(0.01)
Two Children
-0.05 **
(0.01)
Three or More
-0.14 **
(0.02)
Husband Advantage * One Child
0.07 **
(0.02)
Husband Advantage * Two Children
0.18 **
(0.02)
Husband Advantage * Three or More
0.22 **
(0.02)
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model.
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Table A5. Sensitivity Test for Spouses’ Potential Experience a
Model A
Model B
Husband Advantage
0.27
**
0.27
**
(0.01)
(0.01)
Number of Children
-0.04
**
-0.04
**
(0.00)
(0.00)
Husband Advantage * Number of
Children
0.08
**
0.08
**
(0.01)
(0.01)

Model C
0.27
**
(0.01)
-0.04
**
(0.00)
0.08
(0.01)

**

** p > .01, * p >.05. aModel A includes potential work experience, but not age or education. Model B
includes potential work experience and age, but not education. Model C includes potential work
experiences and education, but not age.

Table A6. Sensitivity Test for Spouses’ Relative Education and Age
Sensitivity Testa
Model A
Model B
Husband Advantage
0.27
**
0.27
**
(0.01)
(0.01)
Number of Children
-0.04
**
-0.04
**
(0.00)
(0.00)
Husband Advantage * Number of Children
0.08
**
0.08
**
(0.01)
(0.01)
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model A are the results from the full model in Table 3. Model B are the results after
replacing spouses’ age and education with measures for relative age and education.
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Table A7. Variance Components From Table 6: Random Effects across Net Family Income
Quantile
.05
.10
.25
.50
.75
Husband Advantage * Number of
Children
0.062
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

.90

.95

0.0000

Number of Children

0.0000

0.0007

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Mean Across Couples

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

0.0000

Within-Couple Mean

0.2726

0.179

0.1432

0.1416

0.1278

0.1272

Residual

0.3711

0.2122

0.1817

0.1538

0.1530

0.1794

0.0019
(0.0031)
0.0083
(0.0018)
0.0000
(0.0000)
0.2590
(0.0126)
0.2464
(0.0059)

**
**
**
**
**

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Gross model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and an
interaction term for gender * number of children., age in years, years of education, weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the
dyad.
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Table A8. Variance Components from Table 7: Random Effects by Educational Attainment
Husband <
Husband
Husband
High
High
High
Both < High School/Wife
School/Wife
Both High
School/Wife
School
Higher
Lower
School
Higher
Male *
Number of
Children
0.0000 **
0.0076
**
0.0000 **
0.0010 ** 0.0000 **
(0.0000)
Number of
Children

0.0066

(0.0045)
**

(0.0028)
Mean Across
Couples

0.0491

0.2017

**

0.2548
(0.0103)

0.0234

**

0.1312

**

0.1425
(0.0064)

**

0.0000

**

0.2437

**

0.1902
(0.0087)

**

0.0343

**

0.1377

**

0.1756
(0.0027)

**

0.0314

**

0.1576

**

0.2216
(0.0041)

0.0026

0.0504

**

0.1774

**

0.2268
(0.0062)

0.0136

**

0.0145

**

(0.0027)
**

0.0522

**

(0.0122)
**

(0.0187)
**

Both Bachelor's

(0.0038)

(0.0158)

(0.0110)
**

**

(0.0020)

(0.0098)

(0.0081)
**

0.0050

0.0221
(0.0070)

(0.0015)

(0.0070)

(0.0220)
**

0.0032

(0.0000)

(0.0009)

(0.0000)

(0.0165)
**

0.0034

(0.0015)

(0.0024)

(0.0126)

(0.0262)
Residual

**

(0.0000)

(0.0232)
Within Couple
Mean

0.0000

(0.0000)

Husband
Bachelor's/Wife
Less

0.1781

**

(0.0135)
**

0.2824

**

(0.0048)

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and its
interaction term for gender * number of children, plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.
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Table A9. Sensitivity Test for Potential Experience Across Income Level
0.05
Husband Advantage

Number of Children

0.1

-0.09

0.22

(0.05)

(0.04)

-0.05

*

(0.02)
Husband Advantage *
Number of Children

0.25
**

-0.03

*

*

(0.03)

0.05

0.26

0.75
**

0.27

(0.02)

-0.03

**

(0.01)
*

(0.02)

**

(0.02)

(0.01)

0.07

0.33

0.5

-0.04

**

(0.01)

0.08

**

(0.02)
**

-0.04

(0.01)

0.06

0.9

**

0.06

(0.01)

-0.06

0.08

0.38

**

(0.04)
**

(0.01)
**

(0.01)

**

(0.02)

(0.01)
**

0.30

0.95

-0.06

**

(0.01)
**

(0.01)

0.08

**

(0.02)

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and its
interaction term for gender * number of children, age in years, years of education, plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the
dyad.

Table A10. Sensitivity Test for Relative Education and Age Across Income Level
0.05
Husband Advantage

Number of Children

0.1

-0.09

0.22

(0.05)

(0.04)

-0.05

*

(0.02)
Husband Advantage *
Number of Children

0.07
(0.03)

-0.03

0.25
**

0.05
(0.02)

**

(0.02)
*

(0.01)
*

0.02

0.5

-0.03

0.06
(0.01)

**

(0.02)
**

(0.01)
*

0.02

0.75

-0.04

0.08
(0.01)

**

(0.02)
**

(0.01)
**

0.27

0.9

-0.04

0.06
(0.01)

**

(0.02)
**

(0.01)
**

0.30

0.95

-0.06

0.08
(0.01)

**

(0.04)
**

(0.01)
**

0.38

-0.06

**

(0.01)
**

0.08

**

(0.02)

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview, number of children in the household, and it’s
interaction term for gender * number of children, age in years, years of education, plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the
dyad.
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Table A11. Variance Components from Table 9: Random Effects by Racial Group

Black

Couple N

White

774

774

774

774

2288

2288

2288

2288

Gross

Baseline

HC

Full

Gross

Baseline

HC

Full

0.157

0.158

(0.007)

(0.007)

Level 1 Variance
Within Couple Mean

0.145

**

(0.011)

0.135

**

(0.012)

Level 2 Variance Components
Husband * Number
of Children

0.004

0.008

**

0.111

**

(0.013)
Residual

0.205

0.097

**

0.1994

**

0.008

**

0.090

**

0.200

0.004

0.177

**

(0.007)

0.004

**

0.071

**

0.193

**

0.012

**

(0.002)
**

0.010

**

0.109

**

(0.008)
**

0.250

0.105

**

0.241

**

0.010

**

0.093

**

0.241

**

0.008

**

(0.001)
**

(0.008)
**

0.013
(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.008)
**

0.011
(0.002)

(0.001)

(0.012)
**

0.156
(0.007)

(0.001)

(0.013)
**

**

(0.002)

(0.002)

(0.013)
**

0.004

0.138
(0.011)

(0.002)

(0.002)
Mean Across Couples

**

(0.012)

(0.002)
Number of Children

0.135

0.081

**

(0.008)
**

0.233

**

(0.004)
(0.0040)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Gross model includes dummy variable for gender and control for year of interview. b Baseline model includes dummy variable for
gender, year of interview, number of children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children . c Model includes all measures
from the baseline model plus measures for age in years, years of education. d Model includes all measures from the human capital model plus weekly
hours, and annual weeks worked for each member of the dyad.
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Table A12. Variance Components from Table 10: Random Effects by
Racial Group
Black
White
Couple N
774
2288
Level 1 Variance
Within Dyad Mean
0.1416
0.1700
Level 2 Variance Components
Husband Advantage

0.0000

0.0000

Residential Bio Children

0.0099

0.0230

Non-Residential Bio Children

0.0000

0.0135

Step-Children

0.0356

0.0346

Husband Advantage * Residential Bio Children

0.0000

0.0266

Husband Advantage * Non-Residential Bio
Children

0.0000

0.0000

Husband Advantage * Step-Children

0.0126

0.0000

Mean Across Dyads

0.0706

0.0721

Residual

0.1929

0.2369

a

** p > .01, * p >.05. Model includes all control measures from full model.
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Table A13. Variance Components from Table 11: Random Effects for Child
Dummies by Racial Group
Black
Couple N

White

774

774

2688

2688

Baseline

Full

Baseline

Full

Level 1 Variance
Within Dyad Mean

0.1401

**

(0.0110)

0.1425

**

(0.0110)

0.1659

**

0.0071

0.1671

**

0.0071

Level 2 Variance Components
One Child

0.0055

**

(0.0090)
Two Children

0.0201

0.0477

**

0.0097

**

0.0000

**

0.0329

**

0.0999

**

0.1978
(0.0040)

0.0079

0.0000

0.0288

**

0.0718

**

0.1916
(0.0039)

**

0.0511

0.0000

**

0.0086

**

0.0914

**

0.1026

**

0.2387
(0.0023)

0.0520

**

0.0000

**

0.0129

**

(0.0072)
**

0.1013

**

(0.0181)
**

(0.0079)
**

**

(0.0000)

(0.0176)
**

0.0230

(0.0097)

(0.0073)
**

**

(0.0047)

(0.0000)

(0.0113)
**

0.0327

0.0085
(0.0043)

(0.0099)

(0.0188)

(0.0128)
Residual

**

(0.0000)

(0.0212)
Mean Across Dyads

0.0285

**

(0.0053)

(0.0127)

(0.0000)
Husband * Three or
More

**

(0.0120)

(0.0136)
Husband * Two
Children

0.0077

0.0125
(0.0047)

(0.0073)

(0.0154)
Male * One Child

**

(0.0077)

(0.0093)
Three or More

0.0026

0.0782

**

(0.0073)
**

0.2310

**

(0.0023)

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Baseline model includes dummy variable for gender, year of interview, number of
children in the household, and an interaction term for gender * number of children . b Full model includes all
measures from the baseline and human capital model plus weekly hours, and annual weeks worked for each
member of the dyad.
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Table A14. Sensitivity Tests for Spouses' Potential Experience by Racial Group
Black
Model A
Husband
Advantage

0.163784

Model B
**

(0.031377)

Number
of
Children

-0.03201

0.044678

0.163483

Model C
**

(0.031372)

**

(0.010888)

Husband
Advantage
* # of
Children

White

-0.0298

0.044639

**

(0.031372)

**

(0.01091)

**

0.163483

Model A

-0.0298

0.044639

**

(0.017754)

**

(0.01091)

**

0.297246

Model B

-0.04445

0.094072

**

(0.01777)

**

(0.006571)

**

0.297236

Model C

-0.04292

0.094161

**

(0.01777)

**

(0.006548)

**

0.297236

-0.04292

**

(0.006548)

**

0.094161

**

(0.014004)
(0.013998)
(0.013998)
(0.008582)
(0.008563)
(0.008563)
** p > .01, * p >.05. Model A includes potential work experience, but not age or education. Model B includes potential work
experience and age, but not education. Model C includes potential work experiences and education, but not age.
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Table A15. Sensitivity Test for Spouses’ Relative Education and Age by
Racial Group
Black
White
Husband Advantage
0.16 **
0.30
(0.03)
(0.02)
Number of Children
-0.03 ** -0.04
(0.01)
(0.01)
Husband Advantage * Number of Children
0.04 **
0.09
(0.01)
(0.01)
** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model.

Table A16. Sensitivity Test of Full Interactive Model from

Table 9
Husband Advantage
Husband Advantage * Black
Number of Children
Number of Children * Black
Male Advantage * Number of Children
Black * Male Advantage * Number of Children

0.281
(0.013)
-0.104
(0.033)
-0.036
(0.005)
0.002
(0.011)
0.081
(0.006)
-0.035
(0.015)

**
**
**

**
*

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model.

168

**
**
**

Table A17. Sensitivity Test of Full Model from Table
10: Race Interactions and Child Dummies
Male Advantage
Male Advantage * Black
One Child
Two Children
Three or More
One Child * Black
Two Children * Black
Three or More * Black
One Child * Male Advantage
Two Children * Male Advantage
Three or More * Male Advantage
One Child * Black * Male Advantage
Two Children * Black * Male
Advantage
Three or More * Black * Male
Advantage

0.280
(0.014)
-0.126
(0.032)
-0.016
(0.013)
-0.058
(0.013)
-0.154
(0.020)
-0.035
(0.058)
-0.033
(0.024)
-0.103
(0.096)
0.069
(0.018)
0.193
(0.017)
0.232
(0.026)
-0.009
(0.097)

**
**

**
**

**
**
**

-0.076
(0.092)
0.002
(0.143)

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model.
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Table A18. Effects of Residential and Biological Status of
Children on Couple’s Wages by Racial Group: 3-Way
Interaction Model
Male Advantage

0.295 **
(0.015)
-0.094 *
(0.037)
-0.054 **
(0.012)
-0.046
(0.034)

Male Advantage * Black
Intact Biological Child
Intact Biological Child * Black
Intact Biological Child * Male
Advantage

0.140 **
(0.016)
-0.095 *
(0.044)
-0.048
(0.170)

Nonresidential Child
Nonresidential Child * Black
Nonresidential Child * Male
Advantage

0.030
(0.060)
-0.117
(0.070)
-0.053
(0.400)
0.151
(0.098)

Step-Child
Step-Child * Black
Step-Child * Male Advantage
Intact Biological Child * Black *
Male Advantage

-0.094
(0.061)

Nonresidential Child * Black * Male
Advantage

0.002
(0.223)

Step-Child * Black * Male
Advantage

-0.041
(0.537)

** p > .01, * p >.05. a Model includes all control measures from full model.
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